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ABSTRACT: 
The aim of this project was to explore the changing relationship between race, space 
and class in Cape Town during the 1980-2011 period by using the social polarisation vs 
professionalisation debate as the starting point. The previous working on this debate, as it 
pertains to Cape Town, took place prior to the availability of the 2011 census data and this 
project continued that work. Based on the data, the growth of high-income occupations 
continued, in the preceding decade, combined with considerable growth in middle-income 
non-manual occupations and an improved educational profile of the employed population. 
However, this project goes beyond that earlier work, by examining the changing racial 
composition of the relevant occupational groups in relation to the composition of the working-
age population at each data point. The spatial or geographical analyses uses both a GIS 
platform to map the changing distribution of the races, occupational classes and the 
unemployed, as well as two segregation indices aimed at better understanding the city-wide 
impacts of those geographical changes. The GIS work uses concepts like suburb and ghetto, 
both of which are ubiquitous in urban studies literature, as a backdrop, but ultimately asks the 
following question regarding the spatial changes: What are the spatial implications of a 
deracialising and professionalising labour market? Ultimately, the findings show that despite 
the aforementioned deracialisation of high-income and middle-income occupations, Black 
Africans and Coloured remained most affected by unemployment. Furthermore, in spite of all 
these changes, Cape Town was still profoundly racially segregated in 2011. 
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1 INTRODUCTION: 
South Africa has a long history of racial discrimination that has shaped all aspects of life, 
including where people could live, what jobs they could take up and which public spaces they 
were allowed to use. While discrimination is not unique to South Africa, it is not always written 
into law. Legislation such as the group are Group Areas Act and amendments (1950, 1957, 
1966), as well as the Labour Relations Act (1956) place limitation on residential choice and job 
opportunities. While these laws are no longer in effect, some have suggested that we are not 
in a post-apartheid, but rather a neo-apartheid era (Seekings, 2011).While the focus of this 
thesis is not directly centred on the aforementioned legislation, nor the question of whether we 
are living under neo-apartheid, these issues provide some background for the focus of this 
thesis. 
It is against the backdrop of South Africa's history and the questions raised about how 
much has changed in the post-apartheid era that the focus of this thesis is to analyse the 
changing relationship between race, space and class in Cape Town, between 1980 and 2011. 
The starting point for this project is the debate between the proponents of the social 
polarisation (for example: Sassen, 2000, Sassen, 2002) theory and those that argue in favour 
of the professionalisation theory (for example: Hamnett, 1994, Hamnett, 1996). Simply, put, 
the former posits that the labour market changes in recent decades, in large part due to 
deindustrialisation, have resulted in employment growth of low-income and high-income 
occupations. On the other hand, Hamnett (1994, 1996) has argued that, with certain 
exceptions, the changes are dominated by employment growth in highly-skilled (i.e. 
professional) high-income occupations and that any polarising effect is between the employed 
and the jobless. 
Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw (2009) provide a useful background on the issue of 
professionalisation, but after building on their work, this project moves to interrogate the racial 
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and spatial characteristics of those changes. 
Following this introduction, the first chapter focuses on the literature review with a focus 
on the aforementioned labour market debate, as well as literature on the spatial changes in 
post-Fordist cities. The labour market debate engages with the work of Hamnett and Sassen, 
as well as those who have built on those foundations. An argument is developed around the 
professionalisation theory, with the aim of interrogating whether that process identified by 
Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw (2009) continued in the 2001-11 period. 
The next chapter discusses the research design, methodological choices, as well as the 
details of the data used in this project. Particular attention is paid to the type of data that were 
required for this project, as well as the way that the spatial issues were conceptualised. The 
next four chapters focus on analyses and findings. 
The first focuses on the polarisation-professionalisation debate. In addition to 
determining whether the previously identified professionalisation process has continued, the 
analyses also focus on the racial differences in the labour in order to determine who has 
benefitted from the changes. This includes a focus on the challenge of unemployment, which 
is a component of the professionalisation theory (Hamnett, 1994, Hamnett, 1996). 
The second findings chapter focuses on the distribution of the middle-class (this will be 
more clearly defined at a later stage), as well as the distribution of middle-class and mixed-
class subplaces. The chapter includes a discussion of the applicability of certain spatial 
concepts to the South African context, as well as an analysis of the changing class and racial 
composition of the formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods. This analysis is conducted using 
subplace-level data from Community Profile Databases provided by Statistics South Africa.  
The third findings chapter focuses on predominantly Black African and Coloured 
subplaces where the unemployment rates are particularly high, with the aim of asking whether 
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the concept of outcast ghettos might apply in Cape Town. It also discusses the changing 
composition of the formerly Black Africans-only and formerly Coloureds-only neighbourhoods 
around the city. As with the previous chapter, the Community Profile Databases are the source 
of the data. 
The final findings chapter makes use of two segregation indices to measure city-level 
inter-racial and inter-class segregation, in order to determine the extent of post-apartheid 
desegregation, as well as to better understand the class characteristics of inter-racial 
segregation, and the racial characteristics of inter-class segregation. 
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW: 
Over the course of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st, an ever-increasing 
proportion of the world’s population have moved to cities due to the perceived or actual 
advantages of living there. Cities have increasingly been the centres of employment 
opportunity, the hubs of economic development and activity, the sites of great wealth and 
opulence, but also home to extreme poverty (United Nations, 2014). 
In fact, some estimates have gone so far as to claim that close to, if not more than, half 
the world’s population were living in urban contexts by 2014 (United Nations, 2014). 
2.1 Post-Fordist Changes in Cities: 
In recent decades, the term ‘post-Fordist’ has often been used to define and/or describe 
the changes that have been taking place in cities around the world, with particular emphasis 
on the ways in which spatial divisions along class lines have developed and become 
exacerbated. The term ‘Fordist’ was coined to describe a form of advanced capitalism where 
mass production not only led to increased levels of consumption, but also enabled workers to 
earn better wages, which in turn fed the aforementioned consumption (Scott, 2014). In the 
USA, this expansion of the manufacturing sector not only led to increased wages and stable 
employment for many, albeit primarily for a White workforce, the aforementioned consumption 
also included many families being able to purchase homes, as well as the spread of car 
ownership (Gobillon et al., 2007, Wilson, 1996, Wilson, 2003, Wilson, 2012). 
However, toward the later decades of the 20th century, some have argued that there have 
been significant shifts in many economies and job markets around the world, particularly 
involving the emerging dominance of the service sector, and related occupations, as well as 
shifts in knowledge and skills requirements. In many contexts these occupations have 
supplanted manufacturing, as well as increased flexibility in urban labour markets, in particular 
(Amin, 1994, Elam, 1994, Sassen, 2000, Sassen, 2002).  
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While these changes took various forms, it is the impact on the labour market that is of 
particular interest here. In Sassen’s (2000) discussion of labour market in a number of selected 
developed economies, she argued that one of the most significant shifts that corresponded 
with the decline of the manufacturing employment, was the growth of employment in service 
or non-manual occupations. While the expansion of the service or non-manual employment, 
in general, was of interest, its impact on the structure or occupational distribution of the labour 
market was also of particular interest. Sassen (2000) paid particular attention to the 
significance to the growth of employment in certain highly-skilled (or professional) high-income 
earning occupations. With regard to economic sectors she also focused on producer services, 
which she defined as being those services that were aimed at other firms and not necessarily 
at the general public, These included insurance, financial, banking, advertising, wholesale 
distribution, design, innovation and legal services. Here the argument differentiated between 
the growth of those occupational categories and the growth of social services (including 
medical and educational), as well as personal services (including domestic workers, 
laundromats, hospitality and entertainment); the majority of those services were aimed at 
members of the public, rather than other firms. One of the challenges when engaging with 
Sassen’s work (2000, 2002) has been that, at times she appears to conflate economic sectors 
with occupations, which others engaging in these labour market debates have differentiated 
between the two more clearly (Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw, 2009, Crankshaw and Borel-
Saladin, 2014). And, it is this occupational focus, particularly with regards to differences in skill 
and income levels in the labour market that is of particular interest in this project. 
While the expansion of high-income occupations in the producer services drove the 
many changes in the economy, and therefore the labour market, the comfortable lifestyles of 
those in those occupations was aided by the expansion of personal services, which was the 
domain of lower-income earning and lesser-skilled occupations. Sassen’s (2000) conclusion 
then was to argue that this resulted in a polarisation of the labour market due to the 
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considerable growth in high-income and low-income occupations due to the expansion of 
service sector employment. 
During the post-war Fordist era of the 20th-century, cities in the USA were seen as being 
epitomised by high levels of manufacturing productivity, consumption and wages, with growth 
that did not necessarily benefit everyone equally. The literature on changes in the urban USA 
have posited a number of explanations for the reasons that so-called ethnic minorities did not 
benefit from the employment growth in the post-war years and decades. Some of these 
explanations have included: the spatial mismatch hypothesis that saw spatial distance from 
employment opportunities as a significant cause, the notion of the gap between the skill levels 
of ethnic minorities and what was required by certain jobs, as well as the related concepts of 
a lack of social capital or experiencing social isolation from the kinds of networks that could 
aid in finding employment (Gobillon et al., 2007, Hartshorn and Ihlanfeldt, 2000, Kasarda, 
1989, Kasinitz and Rosenberg, 1996, Wilson, 2009, Wilson, 2012). 
Nevertheless, regardless of race, space and/or skills, the availability of employment in 
post-Fordist cities does not compare favourably to the preceding period. In fact, much of the 
literature on post-Fordist cities is focused not only on the ways that cities (and their 
populations) have changed, but also the impact that this has had on the labour market, income 
inequality and geography of those cities (Crankshaw, 2012, Graham, 2007, Marcuse, 1997a, 
Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000b). 
2.1.1 A Polarising Labour Market? 
2.1.1.1 Social polarisation: 
One of the dominant voices in the debate around changing urban economies and labour 
markets, including the causes of those changes, is Saskia Sassen (1991, 1995, 2000, 2002). 
Sassen’s work on urban labour markets, which is of interest here, cannot be separated from 
the oft-discussed concept of the ‘global city’, which is also associated with her (Castree et al., 
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2013). Lemanski (2007) explains that this concept was popularised as part of academic 
discourse and including contributions from, among others, Friedmann (1986), Castells (1989) 
and Sassen (1991, 2000). 
According to Sassen, this notion of the ‘global city’ emerged as a result of flows of money, 
information and people which were concentrated in certain locations around the world. 
Whereas, urban theorists had previously argued that the development and ubiquity of global 
telecommunications would negate the prior significance of cities, she argues that this is not the 
case. Furthermore, these cities cannot be understood in isolation, but should be seen as part 
of a global network of cities that play central roles in the managing and servicing of the global 
economic system (Sassen, 2000, Sassen, 2002). They play these central roles due to their 
population size, as well as their “political, economic, social and cultural infrastructure” that 
allows them to play a dominant role in world affairs (Lemanski, 2007: 448). 
In the context of these global cities, Sassen posited that the shift away from 
manufacturing-dominated economies resulted in the loss of what she regarded as semi-skilled 
middle-income jobs – the same jobs that dominated post-war Fordist labour markets. As was 
typical of that Fordist era, due to the corresponding increases in productivity and consumption 
in the USA, portions of the population (i.e. mostly White families) became more financially 
stable and eventually move out of the inner-cities to the surrounding suburbs, where home and 
vehicle ownership was the norm (Gobillon et al., 2007, Wilson, 2003, Wilson, 2012). 
In contrast to the middle-income jobs being lost due to the declining manufacturing 
sector, the employment growth in the service sector was seen as resulting in the growth of two 
job or occupation categories. On the one hand, there was an increase in professional high-
income jobs that required tertiary qualifications and/or other specialised skills. Sassen (2000: 
63) argued that the dominant reason for this development was the considerable growth in the 
number of people employed in what she referred to as “producer services” – these include 
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Insurance, Real Estate, Engineering, Legal Services, as well as Banking, Accounting and other 
finance-related services.1 
Sassen’s (2000: 63) logic is that one of the consequences of these changes is that the 
lifestyles of those employed in these high-income earning occupations led to an increased 
demand for “personal services” (e.g. Domestic Services, Hospitality Services, Beauty Shops 
and various types of Entertainment), as well as “social services” (e.g. Medical, Health, 
Education and miscellaneous services). Her argument was that a significant proportion of the 
jobs in the latter categories, especially among personal services, consisted of low-income jobs 
with minimal skill or educational requirements. 
Sassen’s work focused primarily on those cities regarded as global cities, particularly, 
but not limited to Los Angeles and New York city. According to Sassen (1984, 1991) the growth 
in the number of low-skilled and unskilled jobs in post-industrial urban economies was 
attractive to and resulted in the arrival of large numbers of migrants to fill those roles. One of 
the criticisms of Sassen’s work has also been that the availability and willingness of a growing 
migrant population to fill those jobs not only led to those jobs becoming increasing undesirable 
for locals, but their presence contributed to keeping the wage levels for those jobs extremely 
low (Hamnett, 1994, Hamnett, 1996). While the direct evidence to support some of these 
claims has been argued to be somewhat lacking (at least, according to: Borel-Saladin and 
Crankshaw, 2009, Hamnett, 1994), other have used Sassen’s theory to explain the kinds of 
changes taking place in other contexts. 
Baum (1997), focusing on Sydney, as well as Chiu and Lui (2004), focusing on Hong 
Kong used data on the numbers of individuals employed in various occupational categories to 
                                                 
1 Considering this discussion on high-income and middle-income occupations, it is perhaps worth noting that it is 
necessary to differentiate more clearly between class and income categories in the context of this debate. For 
the sake of this project, the definition used by Crankshaw (2008), where high-income Managerial and 
Professional occupations are seen as synonymous with middle-class. 
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demonstrate that, as the social polarisation hypothesis posits, there were significant decreases 
in the number of manufacturing jobs. Their data also show increases in the numbers of highly-
skilled jobs (e.g. professionals, managers), as well as increases in the numbers of clerical and 
shop-related service jobs. While they have used this as evidence of social polarisation in their 
cities, their interpretation of their income data has been the target of critique because some 
jobs they claim to be low-income service jobs earn incomes that are similar to, if not possibly 
higher than, the manufacturing jobs in decline (Baum, 1997, Chiu and Lui, 2004, Borel-Saladin 
and Crankshaw, 2009). 
2.1.1.2 Professionalisation: 
2.1.1.2.1 Hamnett’s critique of the Social Polarisation thesis: 
Chris Hamnett (1994, 1996) provided an alternative explanation for how 
deindustrialisation has changed urban labour, in work that focused on London and other 
European cities, but also provided a critique of Sassen’s process and conclusions. There are 
four points in Hamnett’s work worth drawing on here. 
Firstly, in his work Hamnett found that there was a polarizing trend in the labour markets, 
if not in the occupational distribution of the job markets, of the cities he focused on. He argued 
that the dominant change that was taking place was one of professionalisation. More 
specifically, he uses data on the changes in the occupational distribution to show that the 
fastest growing occupational categories (in terms of the numbers of people employed) are the 
managerial, professional and technical occupations (Hamnett, 1994, 2003).  
Secondly, Hamnett’s analysis showed that it is worth differentiating between absolute 
change (i.e. the actual numbers of jobs) and relative change (i.e. the change in an occupational 
category’s proportion of all jobs available). The validity of differentiating between absolute and 
relative change can be seen in his data on changes in the numbers of jobs in different socio-
economic groups (SEGs) or occupational categories – particularly the following grouped 
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SEGs: ‘Ancillary workers and artists’, ‘Foremen and supervisors, non-manual’, as well as 
‘Junior non-manual workers between 1981 and 1991. While the absolute number of jobs in 
these grouped SEGs decreased by 3,504 jobs, in relative terms they increased from 37% to 
39% of all jobs in the city (Hamnett, 1994). 
The third point is the role played by migration. As discussed above, Sassen argued that 
the increase in the number of low-skill service jobs attracted increasing numbers of migrants 
to cities – in other words it preceded and was therefore the cause of increased migration. 
Hamnett (1994: 1427), citing the work of Soja and Scott (1986: 253) on Los Angeles, among 
others, argued that large number of lesser educated migrants (some undocumented) has 
provided an extremely large “floating pool of cheap unskilled labor [sic]”, thus making cheap 
domestic service for the wealthy that much more possible. In other words, whereas Sassen 
(1991, 2000) argued that the growth of low-wage jobs contributed to the influx of migrants to 
global cities, Hamnett (1994) argued that it was the influx of migrants that made the growth of 
low-income service-sector employment possible. 
Hamnett (1994, 1996) also argued that the extent of welfare provision (or the lack 
thereof) also plays a significant role in determining the extent of the growth of low-income jobs, 
as well as the wage levels. The logic is that in countries with strong welfare systems, such as 
some of those in parts of Western Europe, enable those who are not employed to opt out of 
jobs where the wages are deemed to be unacceptably low (Hamnett, 1994, Hamnett, 1996). 
Hamnett (1996) therefore concludes that where welfare systems are strong, it gives lesser-
skilled members of the working-age population to opt out of the labour market, which means 
that those low-income jobs discussed by Sassen (2000, 2002) would either not exist (i.e. those 
tasks would be subsumed by people in other positions) or the employers would be forced to 
increase the pay on offer for those positions. 
Hamnett (1996) also argues that, whereas the social polarisation thesis argues for a 
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polarisation within the labour market between high-income and low-income earners, he argues 
that the major division (or polarisation, if one prefers) is between the fast-growing high-income 
earning occupations, on the one hand, and the unemployed. This increase in unemployment 
is the consequence of insufficient or limited growth in low-income occupations and/or the ability 
of people in a position to consider taking those jobs to opt out of the labour market because 
the provisions of the welfare system. Thus, unemployment growth forms an integral part of his 
professionalisation thesis and will also be addressed further in this study. 
However, a point that is worth making here is that there is a potential contradiction in 
Hamnett’s discussion of the role of migrants in urban labour markets. On the one hand, he 
suggests that in certain contexts it is the growth of lesser skilled immigrant populations that 
have contributed to the expansion of low-income employment, yet he also suggests that in 
contexts where Sassen’s concept of social polarisation is not evident and there has been 
increased unemployment, it is the immigrant populations that experienced high levels of 
unemployment (Hamnett, 1994, Hamnett, 1996). So, the question is, whether, in his thesis, 
large immigrant populations contribute to an increase in low-income employment growth or 
whether they bear the brunt of increased unemployment. After all, he does distinguish between 
unemployment and those who are not economically active, and those who are relying on a 
welfare system would not fall into the former (Hamnett, 1994, Hamnett, 1996). 
The inclusion of unemployment means that Hamnett’s (1994, 1996) argument allows for 
a polarising effect even in a context where professionalisation is the dominant process. What 
this means is that where Sassen (2000, 2002) argued that the polarisation effect is happening 
in occupational distribution of the job market, the professionalisation theory suggests that the 
polarisation effect is happening within the labour market, which is another term for the working-
age population (Statistics South Africa, 2010). What this means is that the polarising effect is 
between those who are employed, particularly those in middle-income and high-income 
occupations, and those who are either unemployed or not economically active (Borel-Saladin 
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and Crankshaw, 2009, Hamnett, 1994, Hamnett, 1996). 
It is also worth emphasising that while Sassen (2002, 2000, 1991) only sporadically 
mentions unemployment in her discussion on changes in the labour markets of so-called global 
cities, it is not as central to her discussion as it is in Hamnett’s work on professionalisation 
(Hamnett, 1996, Hamnett, 1994). Then again, when one considers that in the 60 years leading 
up to 2011 the monthly employment rate for the USA only crossed the 10% marked 11 times. 
On the other hand, there were 226 months when the unemployment rate was below 5% 
(Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2018). 
An additional point worth mentioning is that while the evidence Sassen (2000) provides 
is evidence of what she refers to as increased income inequality (at individual and/or household 
levels) and this is not direct evidence of the particular income and occupational changes she 
claims in her social polarisation thesis. 
2.1.1.2.2 Further development of the Professionalisation argument: 
In recent years, Crankshaw and Borel-Saladin have also focused on the debate between 
Sassen’s theory of social polarisation and the professionalisation theory developed by 
Hamnett. While their work has primarily focused on South African cities like Cape Town (Borel-
Saladin and Crankshaw, 2009, Crankshaw, 2012) and Johannesburg (Crankshaw and Borel-
Saladin, 2014), as well as Lombard and Crankshaw (2017) who focused on the eThekwini2 
municipality, it has also included critiques of the analysis and interpretation of data by Baum 
(1997) and Chiu and Lui (2004). 
Baum (1997) focused his analysis on Sydney, Australia, whereas Chiu and Lui (2004) 
focused theirs on Hong Kong. Both of these projects drew conclusions in support of Sassen’s 
polarisation theory, but according to Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw (2009) the data from those 
                                                 
2 Also known as the city of Durban. 
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cities contradict Sassen’s theory in a number of ways. 
Firstly, in both Hong Kong (Chiu and Lui, 2004) and Sydney (Baum, 1997) there were 
absolute and relative increases in Managerial, Professional and Associate Professional 
Occupations. Additionally, in Hong Kong (Chiu and Lui, 2004), there were similar increases 
among ‘Service workers and shop sales workers’ and ‘Clerks’3, where in Sydney (Baum, 1997), 
those increases were only evident among ‘Sales and personal service workers’4. At first glance 
this appears to support Sassen’s idea of social polarisation because of the increase in non-
manufacturing occupations, but that conclusion is brought into question when including the 
income data in the analysis (Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw, 2009).  
The second way in which these findings contradict Sassen’s (2000, 2002) theory of 
polarisation, is that includes the argument that increases in service sector employment leads 
to increases in both high-income employment (i.e. managerial and  professional occupations) 
and low-income employment (i.e. the aforementioned clerical, service and sales occupations). 
However, when looking at the income data in the studies on Sydney and Hong Kong, there is 
little difference between the income ranges (Baum, 1997) or median incomes (Chiu and Lui, 
2004) of the service, sales and clerical occupations, on the one hand, and manufacturing 
sector occupations. In fact, the differences are arguably not sufficient to regard the latter as 
middle-income occupations and the former as low-income (Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw, 
2009). 
This critical focus on income categories was also applied by Borel-Saladin and 
Crankshaw (2009) to data on Cape Town’s labour market and in so doing added another 
dimension to the professionalisation argument.  In a table with the title “Percentage monthly 
income distributions of major occupational groups, Cape Town, 2001”, the authors (Borel-
                                                 
3 The ISCO 2008 term for this major group is ‘Clerical Support Workers’. 
4 The aforementioned non-clerical service occupations correspond with the ISCO 2008 classification referred to 
as ‘Services and Sales Workers’. 
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Saladin and Crankshaw, 2009: 657) show that the average incomes, as well as modal income 
categories for those occupations that proponents of the polarisation thesis (Sassen, 2000, 
Sassen, 2002, Baum, 1997, Chiu and Lui, 2004) would regarding as low-income low-skill 
service-sector occupations (i.e. “Clerks”, as well as “Service workers, shop and market sales 
workers”) were on par, if not higher than those of the supposedly semi-skilled middle-income 
manufacturing occupations (i.e. “Craft and related trades workers”, as well as “Plant and 
machinery operators and assemblers”). 
More specifically, the modal income category for “Service workers, shop and market 
sales workers”, the “Craft and related trades workers” and the “Plant and machinery operators 
and assemblers” was “R801-R1,600” per month. The modal income category for “Clerks” was 
“R1,601-3,200”. Focusing on the average incomes reveals an even more striking image. In 
2001, the average income in the aforementioned “Clerks” was R4,255 per month, whereas 
“Service workers, shop and market sales workers” earned an average of R4,403 per month. 
In contrast to those figures, “Craft and related trades workers” earned, on average, R3,061 per 
months, whereas “Plant and machinery operators and assemblers” earned R2,413 per month. 
When compared to the average incomes of those in elementary occupations (i.e. R1,488 
per month) and the three major professional and managerial occupational groups (i.e. average 
monthly incomes of R7,167; R14,150 and R13,337), Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw (2009) 
argued that those clerical and service/sales occupations were more accurately regarded as 
middle-income occupations. In so doing they found that despite the loss of manufacturing-
sector jobs, the growth of those non-professional and non-manual occupations resulted in a 
net growth of middle-income jobs between 1980 and 2001, which therefore could not be 
regarded as polarisation.  
During the period 1980-2001 the number of people employed in Managerial, 
Professional, Technical and Associate Professional (hereafter ‘Managerial and Professional’) 
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occupations collectively increased by 120,894, whereas the number employed in Clerical, 
Sales and Service (hereafter ‘Clerical, Sales and Service’) occupations increased by 91,341 
and the unemployed population, as already mentioned, grew by 355,231. Considering this 
growth of Clerical, Sales and Service occupations, combined with the growth of Elementary 
occupations by just 72,678, it would make sense to consider Sassen’s (2000, 2002) 
polarisation. However, we should not forget that Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw (2009) 
demonstrated that whereas polarisation theory proponents tend to categorise service jobs 
outside the Managerial and Professional occupations as low income, those occupations in 
Cape Town would more accurately be described as middle-income occupations. 
Therefore, when combining the increase in Clerical, Sales and Service occupations with 
the ‘Craft and related Trades workers’, as well as ‘Plant and Machine operators and 
assemblers’ we see that middle-income occupations increased by 82,325 during the 1980-
2001 period. Also demonstrated that although the Clerical, Sales and Service occupations had 
increased significantly, this could not be income polarisation because the earnings of those in 
Clerical, Sales and Service occupations were very similar to those in middle-income Craft, 
Trade, Plant and Machine occupations (Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw, 2009). 
Based on their findings, it is clear that Cape Town underwent changes that, as Borel-
Saladin and Crankshaw (2009) argued, has more in common with the professionalisation 
theory. After all, while there was employment growth at the poles of the occupational 
distribution, the greatest growth could be found in high-income occupations and 
unemployment, as well as nett growth in middle-income occupations. However, the question 
that needs to be addressed is whether this pattern continued after 2001. 
However, none of these projects paid particular attention to the issue of unemployment. 
Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw (2009) stated that they were aware of the issue of 
unemployment but were not focusing on it at that time. Nevertheless, in a paper focused on 
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Cape Town, but prior to the Census 2011 data becoming available, Crankshaw (2012) returned 
to the question of professionalisation in the Cape Town labour market and included a brief 
discussion of unemployment in the city. He used data from the Community Survey that was 
conducted in 2007 to determine, among other things, whether the professionalising trend that 
was evident between 1980 and 2001 (Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw, 2009) had continued. 
According to his analysis, Crankshaw (2012) showed that the growth among Managerial and 
Professional occupations accelerated after 2001, whereas the Clerical, Sales and Service 
occupations saw very little change. 
Regarding unemployment, Crankshaw (2012) briefly mentions the unemployment rates 
for Cape Town according to census data between 1980 and 2001, as well as the Community 
Survey findings from 2007. In line with the professionalisation thesis, unemployment increased 
between 1980 and 2001, because decreasing slightly according to the aforementioned 2007 
data. Furthermore, and in line with the spatial characteristics of inequality and unemployment 
in Cape Town that will be discussed at a later stage in this project, he shows that the 
neighbourhoods with the highest unemployment rates in 2001 were in formerly Blacks-only5 
parts of the city. 
2.1.2 Divided or Quartered Post-Fordist City: 
2.1.2.1 General: 
As stated from the outset, this study is not only focused on the changing relationship 
between race and (occupational) class/employment, but also the spatial characteristics of 
those changes in Cape Town. Fortunately, there is a considerable body of literature among 
geographers and sociologists aimed at understanding the changing geography of post-Fordist 
cities. 
                                                 
5 When the term Black or Blacks is used, it is used as an inclusive term comprising Black African, Coloureds and 
Indians/Asians. 
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This project draws on the work of Peter Marcuse and Ronald van Kempen (Marcuse, 
1997b, Marcuse, 1997a, Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000b, Marcuse and Van Kempen, 
2000a), which focused on their concept of the ‘quartered city’. This idea is based on ‘ideal 
types’ of different sections or quarters of post-Fordist cities (Marcuse and Van Kempen, 1997, 
2000b). 
The concept of an ‘ideal type’, which can also be understood as a ‘mental image’, is most 
closely associated with the work of Max Weber, but can also be found in the field of economics. 
It is primarily a heuristic device aimed at understanding (social) reality and  while it is intended 
to be a true reflection of reality, it is necessary to distinguish between the image and the thing 
itself (Scott, 2014). 
The sections that follow each focus on the various quarters of the city, how they differ 
and how these ideal types can be used to understand the kinds of changes taking place in 
different cities. In particular, the discussion will draw on the analyses of Johannesburg 
(Crankshaw, 2008), Calcutta (Chakravorty, 2000), Rio de Janeiro (Ribeiro and Telles, 2000) 
and Brussels (Kesteloot, 2000). 
While each of these researchers have drawn on the ideal types put forward by Marcuse 
and van Kempen, no existing ghetto or enclave should be expected to fit perfectly with the 
definitions in question, because none are ‘pure’, nor are any of them necessarily new, for 
centuries different societies/communities have had groups that were marginalised for some 
reasons of another (Marcuse, 1997a). 
Furthermore, while in some contexts and certain parts of the city, race was clearly a 
factor in shaping the different quarters (e.g. ghettos and ethnic minorities in the USA), attention 
has to be paid to the possibility of other factors, especially class, that has played a role in 
differentiating between different quarters (Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000b). Similarly, based 
on the significant role that race played in shaping South Africa's social and political history, 
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avoiding any reductionist thinking that attempts to use race as an explanation for anything and 
everything was a priority in this project. After all, even if there is evidence of inequality and/or 
segregation between different races, the processes and/or reasons for it in a period cannot be 
identical in post-apartheid South Africa as they were when the provisions of the Group Areas 
Act and amendments (1950, 1957, 1966) and Labour Relations Act (1956) were still in effect. 
While the city quarters discussed here are ‘ideal types’, it is still necessary to be cautious 
when applying a one-theory-fits-all way of thinking about urban divisions. After all, the 
conceptualisations discussed here have been developed while focusing on cities in the USA 
(and to a lesser extent, cities in western Europe) but the cities need to be understood as 
products of their own specific social and political histories. Furthermore, countries outside the 
USA or Western Europe often encompass developmental trajectories and levels, as well as 
political-economic histories and structure that differ significantly from those in The West 
(Chakravorty, 2000, Kesteloot, 2000). Examples of this could include: the impact of colonial 
and more recent political history/change (Chakravorty, 2000); the role and impact of migrants 
from neighbouring countries (Ribeiro and Telles, 2000); as well as, a city’s ability (or lack 
thereof) to attract certain industries or economic sectors (Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000a, 
Ribeiro and Telles, 2000). 
Additionally, in instances where cities in lesser developed contexts subordinate their 
local markets and development to the trends and expectations of global markets, they 
invariably find themselves in subordinate positions within those global markets and networks 
(Lemanski, 2007, Ribeiro and Telles, 2000). 
In addition to the aforementioned sources, numerous authors have looked at urban 
change with a more explicit emphasis on the global south, with particular attention paid to the 
use of a post-colonial critique. Some of these include Oldfield (2002), Oldfield (2004), Parnell 
and Robinson (2012), Parnell (2014), Roy (2014), but many of these focus more on theorising, 
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with less emphasis on quantitative and/or empirical work that would speak to the arguments in 
this project. In fact, even those who engaged with the ideal types put forward by Marcuse and 
Van Kempen (Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000b, Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000a) in 
relation to contexts outside Western Europe and North America presented some data to 
support their arguments (Chakravorty, 2000, Ribeiro and Telles, 2000). 
2.1.2.2 Citadels: 
According to Marcuse and van Kempen’s taxonomy of city quarters, a citadel can be 
understood as a “spatially concentrated area in which members of a particular population 
group, defined by its position of superiority, in power, wealth, or status, in relation to its 
neighbors, congregate as a means of protecting or enhancing that position” (Marcuse, 1997a: 
229). Due to the protective or preservationist intention behind the formation of these areas, 
they are often fortified and/or insulated against intrusions by the poor or any other considered 
outsiders (Marcuse, 1997a, Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000b). 
In his discussion of the locations where cities’ elites tend to live, Crankshaw (2008) 
compares Johannesburg, South Africa’s largest and wealthiest city, with New York, USA. He 
cities Marcuse and Van Kempen (2000a) when he explains that whereas New York’s elite live 
in protected, downtown, high-rise ‘citadels’, Johannesburg’s elite prefer living on the edge of 
Sandton – a wealthy part of the city’s north, which has become the city’s de facto economic 
centre. While in some contexts, like Johannesburg, the favoured dwelling type might be 
standalone homes of a suburban type (Crankshaw, 2008), in other contexts they are likely to 
be found in gentrified parts of the city that combine areas of upper-income residence, as well 
as spaces set aside for office and/or commercial use (Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000b).  
On the other hand, Ribeiro and Telles (2000) argue that the citadels in Rio de Janeiro 
are more like the ideal type described by Marcuse and Van Kempen (2000b, 2000a). In the 
city’s South Zone, which is close to the central city, the city’s elite has transformed it into “into 
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an exclusive citadel, fortified by Rio’s steep hills and an ominous public and private police 
presence” (Ribeiro and Telles, 2000: 86). 
In terms of who is understood to be resident in these citadels, we would expect to find 
those at the pinnacle of a city’s social and/or economic life. These might include those with 
inherited wealth, members of company or organisation boards, as well as some of the highest 
income earners in professional and/or managerial occupations (Marcuse, 1997a, Marcuse and 
Van Kempen, 2000b). 
2.1.2.3 Suburbs and Edge Cities: 
In the second half of the 20th-century, urban USA  was significantly shaped by the 
suburbanisation of people and jobs (Kasarda, 1989, Wilson, 2012). Before discussing the 
significance of this suburbanisation in the USA’s cities, it is essential to explain the difference 
between the definition of the term ‘suburb’ in those contexts, compared to the South African 
context. In South Africa, the term specifically refers to parts of the city that primarily fulfil a 
residential function within a city, whereas in the USA it is also a separate and therefore 
independent municipality outside the central city (Crankshaw, 2008). 
While it is a fact that only Whites in the urban USA were able to move to the suburbs in 
the years following World War 2, there are disagreements on the mechanisms by which this 
happened. The various theories include that it was a consequence of racial income differences, 
racial prejudice, housing market discrimination, as well as different tastes in housing or access 
to information (Dawkins, 2004). 
In his work focused on the urban USA, Wilson (1996, 2009) discusses the way in which 
Blacks were discriminated against in the housing market, including in terms of access to 
financing. During and following the Great Depression there were large numbers of 
foreclosures. Consequently, in the post-war years the federal government proceeded to 
underwrite mortgages with the aim of assisting citizens to become homeowners. However, this 
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process was selectively applied by the Federal Housing Authority (FHA) in such a way that 
excluded areas that were considered financially risky – areas that happened to be populated 
predominantly by Blacks and other ethnic minorities. This process, also known as ‘redlining’, 
was common practice and displayed a clear racial bias and was only discontinued in the 1960s 
(Gobillon et al., 2007, Wilson, 2009, Wilson, 2011). In addition to this suburbanisation of 
households, there was also a process of employment suburbanisation that coincided with the 
deindustrialisation discussed earlier. Furthermore, even in cities where significant numbers of 
blue-collar, manufacturing jobs remained, many of those jobs also relocated to the suburbs 
(Kasarda, 1989). 
In addition to these discriminatory practices, the independence of those suburbs meant 
that despite the rapidly growing Black urban population and the need for additional housing, 
those suburban municipalities could block any attempts at establishing public housing 
developments within their borders. Consequently, the options available to urban Blacks for 
much of the 20th-century were extremely limited. Nevertheless, towards the end of the century, 
some upwardly-mobile Blacks who had the means were able to move out of the inner-city 
ghettos, either to the predominantly White suburbs or to non-poor parts of the metropolitan 
areas that were mostly resident to Blacks and other ethnic minorities (Wilson, 2012). 
Marcuse and Van Kempen (2000b) described the suburbs as those primarily residential 
sections of a metropolis city where single families own homes and where there are safe, quiet 
and green spaces suitable for children. Additionally, those who live there can do so because 
of the incomes they earn afford them the opportunity to do so. In the USA context, the suburbs 
are usually found outside the central city, but tend to form part of an expanding metropolis. 
They also tend to be, or least are regarded as, predominantly-White middle-class spaces 
(Wilson, 2012). 
The move to the suburbs, in the USA, coincided with and was made possible by the 
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Fordist expansion of the middle-classes, particularly in the years following World War 2. One 
of the consequences of the growth of the class was that there was a considerable increase in 
car ownership, thereby facilitating the move to the suburbs, even if or when many jobs 
remained in or around the central city (Kasarda, 1989, Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000b). 
At this point it is worth pointing out that an aspect of the suburb ideal type is that, as with 
various other quarters of the city, some have become totalised. This means that, for many, 
their everyday lives are or can be conducted within the quarter where they are resident without 
the need or opportunity to engage with other parts of the metropolis. Marcuse and Van Kempen 
(2000b) explain that in the 1990s, Garreau (1991) coined the term ‘edge city’ to describe the 
idea of the ‘totalised suburb’ that were taking shape around major cities in the USA. The 
concept of an edge city refers to a situation where the central city is no longer the dominant 
location for jobs, restaurants, offices and shops but where the surrounding suburbs have 
become direct competition for the inner city in these areas in addition to the original and 
primarily residential function (Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000b, Marcuse and Van Kempen, 
2000a). 
One of the authors that engaged with the ideal types discussed here, Chakravorty (2000: 
56), discussed spatial change in Calcutta included the following claim: 
“I, and I believe others in this volume, use a somewhat different 
analytical framework from the one suggested by the editors. This should 
not be surprising since the default model and hypothesis appear to be 
have been proposed, to a large extent, with the “western” city and 
economy in mind, especially its American variant.” 
Some developments that have taken place in Calcutta since the latter half of the 20th-
century have been developed in such a way that they have elements in common with both 
edge cities and the previously discussed citadels. 
Chakravorty (2000) explained that some of the developments in question, like New 
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Calcutta and Salt Lake were specifically developed with the city’s upper-income earners in 
mind. It was intended that 78% of the New Calcutta residents be middle- to high-income 
earners in an area that included advanced offices and open spaces. On the other hand, Salt 
Lake was an area that pre-dated New Calcutta and had a smaller population than the latter. 
As was intended for New Calcutta, Salt Lake was successful in excluding visible signs of 
poverty of slums from the area, but a consequence of this is that the residents struggle to find 
reliable domestic workers to aid them in maintaining their lifestyles.  
According to Chakravorty (2000: 71), New Calcutta could be expected to be a success 
for a number of reasons, including the fact that “it is close enough to Calcutta city for a relatively 
easy commute (for employment or services), and as a planned development it will bypass the 
city’s ills – poor infrastructure, slums, and poverty”. While the author explicitly stated that the 
ideal types of post-Fordist city quarters might not apply to contexts outside “western” cities, it 
is worth noting that these developments have something in common both suburbs due to the 
inclusion of open spaces and green areas. They also have similarities with 
exclusionary/fortified enclaves or citadels, which tend to be home to most middle- and high-
income earners, explicitly exclude poverty and the include of technologically advanced office 
spaces (Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000b, Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000a). 
2.1.2.4 Ghettos (or Enclaves): 
2.1.2.4.1 Classic vs. Outcast ghettos in the USA: 
The growth of suburbs on the outskirts of some of the USA’s cities, as well as the 
movement of people and jobs out of those central cities in the later 20th-century, played a 
significant role in shaping the ghettos in the central cities (Kasarda, 1989, Wilson, 2012). 
However, these ghettos in the urban USA have undergone some changes in recent decades 
that have worsened the plight of those living there. 
According to Marcuse and van Kempen (Marcuse, 1997a, Marcuse and Van Kempen, 
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2000b, Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000a, Marcuse, 2001), a ‘ghetto’ can be understood as 
an involuntary spatial concentration of a group of people (e.g. defined by ethnicity, race or 
religion) regarded as subordinate, or supposedly inferior, group created and/or enforced by 
dominant groups in a society. While the concept of a ghetto is not something new, more recent 
conceptualisations thereof have been significantly shaped, in the 20th century at least, by the 
establishment and development of Black ghettos in the urban USA. However, the literature on 
the USA’s ghettos has come to differentiate between so-called ‘classic ghettos’ and, a new 
formation, the ‘excluded ghetto’ or ‘outcast ghetto’ (Marcuse, 1997a, Marcuse and Van 
Kempen, 2000b, Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000a). Before exploring how those ghettos have 
changed, it is necessary to define what is meant by the term. 
According to Wilson (2012), the presence of African Americans in the USA’s cities, 
especially those in the Northeast and Midwest, were shaped by what he refers to as the First 
and Second Great Migrations from the rural South. The first began at the end of the 19th-
century and lasted until the Great Depression, while the second took place between 1940 and 
1970. The increasingly industrialised and capitalist urban labour markets attracted many to 
these cities, but also led to the development of slums in both historically poor neighbourhoods, 
as well as higher income neighbourhoods. Consequently, all these areas became increasingly 
undesirable for those households who could afford better, but this was usually limited to White 
households due to the limited means of other households, as well as the aforementioned 
discriminatory housing and banking practices (Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000b, Wilson, 
2012). 
In the USA, ghettos have primarily been populated by Blacks and/or other ethnic 
minorities have, for the most part, been located in the inner cities. In order to understand the 
extent of the disadvantages experienced by those living in the ghettos, one needs to include a 
discussion on the suburbanisation of households and jobs during the 20th-century, as well as 
the development of ‘edge cities’ (Kasarda, 1989, Wilson, 2012). 
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For now, attention should be paid to the differences between the classic ghettos and, the 
more recent, excluded/outcast ghettos. This new ‘outcast ghetto’ formation is home to those 
who are, in many ways, excluded from participation in the mainstream political, economic and 
social life of the cities in which they live (Marcuse, 1997a, Wilson, 2012). In fact, this new 
outcast ghetto has also been seen as a part of the city that has essentially been abandoned 
by those who are in control of the city, resulting in high levels of unemployment, as well as 
weakened internal cohesion, deterioration of cultural life and lives dominated by despair 
(Marcuse, 1997a, Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000b).  
According to Marcuse and Van Kempen (2000b), this idea of ‘abandonment’ can be seen 
in the changing relationships that the ghettos have with cities’ mainstream economies and 
labour markets. Whereas the USA’s ghettos have always been racially defined, they were 
previously tied into the cities labour market because their residents, of various classes were 
employed, and those who were not employed knew that was a temporary condition because 
they could expect circumstances to change from time to time. 
However, macroeconomic changes, such as ever-increasing deindustrialisation, and its 
local effects, as well as the increased suburbanisation of employment opportunities contributed 
to the increasing unemployment, which impacted low-skilled workers most severely. These 
effects were compounded by the extent of African American migration and their concentration 
in the inner-city ghettos throughout the 20th-century (Kasarda, 1989, Marcuse and Van 
Kempen, 2000b, Wilson, 2012). 
One of the unfortunate ironies of the evolution of the outcast or excluded ghetto is that 
as they became more excluded from mainstream social and economic structures outside the , 
which Wilson (2012) refers to as ‘social isolation’, it also led to the erosion of social bonds 
within the ghettos (Marcuse, 1997a). 
Nevertheless, Marcuse and Van Kempen (2000a: 256) conclude that the excluded ghetto 
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as they have conceptualised it was primarily a phenomenon of urban USA because its 
development was dependent on “a specific combination of ‘racial’, political and economic 
circumstances to produce”. More specifically, this type of ghetto is the product of a long history 
of discrimination against a particular group or groups, changing forms of urban poverty and 
limited or no state action to bring about positive change for the most disadvantaged. 
2.1.2.4.2 Impoverished neighbourhoods in other contexts: 
While the USA is certainly not the only context where ghettos or comparable 
environments are to be found, the ways they are conceptualised based on the USA’s cities 
tend to dominate some discussions of urban change and inequality. After all, the socio-political 
histories of many so-called Third World countries, as well as their relationships with global 
economic changes, differ from those in the USA and Western Europe. Consequently, the 
effects, both economic and spatial, could differ considerably from those in cities in The West 
(Chakravorty, 2000, Wacquant, 2008). 
One idea that has significantly shaped this project, especially in terms of the spatial 
focus, is the idea that urban space can both reflect and reinforce inequalities (Moyo and 
Zuidgeest, 2018, Schensul and Heller, 2011). Therefore, when one discusses ghettos or 
comparable impoverished contexts in other parts of the world it is worth noting that, for many 
living in those contexts, “spatial segregation intensifies hardship” (Wacquant, 2008: 28).  
In Rio de Janeiro, the city’s poor are to be found in favelas close to the city centre, as 
well as increasingly on the outskirts of the city. Ribeiro and Telles (2000: 86) argue that “favelas 
tend to be favored by persons without regular income precisely because of their proximity to 
the income sources in the central city”. This contrasts with the experiences of many in the 
USA’s ghettos who, since the late 20th-century have found that living in the central city has left 
them unable to benefit from the nearby income sources because they lacked the skills many 
of the fastest growing occupations required (Kasarda, 1989). On the other hand, some might 
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have the necessary skills, but might still be excluded from the networks that will allow them to 
access those employment opportunities (Kasinitz and Rosenberg, 1996).  
Additionally, it is worth noting that since Brazil’s population includes a considerable 
proportion of people of African descent and mixed race, both class and race are salient in 
understanding segregation and the related tensions that might go with it.  
“The salience of both class and race in residential segregation and 
social tensions is illustrated by a 1992 incident where busloads of young 
people from Rio de Janeiro’s poor communities arrived in unprecedented 
numbers in Rio’s prestigious South Zone beaches. Their presence startled 
local residents… 
These [and other] events brought to light the tenuous relation between 
the predominantly black poor and the white middle class in Rio, a problem 
which had been conveniently neglected in the past because of the 
distance that had generally separated the two groups.” (Ribeiro and 
Telles, 2000: 89) 
Whereas in the USA, and even Rio de Janeiro, there were clear spatial divisions between 
the poorest slums and middle- or high-income earners, this kind of separation is not necessarily 
evident in all cities. For example, in Calcutta, while there are slums, where some of the city’s 
poorest reside, since the British colonial period, the city’s slums have been dispersed across 
each of the quarters, including in the English town. The reason for this is that, in a city where 
infrastructure has often been a problem, it was helpful to ensure that the slums (that could be 
a source of cheap but reliable domestic workers) were in close proximity to those who might 
employ them, or at least just a short commute away (Chakravorty, 2000). 
While the residents of newer developments around Calcutta, such as New Calcutta and 
Salt Lake, might have been pleased that any visible signs of poverty were removed from their 
proximity, the separation from the slums made it difficult for many of those residents to find 
affordable and reliable domestic servants (Chakravorty, 2000).  
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2.1.2.5 Labour market outcomes in Impoverished contexts: 
While Marcuse and Van Kempen (2000a) have argued that what they refer to as the 
excluded ghetto might be a phenomenon that is unique to the USA, it is worth asking whether 
there is in fact a comparable context in urban South Africa or, more particularly, in Cape Town. 
After all, there are factors here that are comparable to the factors that Marcuse and Van 
Kempen (2000a) argue produce the excluded ghetto.  
In order to find points of contrast or comparison, it is necessary to acknowledge that 
South Africa has a long history of discrimination against certain groups. Often the focus might 
fall on the legislated forms of discrimination during the apartheid-era, including the Group 
Areas Act and amendments (1950, 1957, 1966), which shaped where people of different races 
and ethnicities were allowed to live, as well as the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act 
(1953) that placed restrictions on the use of public spaces, services and/or infrastructure. While 
the legislated job market discrimination that was a product of the provisions of the 
aforementioned Labour Relations Act (1956) and others were repealed in the early 1990s, 
poverty and inequality have continued to be major problem in post-apartheid South Africa, 
including Cape Town context (Bhorat and Van der Westhuizen, 2010, Seekings and Nattrass, 
2005)… 
Various schools of thought have focused on the labour market outcomes of cities’ most 
marginalized residents living in ghetto contexts. While various causal mechanisms have been 
posited, there is a tacit agreement in a variety of urban literatures that ghetto environments are 
not in the best (socio-economic and other) interests of its residents. 
One of the catalysts for this particular study, was a previous research project focused on 
understanding the factors that shaped the educational and occupational or class aspirations 
of first-generation university students at the University of Cape Town (UCT), as well as their 
decision-making processes. It was evident from the experiences of some in that study that 
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there was nobody in their family or even their neighbourhood who could help them understand 
the path they would need to follow to obtain the skills and/or education that could lead to the 
kinds of highly-skilled high-income employment their parents were not able to acquire 
(Solomon, 2013). 
It was also clear that, for a number of them, an awareness of the potential negative 
impact of their surroundings on their educational aspirations and achievements shaped their 
decision-making, as well as the steps they took to realise those aspirations. Some families 
tried to move to better neighbourhoods, if they had the means, or at the very least they tried 
getting their children into better (possibly formerly Whites-only schools) outside the 
neighbourhood where they lived. One of the mothers also arranged private transport between 
home and school so her daughter could participate in extra-mural activities and avoid having 
to spend too much time moving through and/or interacting with others in their neighbourhood. 
Some of the young people in the study also encountered peers in their neighbourhood with a 
significant lack of educational aspirations: one was told that if she wasn’t studying she could’ve 
been working and already bought a car (Solomon, 2013) 
These were not unique findings, but was in accordance with other research done 
previously in different contexts, including parts of the USA (MacLeod, 1987, MacLeod, 1995, 
Wilson, 2012) and the UK (Rizvi, 2004, Willis, 1977, Willis, 2004). 
The work conducted by Willis (1977) focused on a town he referred to pseudonymously 
as Hammertown. He found that some of the youth he encountered, referred to as the ‘lads’ 
embraced what Willis referred to as a  a counter school culture among working class residents 
and families, because they have accepted that their future consists of generalised labour. In 
their opinion, all manual or semi-skilled occupations are regarded as the same and work is 
regarded as something that is both inevitable and unpleasant. Also, any notion of job or 
occupational choice was merely a middle-class construct that was not really an option for 
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working-class ‘lads’ like them (Willis, 1977, Willis, 2004). 
Wilson (1989, 2009, 2012), whose work influenced some the work by Marcuse and van 
Kempen (Marcuse, 1997a, Marcuse, 1997b, Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000b), argued that 
one of the main reasons that those living in ghettos experience poor labour market outcomes 
was because of the lack of connections to informal job networks that could be the means to 
finding viable employment opportunities. He referred to this phenomenon as ‘social isolation’ 
and posited ways that it could shape labour market outcomes of ghetto residents: 
“… children will seldom interact on a sustained basis with people who 
are employed or with families who have a steady breadwinner.” (Wilson, 
2012: loc 1053) 
“The development of cognitive, linguistic and other educational and job-
related skills necessary for the world of work in the mainstream economy 
is thereby adversely affected.” (Wilson, 2012: loc 1055) 
Wilson (2012: loc 1083) also argued that comparisons between poor Blacks and Whites 
are problematic because the latter usually “reside in areas, which are ecologically and 
economically very different from poor Blacks”. While the evidence in this study will show limited 
unemployment among the city’s White population, the data will show that the socio-economic 
characteristics of the neighbourhoods that are home to low-income earning Whites differ 
considerably from those where Black Africans and Coloureds in similar occupations reside. It 
is also worth noting that the way social isolation has been conceptualised by Wilson (2012)  
and others (Kasinitz and Rosenberg, 1996), it would suggest that in certain contexts, even 
where suitable jobs become available in close proximity to the that impoverished 
neighbourhoods, being excluded from job networks can prevent them from obtaining those 
jobs too. What this suggests is that in ghettos or similarly impoverished neighbourhoods low-
skilled jobseekers are less likely to find employment due to their limited or lack of social 
connections to people who could connect them to potential employment networks (Kasinitz 
and Rosenberg, 1996, Wilson, 1996, Wilson, 2012).  
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Additionally, for those who might be inclined to pursue something occupations that 
require additional education or skills, the social isolation and poverty in which they find 
themselves, are likely to prevent them from finding the means and/or necessary information to 
enable them to pursue those aspirations (Kaufman, 2003, Solomon, 2013).  
While the discussion of the different quarters could lead one to focus on each part of the 
city in isolation, they cannot be detached from the broader context in which these divisions 
have taken place, as well as the potential consequences. For example, Wacquant (2008) 
explains that any discussion of the marginalisation of those living in ghettos or similar contexts 
also needs to include a discussion of mass unemployment, the extent to which certain 
neighbourhoods (are permitted to) decay, as well as the stigma attached to those who find 
themselves relegated to live in those parts of the city.  
2.1.3 The Changing Geography of Urban Economies: 
While the spatial or geographical literature discussed thus far has focused on residential 
locales in post-Fordist cities, it is important to note that it is important to take into account the 
ways and extent to which the spatial distribution of employment opportunities have changed 
and the impact that this has on those living in different quarters of the city. After all, since the 
seminal work by Kain (1968), there has been considerable work on the so-called spatial 
mismatch hypothesis that focused on the challenges faced by low-skilled workers with no 
suitable employment opportunities in their proximity. In urban USA, it has been noted that in 
addition to the suburbanisation of residents, some cities have seen a significant movement of 
jobs out of the original city to the suburbs, thereby disadvantaging those who remain in ghettos 
of the central city (Gobillon et al., 2007, Kasarda, 1989, Kasarda, 1993, Wilson, 2012).  
The suburbanisation of both jobs and people in the second half of the 20th-century 
resulted in significant changes in the USA’s urban landscape. This was made possible by, 
among other things, the introduction and/or expansion of urban modes of transport, including 
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freeways and increased private vehicle ownership (Gobillon et al., 2007, Wilson, 1996, Wilson, 
2012). 
While large numbers of Whites were moving to the suburbs in the late 20th century in 
the USA, inner-city Black residents were not following suit. The federal government drew 
Whites out into the suburbs in the post-war years firstly by underwriting their mortgages thus 
enabling them to become homeowners in the 1940s and by means of the federal transportation 
and freeway policies of the 1950s. On the other hand, Blacks and other minority groups were 
discriminated against in the housing market, as well as by financial institutions, because the 
central city neighbourhoods where they lived were framed as not being worth the financial risk. 
Consequently, most minority groups were excluded from those earlier years of suburbanisation 
(Gobillon et al., 2007, Wilson, 1996). 
Along with this suburbanisation of large numbers of Whites in those early post-war years, 
the location of the manufacturing industry, which had not yet declined, was also changing. In 
a discussion on Chicago’s changing economic geography, Wilson (2003) described how 
numerous manufacturing establishments in the central city were either closing down or 
relocating to the suburban municipalities. Reasons for these changes included the afore-
mentioned improvements to transport infrastructure, cheaper land, as well as lower crime 
rates. Furthermore, it was possible to purchase larger plots of land for new and larger 
developments in single transactions, as well as not having to deal with the possibility of having 
to demolish the existing old and/or unsuitable structures in the central city. 
Similarly, Kasarda (1989) looked at data from 1970 and 1980 to look at the changes in 
the numbers of jobs by occupational group and location – the latter simply involved 
differentiating between jobs in the ‘central city’ and those in the ‘suburbs’. In each of the six 
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cities6 he addressed, there was a net decrease in the numbers of jobs available in the central 
cities and net increases in the suburbs. The characteristics of these changes differed from city 
to city, but what is of note is that all the cities saw net increases in the numbers of ‘managerial 
and professional’ and ‘technical and administrative support’ jobs in the central cities, as well 
as net decreases of ‘clerical and sales’ and blue-collar’ jobs in the central cities.  
While it has already been mentioned that proximity to suitable jobs was not sufficient to 
ensure labour market success, it is clear that the residents of the central cities, who were less 
likely than Whites in the suburbs to have education beyond high school, would be further 
disadvantaged by the fact that they living in spatially dislocated neighbourhoods meant that 
they were unable to access many otherwise suitable jobs  (Kasarda, 1989, Kasarda, 1993, 
Wilson, 2012). 
On the other hand, while they might have been excluded from the early years of 
suburbanisation, working class and middle class ethnic minorities who had the necessary 
means “gradually abandoned” poor Black neighbourhoods in central cities for the suburbs, with 
the consequence that those left behind were increasingly isolated from employment 
opportunities and/or the networks that might enable them to find employment (Wilson, 2012: 
loc 5384). However, a question that has shaped this study is whether similar patterns are 
evident in Cape Town’s formerly Blacks-only neighbourhoods and/or the majority-Black 
neighbourhoods in recent years (regardless of how they were classified during the apartheid 
years). 
2.2 Racial Hierarchy/Inequality in South Africa’s Labour Market: 
2.2.1 Skilled Migrants, World Wars and Rising Nationalism: 
The focus for this project is on the period from 1980 to 2011. However, in order to 
                                                 
6 Chicago, Boston, Cleveland, Detroit, New York and Philadelphia.  
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understand some of the factors that shaped that period and the challenges that needed to be 
overcome, it is necessary to take a look at the development of the labour market since South 
Africa started industrialising. After all, as will become evident below, the racial preferences and 
discrimination in the labour market that might be associated closely with the apartheid-era legal 
framework, has its foundation in events that happened decades earlier. 
According to McGrath (2004), when South Africa started industrialising in the 19th-
century, that process was aided by the necessary craft skills that were provided by European 
migrants. Both World War 1 and 2 resulted in concerns about skills shortages, with the former 
leading to more newly urbanised, but lesser skilled Afrikaners entering the workforce. 
Additionally, during the years between the wars there was considerable concern about the so-
called ‘poor White problem’. 
World War 2 also resulted in some reform in the labour regarding the role of Black African 
urbanisation: 
“In the mid- to late-1940s, the De Villiers and Fagan Commissions 
officially accepted the inevitability of African urbanisation and 
proletarianisation and their implications for skills development, though the 
government stopped far short either of political enfranchisement or 
effective education and training strategies.” (McGrath, 2004: 14) 
However, this apparent reform was short-lived, with the 1948 elections resulting in a 
victory for the National Party, possibly at least in part due to the concerns of White combatants 
returning from the war to significant numbers of urbanised and employed Black Africans. 
Ultimately, those concerns would be allayed by the National Party’s implementation of their 
‘grand apartheid’ vision. However, within less than two decades of that victory employers were 
raising concerns about the potentially detrimental effect of racial segmentation in the labour 
market, resulting in some attempts to ‘float the colour bar’ (Crankshaw, 1997, McGrath, 2004, 
Webster, 1986).  
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2.2.2 Economic Growth and the Floating Colour Bar: 
As already mentioned, the role of Black labour was an important political and economic 
issue during the years between the World War 1 and 2, with one court case reaching the 
Supreme Court in 1923 because a “a mine manager was judged to have acted legally in 
ignoring the 1911 Mines and Works Act’s regulations on who could be employed in certain 
occupations by employing an African engine driver underground” (McGrath, 2004: 13). 
Nevertheless, it could be argued that the apartheid government was a political victim of 
its economic success because: 
“Economic growth and change brought changes in the class structure 
of South Africa which in turn shaped political conflict. Skill shortages in the 
late apartheid period led to the steady relaxation of the "colour bar" in 
employment, especially in the service sector. Growing numbers of African 
men and women moved into better-paid employment.” Seekings (2011: 
535) citing Crankshaw (1997) 
The aforementioned employer-led attempts to float the colour bar during the 1960s was 
due to their concerns about the efficacy of apartheid-era labour market segmentation, more 
specifically due to the shortage of skilled White artisans. Consequently, this resulted in 
increased efforts by employers fragment skilled trades, where possible, in ways that would 
allow for the promotion of Black Africans into the new “operative jobs” (Crankshaw, 1990, 
Crankshaw, 1997, McGrath, 2004, Webster, 1986). 
While the government was eventually willing to permit some advancement of Black 
Africans into those semi-skilled operative jobs that were created by the fragmentation of skilled 
trades, under certain conditions, there was resistance from White trade unions. The 
government’s conditions for that advancement were as follows: 
(a) there was a proper separation of the races in the workplace; 
(b) no white worker would be replaced by an African worker; 
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(c) Africans were not placed in authority over whites; and 
(d) African advancement took place with the consent of the white 
unions.     (Crankshaw, 1997) 
Despite the initial resistance from White trade unions, this arrangement ultimately 
benefitted White workers, because in order to float the colour bar and adhere to the 
government’s conditions, “employers were obliged to re-train and promote semiskilled white 
workers into more senior positions ahead of Africans” (Crankshaw, 1997: 46). 
Nevertheless, it also benefited a portion of the Black African population, because the 
1970s saw the emergence of a small, but growing Black African middle class whose upward 
mobility was made possible by their entrance into occupations previously reserved for Whites. 
Furthermore, this made it necessary to reform the “racist legislation that governed both 
education and employment” and as a result, in some parts of the country, like Johannesburg, 
“[by] the end of the apartheid period, a sizeable Black African middle class had therefore been 
established (Crankshaw, 2008: 1696). 
The significance of this argument developed by Crankshaw (1997) is that, while this 
Black African middle class might have developed prior to the end of the apartheid era, it only 
benefited a small proportion of the Black African population and it was limited to certain routine, 
yet semi-skilled, non-manual occupations. Additionally, since the practice of floating the colour 
bar was still in place, these changes did little undo the considerable inequalities between 
Whites and other races. 
Before going further, it perhaps worth interrogating what is meant by this term “middle 
class” or sometimes “middle class”? There have been numerous attempts to clarify what it 
meant by this term, the means by which the category should be defined and/or the theoretical 
underpinning of class differentiation. The various discussions have invoked both Marx and 
Weber, while other have focused on the subjective or political characteristics of the term. These 
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discussions have also interrogated whether the middle class or classes refer to middle income 
earners (Southall, 2016, Visagie and Posel, 2013, Visagie, 2013). However, since this project 
is engaged with an existing debate, when the term “middle class” is used in this project it will 
refer to those employed in highly-skilled high-income occupations, as indicated by Crankshaw 
(2008). Therefore, this term is not treated as synonymous with “middle income”.  
2.2.3 Post-apartheid developments in Cape Town: 
2.2.3.1 Changes in Cape Town’s Labour Market: 
Research that has been conducted by Crankshaw (2012), as well as Borel-Saladin and 
Crankshaw (2009), has shown that the labour market in Cape Town has become increasingly 
skills intensive. In other words, an increasing proportion of the jobs available, require at least 
completed secondary education or more.  As previously mentioned, their work focused on the 
debate between those arguing in favour of the social polarisation argument (Baum, 1997, Chiu 
and Lui, 2004, Lemanski, 2007) and Hamnett’s theory of professionalisation (Hamnett, 1994, 
Hamnett, 1996).  
According to Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw (2009), when looking at the changes in 
occupational distribution in Cape Town between 1980 and 2001, the most significant growth 
in terms of the number of people employed in various occupational categories were those that 
required high levels of skill or education and which earned high incomes. They showed that of 
the 308,694 added to the labour market in Cape Town between 1980 and 2001, 135,243 were 
in highly-skilled high-income earning occupational categories such as ‘Managers, legislators 
& senior officials’, as well as ‘Associate professionals & technicians’. That said, it is worth 
keeping in mind that although these are the fastest growing occupational categories, they only 
make up 27% of the available jobs in 2001 (when we include ‘professionals’).  
In addition to these highly-skilled occupations, Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw (2009) 
demonstrated that there were significant increases in the semi-skilled non-manual 
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occupational categories, such as ‘Clerical Support Workers’ and ‘Services and Sales Workers’. 
Over the period in question, an additional 54,211 jobs were added in these categories. In 
addition to these changes, they also demonstrated that Cape Town’s labour market had, on 
the whole, become increasingly education- or skills-dependent. For example, whereas only 
26% of Cape Town’s employed population had completed secondary school or more in 1980, 
that had increased to 48% by 2001 (Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw, 2009, Crankshaw, 2012). 
The significance of these findings is that the considerable growth in employment in 
highly-skilled high-income occupations, as well as the upskilling of the employed population 
are both in agreement with the professionalisation theory posited by Hamnett (1994). While 
Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw (2009) explicitly stated that they were not addressing the issue 
of unemployment at the time, Crankshaw (2012) briefly addressed it, but that was focused on 
the spatial distribution of unemployment. 
This importance of secondary and/or tertiary education is, according to evidence from 
Branson et al. (2009), not limited to Cape Town. In a report titled The Demand for Tertiary 
Education, Branson et al. (2009) aimed to assess the relationship between years in education 
and labour market outcomes. More specifically, they wanted to calculate the returns on higher 
education, both in terms of earnings and the likelihood that they would find employment. Their 
findings demonstrated that there are significant advantages for those who have completed 
secondary and/or tertiary education, compared to those who have completed neither. They did 
this by drawing on data from the Labour Force Surveys (LFS) and the Cape Area Panel Study 
(CAPS) for the period between 2000 and 2007. 
Their findings showed that those who had, at the very least, completed their secondary 
education were more likely to find employment than those who had not. More specifically, 
those with at least some tertiary education were two to three times more likely to find 
employment than those who had not completed their secondary schooling. On the other hand, 
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while those who had completed high school were more likely to find employment that those 
who had not completed high school, they were less than twice as likely. Apart from the 
increased odds of finding employment, there were also significant returns for those who have 
spent more years in education. They found showed that those who had completed their 
secondary school education could expect to earn up 70% more, whereas those with a degree 
earned up to 3.5 times more than those with incomplete secondary school education. While 
these returns explain why it makes sense to pursue higher levels of education, the costs 
involved in that pursuit, as well as the poor quality of secondary education available to many, 
means that tertiary qualifications have remained inaccessible for many (Branson et al., 2009). 
Unfortunately, many South Africans have neither completed their secondary education 
nor have they obtained a tertiary qualification. According to the ‘Education’ section of The 
South Africa Survey 2014/2015, Ndebele (2015) shows that of all persons aged 20 years or 
older in South Africa, only 39% had competed high school and 7% had completed a post-
secondary qualification. 
2.2.3.2 Racial Inequalities:  
As already stated, data from a number of cities have shown a trend toward the increasing 
importance of higher levels of educational or skills for success in the job market (Borel-Saladin 
and Crankshaw, 2009, Branson et al., 2009, Crankshaw, 2008, Crankshaw, 2012, Hamnett, 
1994, Kasarda, 1989). However, some members of marginalised groups in both the USA (e.g. 
ethnic minorities) and South Africa (e.g. Black Africans, Coloureds Indians/Asians under 
apartheid) have struggled to attain the necessary quantity and/or quality of education required 
to find employment in an increasingly skills-intensive labour market (Kasarda, 1989, Nattrass 
and Seekings, 2001, Ndebele, 2017, Wilson, 2012).  
In certain cities in the USA, this has been exacerbated where the minorities in question 
are recent migrants to the city and their arrival has, at least to some extent, coincided with the 
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deindustrialisation causing a decline in the employment they hoped to pursue and/or the 
suburbanisation of employment resulting in a spatial mismatch between where they live and 
the locations of suitable employment (Kasarda, 1989). Kasarda (1989), citing Bailey (1987), 
Bonacich and Modell (1980), Light (1972), Waldinger (1986), Wilson and Portes (1980), when 
arguing that while African Americans, like other ethnic minorities, have often arrived in the city 
with limited education, they have at times fared considerably worse when it comes to finding 
employment. The explanation for this is that members of some other ethnic minorities benefit 
from “ethnic solidarity and kinship networks” that play a significant role in facilitating some 
degree of social mobility, particularly through self-employment (Kasarda, 1989: 42). 
In the literature on cities in the USA, various theories have been formulated to explain 
the poorer labour market outcomes of ethnic minorities. One of these is the so-called ‘spatial 
mismatch hypothesis’, which essentially argues that those who live far away from jobs for 
which they are suited, the less likely they are to find those jobs and fill those positions (Gobillon 
et al., 2007, Holzer, 1987, Kasarda, 1989). Gobillon et al. (2007) went so far as to delineate 
specific mechanisms by which those who live in spatially dislocated neighbourhoods are 
discriminated against.  
While not disputing the idea that spatial factors and/or distance play a role, others have 
argued that being socially isolated – that is, lacking sufficient social connections or social 
capital – can play an even greater role in finding employment (Kasinitz and Rosenberg, 1996, 
Wilson, 2012). A study that focused on the Red Hook neighbourhood, in close proximity to the 
New York harbour, demonstrated that even where job-seekers live in close proximity to job 
which they are suited (in terms of education/skill), their lack of social connectedness to those 
working in those jobs hinder their chances of find employment (Kasinitz and Rosenberg, 1996). 
Studies like this would suggest that it is a combination of social connectedness and physical 
proximity that can significantly shape labour market outcomes and where those social 
networks primarily consist of particular racial, ethnic or familial groups it can exacerbate 
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existing racial inequalities (Kasarda, 1989, Kasinitz and Rosenberg, 1996, Wilson, 2012).  
Due to the aforementioned apartheid-era legislation, inequalities in South Africa have, to 
a large extent, taken particularly racial dimensions; and, these inequalities have persisted into 
the post-apartheid era. However, the question has, at times, been raised regarding whether 
we are truly in a post-apartheid society.  
Seekings (2011: 536) cites Pilger (2007) who said that “apartheid did not die”. Seekings 
goes further by stating that the apartheid-era inequalities have been replaced by so-called 
market inequities. When discussing the state of South Africa’s cities, he argues that we should 
perhaps be using the term ‘neo-apartheid’ and not ‘post-apartheid’, especially when one 
considers that an overwhelming majority of people still living in mono-racial suburbs and/or 
townships.  
This is not to say that nothing has changed – there has been a shift in the social structure 
in terms of the relationship between race and class. This shift has been most evident among 
those in highly-skill high-income occupations and those with considerable wealth and/or 
business activities, which have become increasingly diversified, while the poorest clusters of 
the population are still primarily, if not completely, made up of Black7 South Africans. This has 
been possible due to better educational opportunities, as well as the combination of the so-
called ‘affirmative action’ and ‘black economic empowerment policies’ (Seekings, 2011). 
Nonetheless, these market shifts, particularly the emphasis on neo-liberalism have, according 
to McDonald (2008: 42), made Cape Town "one of the most – if not the most – unequal cities 
in the world". 
In a study focused on the persistent racial inequality and deindustrialisation in Cape 
Town, Crankshaw (2012) showed that both in Cape Town and in the Western Cape, as a 
                                                 
7 Comprising Black African, Coloureds and Indians/Asians. 
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whole, the proportion of Whites among professional and semi-skilled middle-income non-
manual (i.e. clerical support services and sales) employment had decreased significantly. This 
was not primarily due to Whites losing jobs in these occupations, but rather that as part of the 
process of the labour market became more professionalised, other population/racial groups in 
have made significant gains in these occupational categories. Additionally, as the data 
analyses in this study will demonstrate, the job market growth was considerably greater than 
the growth of the White population in Cape Town. 
However, a number of additional points are worth noting, from Crankshaw’s work, which 
contradict previously posited arguments, in particular those put forward by Lemanski (2007). 
In that article, she suggested that the changes growth of highly-skilled occupations has 
primarily benefited Whites, thus exacerbating the inequalities inherited from the apartheid era. 
On the other hand, Crankshaw (2012) has argued that while Whites have benefitted from these 
labour market changes they were not the sole beneficiaries from the growth in highly-skilled 
employment. He argued that in Cape Town’s labour market that was undergoing a 
professionalisation (Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw, 2009) there was evidence of 
deracialisation among highly-skilled high-income occupations. Although Whites comprised the 
largest proportion of those in the professional occupations, albeit not an outright majority as of 
2007, Black Africans, as well as Coloureds and Indians have made significant gains in those 
occupations (Crankshaw, 2012). 
Crankshaw (2012) also showed that Whites no longer dominated in the middle-income 
earning semi-skilled white-collar occupations. Nonetheless, despite the increased 
representation of Black Africans and Coloureds amongst professionals, managers and 
technical occupations, Whites are still considerably over-represented in those occupational 
categories. Also, although the data presented supports the conclusion that the job market in 
Cape Town has become more professionalised, there is also evidence of increased 
unemployment and both of these are characteristic of Hamnett’s theory of professionalisation 
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(Hamnett, 1994, Hamnett, 1996).. Crankshaw (2012) also reiterated that the growing number 
of middle-income non-manual jobs require greater levels of literacy and numeracy skills than 
the declining semi-skilled middle-income manual occupations. A somewhat contradictory 
consequence of these changes is that, while significant income gains have been made by 
better-educated Black Africans and Coloureds in highly-skilled occupations, these have been 
eroded by growing levels of unemployment particular among those who do not have the 
necessary skills or education to find employment in the aforementioned semi-skilled and 
highly-skill occupations that were growing  (Crankshaw, 2012). 
It has already been shown that changes in Cape Town and South African society, 
specifically the labour market, have resulted in an increasing demand for higher educational 
or skill levels, relegating many who do not have the requisite skills to unemployment. However, 
one of the questions that remains, and which will be addressed in this study, is whether there’s 
evidence that people of different races with the same level of education have had similar levels 
of success in finding employment.  
2.3 Racial Segregation: 
2.3.1 Separateness in the apartheid’s ‘White cities’: 
2.3.1.1 General: 
In a chapter titled ‘Race, Class, and Inequality in the South African City’, Seekings (2011) 
discusses a number of characteristics of urban South Africa during the apartheid era that might 
be different to urban trends in other parts of the world and there are three points worth 
highlighting here. Firstly, for the most part the country’s towns and cities were generally 
regarded as ‘White South Africa’, with others permitted to be there under certain 
circumstances.  Secondly, as has already been discussed, he explains that the aim of the 
apartheid government was not merely to separate the races, but to create and maintain a racial 
hierarchy that “took on a caste-like form” (Seekings, 2011: 533). 
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Thirdly, he explains that “residential segregation was especially thorough, and controls 
on urbanization unusually severe” (Seekings, 2011: 532). Under the Group Areas Act and 
amendments (1950, 1957, 1966), the population was separated into racially designated ‘Group 
Areas’ and where necessary group were forcibly removed (i.e. especially during the 1960s and 
1970s) from newly designated Whites-only neighbourhoods in order to make way for Whites. 
However, the aim to prevent interracial social interaction was also inscribed on the architecture 
of the city’s public spaces (Seekings, 2011). 
In addition to this physical separation, there were stringent influx controls in place that 
were enforced by means of the ‘pass laws’ imposed on the Black African population. 
Consequently, the majority of the country’s Black African population were prevented from 
entering and remaining in urban centres unless they were employed, resulting in the majority 
of the country’s unemployed being kept out of the cities and relegated to lives of poverty in so-
called rural slums (Seekings, 2011). 
In addition to these controls, Black Africans were further disadvantaged in the western 
part of what was then the Cape Province8 because there was a policy of Coloured labour 
preference in the region, aimed at accommodating the larger Coloured population in the region, 
which also supported the apartheid government’s idea of maintaining a racial hierarchy (Borel-
Saladin, 2013, Lemanski, 2011, Oldfield, 2004, Seekings, 2011). 
2.3.1.2 Looking at some of South Africa's largest metropolitan areas: 
Different cities in South Africa have experienced difference social and geographical 
trajectories both during and after the end of the apartheid period. Johannesburg, for example, 
has undergone considerable spatial change, both in terms of residential location and 
segregation, as well as the geography of its labour market and economy (the latter will be 
                                                 
8 The present-day Western Cape.  
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discussed in more detail at a later stage). 
According to Beall et al. (2002), during the years following World War 2, Johannesburg 
was quite mixed, both in terms of race and class. But, this was not to last. In addition to the 
trend of northward suburban development, which was exclusively for White residents under 
the Group Areas, there were significant number of apartment developments around 
Johannesburg’s Central Business District (CBD), in areas such as Hillbrow, Yeoville and Berea 
during the 1950s and 1960s. 
On the other hand, the majority of the city’s Black African, Coloured and Indian/Asian 
residents were relegated to living in neighbourhoods situated south-west of the CBD such as 
Soweto, Eldorado Park and Lenasia, respectively. As with other parts of the country, some 
neighbourhoods previously not home to Whites were declared Whites-only and the residents 
were forcibly removed. These include, the formerly Indians-only neighbourhood of Pageview 
and the predominantly Black African inner-city township of Sophiatown, both of which saw its 
residents forcibly removed during the 1950s (Beall et al., 2002, Parnell and Pirie, 1991). 
However, as early as the 1970s, the impact of the Group Areas Act and amendments 
(1950, 1957, 1966)was beginning to crumble, particularly in some of the aforementioned 
neighbourhoods around the CBD. By this point, most of the city’s White residents who could 
afford to do so, had relocated to the northern suburbs. This residential move was later followed 
by an accelerated movement of commercial and economic activity away from the old CBD to 
Sandton and Rosebank and surrounds in the north (Beall et al., 2002, Beavon, 1998, 
Crankshaw and White, 1995, Crankshaw, 2008). 
Although, the inner-city apartment districts previously exclusively for White use became 
increasingly racially integrated, the divide between Whites in the north and all other groups in 
the south and/or south-west remained somewhat intact for the remainder of the apartheid 
period. Perhaps the only exception to this north-south divide was Alexandria, east of Sandton 
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in the north, which managed to survive forced removal during the apartheid period (Beall et 
al., 2002, Crankshaw, 2008). 
2.3.1.3 Cape Town: 
Whereas Johannesburg underwent a considerable reconfiguration prior to the official 
end of the apartheid period, due to the aforementioned northward developments, the same 
cannot be said of Cape Town. One of the major differences between Johannesburg and Cape 
Town, apart from the different demographics, is the latter’s topography. More specifically, the 
potential size and shape of the area that currently comprises the City of Cape Town is hindered 
by the False Bay and Atlantic Ocean coastlines, as well as the mountains that run the length 
of the peninsula. Ultimately, the White population remained concentrated along the coasts of 
the peninsula, as well as along the peninsula’s mountains (Bickford-Smith, 2001, Turok, 2001).  
Contrary to popular belief, enforced segregation and forced removals in the greater Cape 
Town area predate the apartheid government (Field, 2001). According to Bickford-Smith 
(2001), as far back as the 1880s, parts of Cape Town were “by law” set aside for Whites only, 
whereas in others there were less formal forms of segregation. Additionally, at the dawn of the 
20th-century there was talk of a “kafir invasion” at the Cape when Black Africans comprised 
10,000 of the 160,000 residents at the time. Using the spread of bubonic plague at the time as 
a justification, many of the region’s Black African residents were forcibly removed to a 
compound at present-day Ndabeni. Another given reason was supposedly to prevent natives 
coming to harm by learning bad habits as a result of living in close proximity to Europeans and 
Coloureds (Bickford-Smith, 2001). 
While only Black Africans were forcibly segregated by law prior to apartheid-era 
legislation, such as the Group Areas Act and amendments (1950, 1957, 1966), there was also 
some de facto segregation between Whites and Coloured was evident prior to the that 
watershed piece of legislation. For a number of decades prior to 1948, richer Whites were 
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purchasing larger plots of land in suburbs like Rondebosch and Kenilworth, whereas 
Coloureds, who could not afford to purchase in those areas were relegated to less affluent 
pockets of the city. During that same period, the Cape Town City Council also built houses for 
the poor of all races, but they ensured that those areas set aside for Coloured were not in the 
proximity of White areas (Bickford-Smith, 2001). 
While it is clear that racial segregation was a reality in Cape Town prior to 1948, the 
years that followed resulted in the city’s map being radically redrawn. The Group Areas Act 
and amendments (1950, 1957, 1966) was aimed at bringing an end to racially mixed suburbs 
and ensure, where possible, physical boundaries between the races (Crankshaw, 2012, 
Graham, 2007). 
Whereas prior to 1948 there were some predominantly Coloured neighbourhoods found 
among White neighbourhoods, ostensibly to provide easy access to cheap labour, the 
apartheid government’s vision of ‘total apartheid’ brought this to an end (Bickford-Smith, 2001, 
Turok, 2001). Some examples of these pockets of working-class Coloured neighbourhoods 
include Tramway Road in Sea Point, as well as Lower Claremont, which includes present-day 
Harfield Village (Bickford-Smith, 2001, Paulse, 2001, Swanson, 2001). As Turok (2001) 
describes it, the impact of the Group Areas legislation on Cape Town was devastating, 
because it destroyed “well-established” communities and forcibly moved them to newly 
established and somewhat older ‘townships’ or public housing estates on the Cape Flats.  
One of the consequences of the greater degree of segregation in Cape Town was the 
need for workers to be highly mobile, whereas previously they were somewhat more evenly 
spread across the city (Bickford-Smith, 2001, Turok, 2001). Unfortunately, the need for mobility 
has resulted numerous penalties for the city and its residents. Firstly, the average commute 
time and distance increased significantly, thereby not only inconvenience the commuters, but 
also leading to greater congestion. Secondly, in order to make the commutes affordable for 
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low-wage earners travelling great distances, it was necessary for the city to absorb some of 
those costs by means of transport subsidies. Another indirect consequence is that those who 
live further away from employment opportunities, such as those living on the Cape Flats where 
they were forcibly relocated, face additional spatial or geographical obstacles when trying to 
find suitable employment (Crankshaw, 2014, Turok, 2001). 
2.3.2 Post-apartheid Segregation or Desegregation: 
2.3.2.1 Across South Africa: 
Following the release of Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners, as well as the 
unbanning of the African National Congress (ANC) and other anti-apartheid movements much 
of the apartheid-era legislation was abolished. Among the legal steps that were taken was the 
Abolition of Racially Based Land Measures Act of 1991, which was aimed at undoing the 
longstanding Group Areas Act and amendments (1950, 1957, 1966). However, while this and 
other new pieces of legislation removed certain legal restrictions on where the majority of the 
country’s citizens could live, which schools they could attend and which beaches they could 
use, simply removing legislation would not reverse the effects of the apartheid era overnight 
(Christopher, 2005b, Christopher, 2005a, Seekings, 2011). 
The question of whether enough has been done to undo the spatial legacy of apartheid, 
is a continuously contentious issue being discussed in the media and, in recent years, the 
catalyst for numerous urban land and housing orientated social movements such as Abahlali 
base Mjondolo (Robins, 2008). In an article titled ‘The Slow Pace of Desegregation in South 
African Cities, 1996–2001’ Christopher (2005b: 2306) argues that the lack of significant 
political action can be linked to policy changes that took place in the 1990s. He argues that the 
“the adoption of the free-market Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy… 
effectively ended any attempt to implement far-reaching state-funded schemes to undo the 
apartheid city”. 
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Although the debate around policy development and implementation is an important one, 
this project is focused on the data that reflects the changes that have or have not taken place 
in Cape Town. However, a question worth asking is whether South Africa as a whole has seen 
any significant desegregation? In the aforementioned article by Christopher (2005b), as well 
as the one that followed, which was titled ‘Further progress in the desegregation of South 
African towns and cities, 1996–2001’ (Christopher, 2005a), he addressed this very question. 
In order to do this, he uses the index of dissimilarity (one of the methods to be used in this 
project and that will be discussed in more detail in the methodology section) to measure the 
extent to which the different racial groups are evenly distributed across the country’s towns 
and cities. 
As the title ‘The Slow Pace of Desegregation in South African Cities, 1996–2001’ 
suggests, Christopher (2005b) was arguing that during those early post-apartheid years the 
process of residential desegregation was rather slow and limited. Nevertheless, there are two 
important points worth making here. Firstly, he argued that the levels of White segregation, 
based on the dissimilarity index, remained extremely high during the intercensal period 1996-
2001, indicating an extremely uneven spatial distributions of that population across the towns 
that were the focus of the study. Secondly, although there was some decline evident in the 
median index values for Black Africans, Coloureds and Indians, the extent of the decline was 
less than what was seen between 1991 and 1996. He also acknowledged there were some 
regional variations in the index values (Christopher, 2005b). Here it is worth reiterating that 
1991 was not only a census year, but was also the year that the Abolition of Racially Based 
Land Measures Act (1991). This piece of legislation brought to an end the provisions of the 
Group Areas Act and amendments (1950, 1957, 1966), thus allowing those with the necessary 
means to live in any neighbourhood they chose, regardless of their race. 
It is necessary to emphasise that these residential changes were dependent on people 
having the financial means, because the aforementioned lack of state intervention regarding 
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racial segregation meant that any residential desegregation would depend on the availability 
of mortgage finance. But, Christopher (2005b) adds that access to mortgage finance was 
hindered by the fact that many Black Africans, Coloureds and Indians lacked the necessary 
collateral and/or found that the neighbourhoods  where they lived at the time were subject to 
some form of red-lining. 
While, according to Christopher’s (2005b, 2005a) findings, Whites remained the most 
segregated, those results appeared to be somewhat contradictory. He found that although the 
White population was the most segregated, in terms of the dissimilarity measure, it was also 
the formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods that were undergoing considerable desegregation. 
This very paradox is at the centre of why it was beneficial to make use of more than one method 
to analyse the spatial changes, or lack there, in Cape Town’s suburbs. Nevertheless, this 
desegregation of formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods is at the core of the research 
conducted by Crankshaw on Johannesburg (2008) and Cape Town (2012). 
In ‘Race, Space and the Post-Fordist Spatial Order of Johannesburg’, Crankshaw (2008) 
focuses primarily on the extent of the desegregation that had taken place in the formerly 
Whites-only Group Areas – both the more middle-class neighbourhoods north of the CBD, as 
well as the inner-city neighbourhoods and historically working-class neighbourhoods south of 
the CBD. 
Crankshaw found that although there was some degree of desegregation in many of the 
formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods in the north, the greatest degree of change was to be 
found in the neighbourhoods that were closer to the CBD, such as the inner-city apartment 
districts discussed by Beall et al. (2002), as well as the formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods 
south and west of the CBD. Those are also the White Group Areas closest to the apartheid-
era Black African, Coloured and Indian Group Areas of Soweto, Eldorado Park and Lenasia 
(Crankshaw, 2008). 
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2.3.2.2 Cape Town: 
In a 2001 article, Turok (2001) made the following statement about the extent of Cape 
Town’s spatial inequalities: 
“There is a gulf between Cape Town’s poor townships and its affluent 
suburbs which appears to be widening in several respects. Institutional 
practices and market forces are tending to reinforce spatial divisions 
rather than to assist urban integration, and there has been little 
spontaneous movement of disadvantaged communities into well-located 
areas.  Consequently, Cape Town remains one of the least-altered cities 
in the country.” (Turok, 2001: 2371) 
This was clearly a bold statement about the extent of the city’s spatial inequalities, but 
Turok was not alone in his assessment. Lemanski (2007), similarly argued that the city had 
seen a lack of significant change to the spatial legacy of the apartheid era, which was at least 
in part due to the city’s intention to become a more globally connected and relevant city. This 
is a trajectory that, according to Lemanski (2007), almost inevitably leads to greater inequality 
and segregation. 
In terms of the spatial inequalities, both Lemanski (2007) and Turok (2001) argued that 
the extent of the role market forces were being permitted to play in the city’s development, as 
compared to more concerted state interventions (Christopher, 2005a), was leading to 
apartheid-era geography being perpetuated, not transformed.  
Lemanski (2007) argued that the city’s approach was leading to: 
“… the creation of low-income ‘slums’ on the urban periphery (where 
land is affordable), far from economic activities, thus trapping residents 
into poverty and inhibiting their potential to contribute to the growth of the 
urban economy” (Lemanski, 2007: 454) 
Similarly, Turok (2001: 2369) argued: 
“The concentration of the new housing projects on peripheral sites in 
the south-east was discussed earlier. This is mainly because the national 
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scheme requires each unit to be built on its own plot and the small subsidy 
size limits the price that can be paid for the land…” 
In apparent agreement with the claims made by Turok (2001) and Lemanski (2007), 
Crankshaw (2012: 857) stated while the growing Black9 middle class was moving into and 
contributing to the desegregation of the formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods “low-skilled and 
unemployed Black residents… are increasingly concentrated in the old public housing estates, 
backyard rooms, and shack settlements of the Cape Flats” 10. He rounds off this argument by 
stating that the new divisions that were developing in Cape Town were between middle-class 
formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods that were becoming racially mixed, on the one hand, and 
predominantly working-class Black11 neighbourhoods with high levels of unemployment. 
Before delving further into Crankshaw’s findings, which also built on the work of Graham 
(2007), it is essential to make a methodological observation about this work. As with his 
research on desegregation in Johannesburg (Crankshaw, 2008), Crankshaw’s focus in his 
2012 article was on the city’s formerly Whites-only Group Areas and not the entire city. The 
reason this is an essential point is that while this project will not necessarily dispute the findings 
by Crankshaw (2012), it will show that when the changes in these formerly Whites-only Group 
Areas are assessed alongside changes in other parts of the city and incorporated into analyses 
of changes in the city as a whole, it is possible to reach quite different conclusions about the 
degree of desegregation, or lack thereof, in Cape Town. 
More specifically, the arguments put forward by Crankshaw (2012), Lemanski (2007) 
and Turok (2001) regarding the spatial inequalities evident in Cape Town have carried 
considerable weight in debate on this issue in recent years. However, neither Lemanski (2007) 
nor Turok (2001) present detailed evidence to support those claims. On the other hand, while 
                                                 
9 Comprising Black African, Coloureds and Indians/Asians. 
10 Comprising Black African, Coloureds and Indians/Asians. 
11 Comprising Black African, Coloureds and Indians/Asians. 
 67 
 
Crankshaw (2012) did present some evidence on desegregation, it was limited to the city’s 
formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods. While the findings to be presented in this study will not 
necessarily dispute the findings on those formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods, it will show 
that only focusing on the desegregation in those parts of the city has perhaps overstated the 
extent of that desegregation. 
2.4 Cape Town’s Economic Geography: 
2.4.1 Spatial Economy: 
As has already been discussed, the literature on urban change has not only focused on 
changing residential geography, but also on the geographical characteristics of economic 
activity and therefore of the labour market. The reason for this is that, as already stated here, 
urban space not only reflects the inequalities that can be found in a city, it can also reinforce 
those inequalities (Moyo and Zuidgeest, 2018, Schensul and Heller, 2011). One of the major 
changes discussed in the literature thus far, has been the suburbanisation of large numbers of 
jobs, but especially many of the remaining manufacturing-sector jobs, as well as the lower-
skilled service sector jobs in the urban USA (Kasarda, 1989, Kasinitz and Rosenberg, 1996, 
Wilson, 1996, Wilson, 2012). 
As previously mentioned, Johannesburg underwent considerable residential 
reconfiguration starting in the 1970s, when large number of the city’s middle-class Whites 
moved north to newly developed suburbs. While those northern suburbs were primarily 
residential developments at first, they were followed by malls, office parks, industrial 
developments and more. The region’s shifting economic geography resulted in northern 
suburbs like Rosebank and Sandton surpassing the old CBD in terms of economic activity and 
becoming the de facto commercial and economic centres of what would eventually become 
the City of Johannesburg (Beall et al., 2002, Beavon, 1998, Beavon, 2000, Crankshaw, 2008). 
The question that then needs to be addressed is whether Cape Town’s economy has seen a 
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comparable shift, including perhaps the establishment of a new de facto economic centre? 
Using data from a 1996 Cape Metropolitan Council report, Turok (2001) argued that the 
city’s CBD and the Epping/Parow area, east of the CBD and en route to the northern suburbs, 
were individually the sites of more employment opportunities than any of the city’s other 
economic nodes. However, due to the city’s spatially unequal legacy, most of these people 
were commuting from elsewhere in the region on a daily basis. In fact, according to his 
calculation, more than 80,000 people were commuting from the Black African and Coloured 
Group Areas on the Cape Flats to the CBD each day, with a similar number commuting to the 
Epping/Parow area. 
A similar study was conducted by Sinclair-Smith and Turok (2012), making use of data 
for the period 2001-05. The analysis centred on three proposition the authors gleaned from the 
existing literature on urban development patterns. Those propositions were: 
Proposition 1: “Deconcentration is the dominant tendency, reflected in 
the relative and absolute decline of formal economic activity in the city 
centre.” (Sinclair-Smith and Turok, 2012: 393) 
Proposition 2: “Deconcentration is more pronounced for some 
economic sectors and functions than for others.” (Sinclair-Smith and 
Turok, 2012: 394) 
Proposition 3: “Decentralisation is stronger towards some places than 
others.” (Sinclair-Smith and Turok, 2012: 395) 
Whereas the previous paper looked at the numbers of jobs in various economic or 
commercial nodes, this study used data on the Regional Service Council levies to determine 
the total value of economic activity in different parts of the city and also differentiated between 
different economic sectors, such as: manufacturing, finance and business services, retail and 
wholesale (Sinclair-Smith and Turok, 2012). 
Their first finding refuted the first proposition, by showing that Cape Town was, 
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economically speaking, a monocentric city. This was based on the finding that the economic 
activity in the city centre comprised between a quarter and a third of Cape Town’s formal 
economy. Despite this monocentric structure, their findings supported the second proposition 
because a disproportionate proportion of new economic activity was located in the various 
suburban economic nodes about the city. Some of the suburban nodes that have benefited the 
most include: Bellville; Milnerton and surrounds (including Montague Gardens and Killarney 
Gardens); the corridor that includes Salt River, Paarden Eiland and Maitland; as well as, 
Pinelands and surrounds (Sinclair-Smith and Turok, 2012). 
Lastly, their findings supported the third proposition that suggested that decentralisation 
was moving in some directions and not others. More specifically, they found that new high-
income housing developments, as well as both commercial and industrial developments 
continued to steer clear of the Cape Flats in the southeast of the city (Sinclair-Smith and Turok, 
2012). More specifically, there were numerous new developments on previously vacant land 
in Montague Gardens and surrounding areas, north of the city centre, as well as substantial 
office and retail developments in the Tygervalley area, east of the city centre. It is also worth 
noting that these developments are located in parts of the city that are in close proximity to 
formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods and/or previously undeveloped land (Graham, 2007, 
Sinclair-Smith and Turok, 2012).  
Therefore, one could argue that private-sector developments of various types, including 
housing and commercial developments, in Cape Town have contributed to maintaining the 
legacy of spatial and social inequalities, by perpetuating the spatial dislocation between the 
formerly Blacks-only neighbourhoods and the locations of significant economic activity and/or 
employment opportunities (Lemanski, 2007, Sinclair-Smith and Turok, 2012, Turok, 2001).  
2.4.2 City Improvement Districts: 
While these private sector developments have arguably contributed to perpetuating 
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spatial inequalities, others have argued that in certain circumstances the private sector has 
also been able to exercise undue influence on policy development and implementation, as well 
as the privatisation of the control of public spaces, through public-private partnerships like City 
Improvement Districts, or CIDs (Peyroux, 2006, Didier et al., 2012, Didier et al., 2013, 
McDonald, 2008). 
According to Miraftab (2007: 602), the CID concept has its origins in “a model of urban 
revitalization popularized by New York City: business or city improvement”. The establishment 
of a CID depends on 51% or more of an area’s property owners voting to implement the model 
in their area and it is funded by the owners contributing to the costs involved in the additional 
private services (e.g. security companies) required to ensure the success of the improvement 
model. 
While the debate around the pros and cons of CIDs, as well as the apparent influence of 
the private sector on public policy, is a complex and contentious one (not to mention the fact 
that it is beyond the scope of this project), what is worth noting is the distribution of these CIDs 
across the city. Since the establishment and management of these CIDs are so dependent on 
the financial contributions of the private sector partners, it should come as no surprise that the 
location of the Cape Town’s CIDs largely correspond with the spatial distribution of economic 
activity and the development of suburban economic nodes discussed by Sinclair-Smith and 
Turok (2012), which in turn corresponds with and arguably perpetuates the city’s spatial 
inequalities.  
Some CIDs can be found in well-established areas of economic or industrial activity, 
such as Blackheath, Paarden Eiland, Parow Industria and Epping. On the other hand, others 
are in locations that include formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods, as well as established or 
growing economic or commercial activity, such as Claremont, Sea Point and the city centre. 
Perhaps the only CID that might not fit either of these categories is the Athlone CID, because, 
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while it has established economic activity it is mostly surrounded by formerly Coloureds-only 
neighbourhoods (Geocentric Information Systems, 2009, Graham, 2007, Sinclair-Smith and 
Turok, 2012). 
2.5 Conclusion: 
As previously stated, the starting point for this project was the debate between the 
proponents of the social polarisation and professionalisation theories of urban labour market 
change. while different sides of this debate have been applied to different contexts, including 
the USA (Sassen, 2000, Sassen, 2002), cities in Europe (Hamnett and Cross, 1998, Hamnett, 
1994, Hamnett, 1996), South African cities (Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw, 2009, Borel-
Saladin, 2012b, Crankshaw, 2012, Crankshaw and Borel-Saladin, 2014, Lombard and 
Crankshaw, 2017) and elsewhere (Baum, 1997, Chiu and Lui, 2004). While the role and/or 
significance of migration was addressed in some contexts (Baum, 1997, Chiu and Lui, 2004, 
Hamnett, 1994, Hamnett, 1996, Sassen, 2000, Sassen, 2002), limited attention has been paid 
to the issues of race and unemployment in South African cities in relation to this debate, with 
the latter being a core aspect of the professionalisation theory (Hamnett, 1994, Hamnett, 
1996). This will be done by revisiting the data on Cape Town that was previously analysed 
(Crankshaw, 2012), but goes beyond that to include data from the 2011 census. 
While various research, authors and theorists have engaged in trying to understand the 
spatial changes in post-Fordist cities, with particular attention paid to impoverished sections of 
these cities (Chakravorty, 2000, Kasarda, 1989, Kesteloot, 2000, Marcuse and Van Kempen, 
2000b, Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000a, Marcuse, 1997b, Marcuse, 1997a, Ribeiro and 
Telles, 2000, Wacquant, 2008, Wilson, 2011, Wilson, 2012). However, directly addressing the 
spatial implications of a professionalising labour market is one of the gaps in the literature that 
this project aims to address. In order to do this, a combination of descriptive quantitative 
analyses, GIS mapping and segregation indices, that will be discussed in the following chapter, 
will be used.     
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3 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY: 
3.1 Research design 
The catalyst for the direction of this project emerged from a previous project that focused 
on the educational aspirations and decision-making of a number of Coloured first-generation 
university students at the University of Cape Town (Solomon, 2013). The aim of that study was 
to determine and understanding the factors that shaped those students’ aspirations, as well as 
the factors that aided or hindered their pursuit thereof. Because their parents were not 
university they mostly lived in modest homes and neighbourhoods, where their parents were 
all too aware of the potential negative impact of their surroundings to their children’s 
educational performance and aspirations. For example, one of the participants in the study 
grew up in a neighbourhood where, in 2001, only 1 in 10 adults over the age of 20 years had 
ever completed high school. After all, it is widely accepted that space and location not only 
reflect but can also reinforce inequalities and hinder upward mobility (Schensul and Heller, 
2011, Wilson, 2012, Willis, 1977). 
Consequently, overcoming those potential hindrances was difficult and was only 
possible, at times, through means that were not open to everyone in their neighbourhoods. 
The strategies included getting into formerly Whites-only high school, paying for private 
transport to and from school to enable them to get the most out of their schooling experience; 
as well as to limit their opportunities to socialise in their neighbourhood; using internet access 
at parent’s work and the insight of a graduate family friend to gain the necessary information 
about higher education (Solomon, 2013). 
Considering this background, as well as an awareness of the changes taking place in 
South Africa’s urban labour markets (Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw, 2009, Branson et al., 
2009, Crankshaw and Borel-Saladin, 2014, Crankshaw, 2008, Crankshaw, 2012), a question 
that surfaced pertained to whether residents in neighbourhoods like the ones where these 
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students were raised had undergone any socio-economic change, or whether the challenges 
of limited educational attainment, poverty and poor labour market outcomes had persisted? 
Furthermore, by perusing the suburb and ward profiles the City of Cape Town (2001)  
had developed using data from Census 2001, a few peculiar patterns emerged. For example, 
according to the city’s profiles, formerly Black Africans-only neighbourhoods, which remained 
predominated by that group, showed higher poverty levels and unemployment rates than 
adjacent neighbourhoods that were predominantly Coloured, even where the greater 
proportion of the adults in the former neighbourhoods had completed high school or more (City 
of Cape Town, 2001)  
Additionally, Crankshaw (2012) built on the work of Graham (2007) in order to 
demonstrate that a number of the city’s formerly Whites-only, and relatively affluent, 
neighbourhoods had undergone a degree of racial desegregation since the early 1990s.  
However, a question that remained pertained to how the relationship between race, 
space and class had (or had not) changed in the city as a whole? In order to address this 
question, it was evident that it would be necessary to focus on the entire city, yet at the same 
time maintain suburb level (or similar) detail in the analysis in order to determine the extent of 
the changes, or lack thereof. it was also clear that no single method or analytical approach 
would be sufficient considering the complexity of the changes in question. 
3.1.1 Conceptualising the Relationship between Race, Space and Class: 
3.1.1.1 Race: 
It is difficult to think of contemporary South Africa without considering the ways in which 
race has been used to shape and arguably continues to be used to shape this society, including 
the economic and political structures. The use of race as a means for de jure differentiation, 
discrimination and segregation is closely associated with the apartheid era. However, 
numerous examples discussed here have shown that racial difference had been in use for 
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decades (if not more) prior to the National Party’s election victory in 1948. 
Nevertheless, an individual or group’s racial categorisation was a key determinant for life 
chances under the apartheid regime, as it determined where someone was able to live, which 
educational institutions they could attend, which public spaces or amenities they could use, 
where they were allowed to live, as well as the kinds of occupations they could enter 
(Crankshaw, 1997, Field, 2001, Seekings and Nattrass, 2005, Seekings, 2011). 
Considering the generations whose life chances were negatively affected during that 
period, it should come as no surprise that the legacy of apartheid has persisted into the 20th-
century, especially considering the limits placed on the scope of the economic and systemic 
change implemented during the post-apartheid period (Christopher, 2005a, Seekings and 
Nattrass, 2005, Turok, 2001). However, it is necessary to move beyond simply concluding that 
racial inequality in the post-apartheid period is solely due to the persistence of the 
discrimination of other labour market practices reminiscent of the apartheid-era. Instead, it is 
necessary to look more closely at both persistent educational inequalities and the changes in 
the labour market leading to a greater demand for education. In other words, while inequality 
in contemporary South Africa cannot be detached from apartheid-era factors, attention needs 
to be given to contemporary processes and shifts in society (especially the labour market). 
Consequently, even when addressing social and spatial inequalities as recent as 2011, 
the race variables cannot be ignored. Questions need to be asked regarding whether there is 
any evidence that the racial hierarchy that the apartheid government aimed to implement and 
maintain has persisted in some way (e.g. income, employment and/or educational attainment), 
even after the legislation responsible for apartheid’s creation and implementation had been 
repealed. The focus in Cape Town, is specifically on the differences between the Black African, 
Coloured and White population, remaining aware this the order they are mentioned here was 
the bottom-up order of that apartheid-era racial hierarchy (Seekings, 2011). 
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The reason that less emphasis has been placed on the Indian/Asian population is not 
because their presence was inconsequential, but because, due to regional differences, they 
have consistently remained the smallest proportion of Cape Town’s population. Additionally, 
the results produced by certain analytical methods in this project, particularly pertaining to 
space and segregation, would produce less reliable or comparable results for extremely small 
population group (Massey and Denton, 1988). 
Lastly, where census data included racial categories in addition to the Black African, 
Coloured, Indian/Asian and White options, those categories were not incorporated into the 
analyses. The reason for this was with the aim to allow for consistent comparison between 
datasets, especially since there is at least some uncertainty regarding who might have been 
included in those categories. 
3.1.1.2 Class: 
3.1.1.2.1 Occupational Class: 
In his monograph titled Race, Class and the Changing Division of Labour Under 
Apartheid, Crankshaw (1997) argued that one of the reasons that researchers focused on 
class and labour market dynamics during the late apartheid period appear to produce such 
contradictory findings, was that they were using different methods to define class boundaries. 
In a number of subsequent studies, such as the Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw (2009) study, 
the focus was on using “the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO) and 
the International Standard Classification of Industries (ISCI)”, which according to Borel-Saladin 
(2012a: 36) form the basis for the “South African Standard Classification of Occupations 
(SASCO) and the South African Standard Classification of Industries (SASCI)”. 
Because of this focus on occupational class, it became necessary to focus on the data 
for the ‘working-age population’ also referred to as the ‘labour market’, which Statistics South 
Africa (2010: 149) defines as “persons aged 15-64 years”. However, since the SuperCROSS 
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and SuperTABLE software being used in this analysis has placed the age-related variables in 
5-years bins (e.g. 15-19 and 20-24) it was necessary to make a minor adjustment and, for the 
sake of this project, regard the working-age population as those age 15-64 years. 
Furthermore, whereas some like Seekings and Nattrass (2005) might have developed 
and/or made use of class categorisations that suited the arguments they were making, the aim 
in this study was to ensure continuity with those who have engaged with this 
professionalisation vs social polarisation debate in the South African context. Therefore, in 
addition to basing these analyses on the occupational categories found in the census dataset, 
which in turn were based on ISCO (International Labour Organization, 2007), the discussion 
will also make use of terms that refer to groups of occupations, as others have done in previous 
studies (Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw, 2009, Crankshaw, 2008, Crankshaw, 2012).  
An example of this type of grouping is ‘highly-skilled high-income occupations’, which 
comprise the following categories from the International Labour Office (2012) ISCO framework: 
‘Managers’, ‘Professionals’, as well as ‘Technicians and Associate Professionals’. Where 
necessary, additional explanations and/or definitions will be provided in the footnotes. 
3.1.1.2.2 Employment Status: 
The importance of occupational class aside, a significant proportion of the working-age 
population is not included in those categories.  
One such category, or collection of sub-categories, comprises those who are ‘not 
economically active’ (NEA). This category includes those who form part of the working-age 
population but are neither employed nor looking for employment opportunities. Included under 
the NEA category are those who are physically or mentally not able to be employed, 
scholars/students, discourage work-seekers, as well as homemakers (Dimant, 2016). While 
this diverse category is not central to the polarisation-professionalisation debate and will 
therefore not be subject to considerable analysis, the last category will be. 
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Lastly, there are those in the working-age population who at the time of data collection 
were categorised as ‘unemployed’. In order to be regarded as unemployed in the data, the 
individual in question had to fulfil the following requirements (Dimant, 2016: 266): 
▪ They have not worked during a predetermined period prior to the data 
collection. 
▪ They must have actively looked for work or tried to start a business in a 
predetermined period prior to the data collection. 
▪ They were available to take up employment in the week in which the data 
collection took place. 
If they had not actively looked for work in a predetermined period prior to the data 
collection, they were starting at a definite date in the future. 
The significance of including the unemployment in these analyses is that growth in 
unemployment is an important of the professionalisation theory (Hamnett, 1994, Hamnett, 
1996) and have formed part of the polarisation-professionalisation debate on Cape Town in 
recent years (Crankshaw, 2012, Lemanski, 2007, Turok, 2001). 
3.1.1.3 Race and Class: 
During the apartheid period, as well as in the preceding decades, the occupations 
someone was permitted to enter were shaped by one’s place in the racial hierarchy ,whether 
socially or legally defined (Crankshaw, 1997, McGrath, 2004). 
While the colour bar was floated to varying degrees during the apartheid period and 
repealed during the transition period, the removal of legal obstacles did not guarantee that the 
legacy of labour market discrimination or inequality would disappear (Crankshaw, 1997, 
Seekings and Nattrass, 2005). In fact, different researchers focused on the labour market 
outcomes of the different population groups have produced results that point to evidence of 
limited change, with those differences sometimes linked to the differences in the quality and 
quantity of educational attainment (Borel-Saladin, 2012a, Branson et al., 2009, Crankshaw and 
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Borel-Saladin, 2014, Crankshaw, 2008, Crankshaw, 2012, Lombard and Crankshaw, 2017, 
Seekings and Nattrass, 2005). 
However, one of the aims of this project was to contribute to these debates by including 
analyses using data from the 2011 census. While the most often cited statistic pertain to 
employment status is the unemployment rate, the analyses in this project will include making 
use of the labour absorption rate. This can be defined as the percentage of the total working-
age population (WAP), including those who are ‘not economically active’, who were employed 
at the time of the data collection. The analyses contained in this project include: 
▪ Income distributions by race, disaggregated by grouped occupation 
categories. 
▪ Income distributions by race, disaggregated by grouped levels of educational 
attainment. 
▪ Employment rate by race, disaggregated by grouped levels of educational 
attainment. 
▪ Labour absorption rate by race, disaggregated by grouped levels of 
educational attainment. 
The aim, using these different analyses, is to focus on determining whether there is 
evidence that a racial hierarchy still exists in the labour market that cannot simply be written 
off as the result of educational levels and/or occupation. 
3.1.1.4 Race and Space: 
According to Schensul and Heller (2011: 78): “It is now widely acknowledged in urban 
sociology that space reflects and reinforces inequality” and go further by stating that “[nowhere] 
is this more obviously true and trenchant than in South Africa, where the social, economic and 
racial divisions of apartheid were spatially constructed.” 
Racial differences and divides in South Africa are not merely social constructs, they were 
also inscribed on physical spaces. The maintenance of racial separation and a racial hierarchy 
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was a guiding principle in how cities like Cape Town were constructed in terms of public spaces 
and residential locations. Furthermore, physical constructions like freeways and railway lines 
were, at times, used as boundaries between those Group Areas (Seekings, 2011). 
Analyses of the extent of desegregation in the early years of the post-apartheid period 
indicated that change was extremely slow, at least in part due to the limited state intervention 
to undo apartheid’s spatial legacy, as well as the limited means of much of the Black African 
and Coloured population to access the necessary finance to relocate (Christopher, 2005b, 
Christopher, 2005a, Lemanski, 2007, Turok, 2001). 
Then again, some research has shown that nationally (Christopher, 2005b) and, more 
specifically, in Cape Town, (Crankshaw, 2012, Graham, 2007) there has been some 
desegregation of formerly Whites-only Group Areas, up to and including 2001. 
Considering this background, what evidence has the 2011 census data provided of any 
further progress in terms of racial desegregation, if any? Has the aforementioned ‘slow pace’ 
of desegregation remained problematically slow? Has the desegregation of predominantly and 
historically White neighbourhoods continued? If so, what of the formerly Black Africans-only 
and Coloureds-only Group Areas, have they seen any desegregation? 
Alternatively, and this is one of the key spatial arguments to be made in this project, there 
is perhaps a pattern of spatial change in the data that has, to date, not yet been elucidated. 
3.1.1.5 Class and Space: 
Since the policy framework during and prior to the apartheid period determined which 
racial groups could enter different occupations (Crankshaw, 1997, McGrath, 2004), as well as 
that legislation like the Group Areas Act and amendments (1950, 1957, 1966) determine where 
certain people could live (Christopher, 2005b, Christopher, 2005a, Lemanski, 2007, Seekings, 
2011), it is logical to expect that racially-defined spatial divisions also largely corresponded 
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with class divisions. 
That being said, this type of scenario where both class and race correspond with spatial 
divisions is not unique to South Africa. This type of correlation among race/ethnicity/nationality, 
class and space has also been seen in the USA, Belgium, Brazil and India (Chakravorty, 2000, 
Kasarda, 1989, Kesteloot, 2000, Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000b, Marcuse and Van 
Kempen, 2000a, Ribeiro and Telles, 2000, Wilson, 2012). The literature on the USA has tended 
to argue that members of various ethnic minority groups who are upwardly mobile, eventually 
move out of the ghettos to the suburbs, resulting in spatial divisions that are not solely racially 
or ethnically defined, but are rather shaped by class (Kasarda, 1989, Wilson, 2012). 
The desegregation of formerly Whites-only Group Areas has been determined to be the 
product of upwardly mobile Black Africans, Coloured and Indian being able to access the 
necessary means to relocate to those neighbourhoods (Christopher, 2005b, Christopher, 
2005a, Crankshaw, 2012). This would suggest that there is a similar process at work in Cape 
Town, as was found in the other cities mentioned here. 
From a class perspective, the literature on urban USA tends to argue that the ghettos, 
that were previously solely defined by race or ethnicity, have also come to be defined by 
specific socio-economic characteristics. These include low levels of educational attainment, 
high rates of unemployment and high levels of poverty (Kasarda, 1989, Kasarda, 1993, 
Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000b, Wilson, 2012). 
Considering this theoretical background, as well as the previous evidence on South 
Africa’s towns and cities, it is worth determining what the 2011 census data has to say about 
the relationship between space and class. Is Cape Town following a trajectory similar pattern 
to those described in the aforementioned literature, or is there perhaps a different pattern 
altogether? 
 81 
 
3.1.2 Philosophical position and Logic of Chosen Methods: 
According to De Vaus (2002: 7) “it is the logic of analysis that distinguishes survey 
research”, a logic where “variation in one variable is matched with variations in other variables”. 
Drawing on this logic, this project aims to focus on the contrasting and corresponding variation 
in certain variables for Cape Town, at both the suburb-level and city-level. 
One of the key reasons for making use of quantitative methods is because, through the 
application of probability theory in the sampling methods used, it makes it possible for the 
findings to be applicable to the population from which the sample was selected (Bryman, 2012). 
That said, a qualitative method also allows us to generalise, not in a quantitative way, but in 
terms of a detailed understanding of how certain types of social processes or mechanisms 
operate (Sayer, 1992, Sayer, 2000). 
However, in this project it was not necessary to engage in any sampling processes, at 
least in part because the detailed suburb-level analyses would not have been possible if a 
sample was used. 
There is a long-standing gulf, in the social sciences, between those who primarily 
advocate qualitative methods versus those who advocate quantitative approaches. However, 
what is worth noting is, and what was taken into account in the design of this particular project 
is that both of these categories of methods and/or research approaches have inherent 
strengths and weaknesses or limitations. Furthermore, the distinctions between these 
categories involve distinctions regarding epistemologies, theoretical frameworks, and the 
methods (i.e. techniques) used in research (Sayer, 1992). 
Quantitative research is, at times, portrayed as sterile and unimaginative, whereas 
qualitative research provides deep or rich data that assists in our understanding of everyday 
life and helps us make sense of behaviour, including the meaning behind it. This is because 
although quantitative methods are essential when trying to measure the extent or count the 
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number of certain phenomena in a sample/population, as well as in discovering statistical 
correlations, mathematics is an acausal language (Danermark et al., 2002, Sayer, 1992). 
In the context of this PhD project, it is the ability of quantitative methods to reveal trends 
in a population that is of particular importance. After all, while it is clear that certain legal and 
social processes have been enacted that could potentially impact the city’s population, these 
methods make it possible to discover what kinds of changes have (or have not) taken place, 
as well as the extent to which the city’s population might be better or worse off, at least in terms 
of certain socio-economic criteria. 
While the discovery of these trends or correlations should not be seen as synonymous 
with causal explanations, they could potentially shape future qualitative research aimed at 
understanding the causal mechanisms that have produced or generated certain social 
phenomena (Sayer, 1992). 
3.2 Geographical Research Methods: 
3.2.1 Conceptualising: 
An often repeated idea about the importance of spatial analysis over the course of this 
project is that space not only reflects, but can also perpetuate inequality (Moyo and Zuidgeest, 
2018, Schensul and Heller, 2011). This is widely held in urban sociology and/or urban studies. 
However, it has particular resonance in South Africa, where all aspects of social life, including 
access to and the use of space was limited and/or controlled by far-reaching legislature. This 
not includes the Group Areas Act and amendments (1950, 1957, 1966), that have already 
been discussed here, but also the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act (1953) that 
segregated public spaces, services and vehicles, among others. 
Additionally, an array of research projects by sociologists and economists have focused 
on inequality (both in general and specifically urban) in South Africa, but a detailed spatial 
analysis of inequalities across the City of Cape Town has not been among them. While 
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Crankshaw (2012) focused primarily on the city’s formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods, what 
was lacking was an analysis that both incorporated the rest of the city and addressed the extent 
to which it has (or has not) changed over time. 
The benefits of including space in social analysis, using tools like GIS, are numerous, 
but the use of GIS is not without their critics. Some have, at times, argued that GIS is 
irrevocably positivist, however, even critical researchers have come to realise its potential as 
a tool of subversion (Warren, 2011). Nevertheless, the critiques of technological 
advancements, like GIS, in research are, according to Warren (2011), part of a on-going 
debates, occasionally contradictory, about the roles and/or impacts of technology. 
Nevertheless, using GIS in social research could result in numerous benefits from being 
able to “examine multiple data sources at different points in time, space and place” (Steinberg 
and Steinberg, 2015: 19). According to Janelle and Goodchild (2011) there are five examples 
of spatial reasoning that could benefits social research projects:  
▪ It can be used to identify changes in use of and regional differentiation of 
space(s)  
▪ It can aid in identifying certain physical arrangements and/or spatial patterns, 
such as clustering 
▪ It is possibly a useful tool for documenting changing spatial patterns over 
time  
▪ It can be used for studying flows of people, particularly when focusing on 
spatiotemporal interactions  
▪ It could be useful for hypothesis testing and/or other questions about spatial 
associations 
Furthermore, Kavouras and Kokla (2011) explain this when considering which sources 
of data be mapped, by arguing that any non-geographic data can be associated with 
geographical references and/or data, which in turn opens up additional analytical possibilities. 
There are numerous advantages to thinking spatially and using a Geographic Information 
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System (or GIS) in social research. According to Steinberg and Steinberg (2015: 16), it 
“enables you to visualize, communicate and implement based on a unique and integrated 
research process”. This visualisation could also reveal relationships in the data that otherwise 
(i.e. without graphic such as a map) might not be evident. This benefit has already been evident 
during this project when, using the dot density option to map data on individuals in 'Managerial, 
Professional and Technical in each race/population group, a certain pattern in the geographic 
distribution of those individuals became evident. This is a pattern that would not have been 
impossible to find without the map, but which was certainly made more likely with the 
incorporation of the ArcGIS software. 
It is also worth noting that this finding not only revealed a pattern in the data, it also 
shaped subsequent questions to be asked of the data, as well as contributing to the search for 
additional techniques for advancing the data analysis. 
3.2.2 Low-level geographical detail: 
3.2.2.1 General: 
From the outset of this project it was clear that space was going to form some part of the 
analyses of inequality in Cape Town, regardless of which socio-economic criteria were the 
focus of those analyses or the time period in question. However, what was not clear at the 
beginning was at which level of geographical aggregation the spatial analyses would take 
place and based on the options that presented themselves when the Community Profiles 
Databases (see Note 2) were accessed, the answer was not immediately obvious. Some of 
the options (and related or explanatory concepts), provided by Statistics South Africa (2010), 
were as follows  
Magisterial district: “subdivision of the country for the administration of 
the judicial system as proclaimed by the Department of Justice.” (Statistics 
South Africa, 2010: 111) 
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Municipality: “the area of jurisdiction of the third sphere of government, 
after national and provincial.” (Statistics South Africa, 2010: 112) 
Subplace: “second (lowest) level of place names.” (Statistics South 
Africa, 2010: 116) 
Main place: “first level of place names.” (Statistics South Africa, 2010: 
111) 
Place name: “the civic entities below the level of municipality in the 
census geography hierarchy.” (Statistics South Africa, 2010: 113) 
Enumeration area: “the smallest geographical unit (piece of land) into 
which the country is divided for census or survey purposes. See 
enumeration area type” (Statistics South Africa, 2010: 105) 
There were a number of factors to consider. At the one end of the scale, both magisterial 
district and main place were too large. The reason for this is that neither of those would 
necessarily allow for the possibility of low-level geographical change and any one of them 
could arguably contain numerous former Group Areas that were designated for different 
population groups. 
At the other end of the scale, making use of small areas or enumerator areas, but each 
of those would only have codes not names. Ultimately, the decision to use subplaces was 
influenced by the fact that even without seeing the location on a map, the names of the 
subplaces carry with them and could invoke social, political and historical significance. Stated 
differently, unlike enumeration areas, which are primarily used for census and survey 
purposes, subplaces more closely approximate the concept of ‘neighbourhood’ (Massey et al., 
1996, Statistics South Africa, 2010). 
Nevertheless, this decision was not without its challenging consequences. The most 
significant of these was the fact that geographic boundaries often shifted from one census to 
the next (Space-Time Research, 2016a). Therefore, while the same subplace might be found 
in consecutive censuses, the boundaries of the area with that name in 1996 might not 
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corresponded precisely with the boundaries of the identically named subplace in the following 
census. While there is likely to be considerable overlapping, the boundaries might not be 
identical.  
However, even before looking at a detailed map the likelihood of shifting boundaries is 
evident in the fact that although the over area comprises the City of Cape Town remained 
unchanged between 2001 and 2011, there were hundreds more subplaces in 2011, than in 
2001.  
3.2.3 Selection of subplaces: 
Before mapping the working-age population, it was necessary to deal with the different 
enumerator area (or EA) types. After all, if all EA types, such rural farms and industrial areas, 
are included it hinders the possibility of being able to detects patterns of change in residential 
locations or segregation. Consequently, the decision was taken to focus primarily on subplaces 
that are predominantly residential (i.e. they mainly consisted of ‘urban: formal’ and ‘urban: 
informal’ EA types). For example, in map 3.1, the dominant EA types of each of the subplaces 
are displayed, with those that were predominantly “urban: formal” residential areas in blue and 
those that were predominantly “urban: informal” residential areas in red12.  
                                                 
12 This approach was used for mapping purposes only, when doing calculations on the population, all subplaces 
were included. 
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Map 3.1: Dominant/Modal EA type by subplace, 1996 
Source: Community Profiles Databases (see: Note 3) 
Once that selection was made, then questions about the characteristics of those 
subplaces, such as whether they perhaps comprised formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods or 
the unemployment rates were addressed. 
3.2.4 Dimensions of Segregation: 
Over the years there has been a lively debate around the idea of segregation, including 
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how to define and measure it. As part of this debate, there have been numerous proponents 
defending certain measures and/or techniques, while critiquing others. 
Following years of debate regarding the efficacy of various segregation measures, 
Massey and Denton (1988) proposed an understanding of segregation that does not rest on a 
single measure. Instead, they argued that segregation should be understood as “a 
multidimensional phenomenon varying along five distinct axes of measurement” and 
proceeded to focus on 20 different measures across these five dimensions, which are (Massey 
and Denton, 1988: 281): 
▪ Evenness: “… refers to the differential distribution of two social groups among 
areal units in a city.” (Massey and Denton, 1988: 283) 
▪ Exposure: “Residential exposure refers to the degree of potential contact, or 
the possibility of interaction, between minority and majority group members 
within geographic areas of a city.” (Massey and Denton, 1988: 287) 
▪ Concentration: “… refers to relative amount of physical space occupied by a 
minority group in the urban environment” (Massey and Denton, 1988: 289) 
▪ Centralization: “… the degree to which a group is spatially located near the 
center of an urban area.” (Massey and Denton, 1988: 291) 
▪ Clustering: “the extent to which areal units inhabited by minority members 
adjoin one another, or cluster, in space.” (Massey and Denton, 1988: 293) 
In a more recent article titled “Measuring racial residential segregation at different 
geographic scales in Cape Town and Johannesburg”, Parry and van Eeden (2015) discuss an 
evaluation of these five dimensions of segregation conducted by Reardon and O’Sullivan 
(2004). As part of their evaluation of these dimension, Reardon and O’Sullivan (2004) argue 
that concentration and centralization are subcategories of the evenness dimension and do not 
differentiate between evenness and clustering. Nevertheless, they still draw a distinction 
between spatial evenness and spatial exposure/isolation. In agreement with this argument, the 
analyses of segregation in this study focused solely on these two aspects of segregation. 
3.2.4.1 Evenness: 
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While the visual display of the data using ArcGIS is both revealing and striking, it was 
evident that it was necessary to be able to quantify the extent to which Cape Town’s population 
has remained segregated or become desegregated during the period in question. 
The dimension of ‘evenness’ focuses on “differential distribution of two social groups 
among areal13 units in a city” (Massey and Denton, 1988: 283) and the minority group is 
regarded as been segregated when it is unevenly spread across the area in question. 
According to Massey and Denton (1988: 284) evenness is “maximized and segregation 
minimized when all units have the same relative number of minority and majority members as 
the city as a whole”. 
To date, the dissimilarity index (D), that was discussed by Duncan and Duncan (1955), 
has been particularly useful in this regard, has been the widely used and at times the only 
measure used by some. This index has come under scrutiny (Cortese et al., 1976, Cortese et 
al., 1978), while others have demonstrated some of its benefits in research conducted in South 
Africa (Christopher, 2005b, Christopher, 2005a, Horn, 2012, Parry and van Eeden, 2015, 
Schensul and Heller, 2011, Schensul, 2008, Schensul, 2009) and elsewhere. 
According to Duncan and Duncan (1955), the dissimilarity index can be understood as a 
measure of the average deviation of subplaces from the city’s overall racial composition. It is 
calculated using the following formula (Farley and Taeuber, 1968, Farley and Taeuber, 1974, 
Taeuber and Taeuber, 1976): 
 
In this dissimilarity calculation A refers to the race or social category that is the focus of 
                                                 
13 For example, subplaces in the census data. 
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the calculation (e.g. Black Africans or Coloureds), while B refers to the rest of the population. 
This reveals one of the limitations of the formula – it can only be used to calculate the 
dissimilarity between two specific groups, or one group and the sum of all other groups in the 
population. Furthermore, ‘Ai/A’ is the total of A in the suburb or census tract i, divided by the 
total of A in the population. One way of interpreting the result is that it is the “proportion of [A] 
who would have to change their tract of residence to make qi=q for all i" (Duncan and Duncan, 
1955: 211). 
One of the critiques of this index is that the results from this index are “affected by 
differences in the proportion of the minority in the population, thus preventing inter-city 
comparisons” or differences of the same city at different points in time, although this claim has 
been a point of contention (Cortese et al., 1976: 631). While the search for a method that 
allows inter-city comparisons continues, this objection to the use of this index was a useful 
catalyst for rethinking how this index might be applied. More specifically, whereas the total 
population is usually seen as the entire city, with the aim of using a single index to calculate a 
single measure that indicates the degree of segregation in a city, it became evident that there 
are in fact different populations within a city. This meant that applying this index to each of 
them separately (depending on the research question in focus) could reveal something about 
the extent and characteristics of the segregation that might have otherwise gone unnoticed if 
the index was applied to the whole population. 
One last comment that needs to be made regarding interpretations of the dissimilarity 
index is discussed in a study of desegregation of towns and cities in South Africa. According 
to Christopher (2005a), studies focused on cities in the USA show dissimilarity results that can 
be regarded as integrated due to variations in spatial configurations, including the population 
sizes of areal units. It is worth noting that these guidelines come from a context that did not 
experience the sorts of legislated segregation seen in South African, but rather discrimination 
such as the redlining of certain areas or the denial of housing subsidies for members of ethnic 
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minority groups (Kantrowitz, 1969). This study will therefore proceed by using these guidelines 
when interpreting results for D. 
3.2.4.2 Isolation or Exposure (P*-type measure): 
Like the index of dissimilarity, or D, the exposure index or P*-type measure has also 
been the subject of considerable debate and critique. Nonetheless, it can be understood as 
contributing to our understanding of one of the dimensions of segregation. More specifically, 
the measure for residential exposure focuses on the extent of potential contact between people 
of different groups within their residential areal units of the city (Massey and Denton, 1988, 
Parry and van Eeden, 2015, Stearns and Logan, 1986). While the exposure and evenness 
dimensions are empirically connected, they measure distinct phenomena. 
For example, members of one group can be relatively evenly distributed among 
residential areas of a city, but at the same time experience little exposure to majority members 
if they are a relatively large proportion of the city, a point well-elaborated by Blau (1977). 
Conversely, if they are a very small proportion, minority members will tend to experience high 
levels of exposure to the majority no matter what the pattern of evenness. Exposure indices 
take explicit account of the relative size of minority and majority groups in determining the 
degree of residential segregation between them (Massey and Denton, 1988). 
The formula for calculating exposure or isolation is as follows (Massey and Denton, 
1988): 
 (Massey and Denton, 1988) 
Here, xi refers to the number of individuals of group x in the i-th areal unit, whereas X is 
the total population of that group in all areal units. On the other hand, yi refers to the number 
of individuals of group y in the i-th area (alternatively, y could refer to the non-x population). 
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Lastly, ti refers to the total population (i.e. x + y) in the i-th areal unit. One of the characteristics 
(or shortcomings, according to some) of this measure is that it is asymmetrical. In other words, 
xP*y does not have the same result as yP*x. The use of this index to calculate isolation is 
possible when calculating xP*x and not xP*y (Massey and Denton, 1988). 
Massey and Denton (1988) go on to explain that when focusing on the potential isolation 
or exposure for group x, then it is important to note that the sum of xP*x and xP*y is 1. In other 
words, it is possible to calculate the potential interaction between members of group x and 
members of all other groups or subgroups (that are not members of group x) in a city and these 
would all add up to 100%. This utility of this characteristics of this particular measure will 
become more evident at a later stage in this study (Massey and Denton, 1988).  
While the process to decide on the most suitable methods in this study was substantial, 
it was also necessary to give significant consideration to decisions about the suitability of the 
available data. 
3.3 Data selection, accumulation and preparation 
3.3.1 Secondary Analysis and Official Statistics: 
Due to the historical and exploratory nature of this research project, as well as the 
quantitative approach, it was necessary to seek out existing official datasets. In the process of 
finding suitable datasets, various surveys were looked at, including the National Income 
Dynamics Survey and the Quarterly Labour Force Surveys. Some of the strengths of these 
surveys was the detailed design of the questionnaire and the variety of variables it included. 
However, only the census datasets that included data for the full-count had the 
geographical details necessary for this project. Consequently, the full-count SPSS datasets for 
1980 and 1991 were obtained, in addition to the data available using Community Profile 
Databases by means of the SuperTABLE and SuperCROSS software for the 1996, 2001 and 
2011 census counts. The SPSS files were available from the DataFirst website, whereas the 
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SuperTABLE and SuperCROSS software and databases were available through the DataFirst 
offices. 
Perhaps the most obvious benefit for this project was the cost and time involved in 
collecting data, but it also allowed for the possibility of a historical approach in this project. 
Although there is no guarantee that this expectation will be met, it is safe to assume that the 
quality of the data collected and collated in official datasets will be of a high quality. 
Furthermore, it is also possible that reanalysis of existing datasets could result in new 
interpretation of the data in question (Bryman, 2012). 
Despite these advantages, there are potential challenges that also need to be overcome 
or dealt with. These potential disadvantages or challenges include, but are not limited to, lack 
of familiarity with the data, the complexity of the data and the absence of key variables 
(Bryman, 2012). De Vaus (2002) adds that when conducting secondary analysis certain 
questions might have been asked in ways that do not perfectly suit the intended research 
question, but sometimes adjustments need to be made especially where the only alternative 
is abandoning the planned research. Prior to arriving at the current research question, another 
version had to be abandoned when I realised that the data simply didn’t exist. Nonetheless, 
the research question was considerably reformulated in order to ensure that it was answerable 
with the existing data. 
3.3.2 Datasets and Preparation: 
3.3.2.1 General: 
3.3.2.1.1 Overview: 
The aim of this study was to use existing census datasets from the 1970s to 2011 to 
demonstrate the extent to which spatial and economic inequalities in Cape Town had shifted 
or persisted. While it was possible to obtain various datasets through the DataFirst centre and 
its website, through initial examination of pre-1980 datasets it became clear that the structure 
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and quality of the datasets was going to make comparative analyses difficult. Furthermore, 
since some occupational and residential shifts started taking place during the 1980s, it was 
ultimately only necessary to have one serviceable pre-1991 census dataset to ensure there 
was a data point prior to those changes. The search to find a first data point therefore shifted 
to 1980 and 1985. 
3.3.2.1.2 Geography: 
One of the challenges to be addressed is whether the available data has suburb or 
subplace level detail – after all, mapping the aforementioned social and racial inequalities at 
that level of geographical detail is the aim of this project. However, not all census datasets 
have geographical detail at the requisite level. 
While the SPSS datasets available for the 1980 census have the requisite geographical 
detail, the later publicly available SPSS datasets do not. Nonetheless, subplace level data 
could be access using the Community Profile Databases on the SuperCROSS system 
accessible online and via the DataFirst lab on campus. One limitation of the SuperCROSS 
system is that the datasets are not fully integrated – for example, while certain household 
variables regarding type of structure and access to services might be integrated, it would not 
be possible to analyse those variables in conjunction with certain educational and/or 
occupational variables. This means that although low-level geographical detail is available, the 
way in which the data has been arranged and/or integrated limits the kinds of analysis that 
could be done. 
However, fully integrated data at subplace level detail is available for analysis at the local 
Statistics South Africa offices and is available to be accessed, by appointment, by those 
wanting to use it for research. 
3.3.2.2 1980: 
According to metadata available from DataFirst (2014b: 4), “1980 South African 
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Population Census was a count of all persons present on Republic of South African territory 
during census night (i.e. at midnight between 6 and 7 May 1980)”. The detailed statistics it 
aimed to collect focused on various aspects of households (such as dwelling type and 
household goods) and individuals (including population group, employment status and 
religion). 
3.3.2.2.1 Sample: 
While the metadata available on the DataFirst website (2014b) does not explicitly confirm 
that the datasets available are a full-count, email correspondence between representatives of 
Statistics South Africa and DataFirst, respectively, confirm that this is in fact the case (Alberts, 
2008). 
3.3.2.2.2 Geography 
The aim of this census was not only to provide detailed statistics of the population in 
1980, but also to do so at a small area level (i.e. large scale). It therefore had the enumerators 
subdistrict (or ESD) as the “lowest level of geographic aggregation”, but also included suburbs, 
which was the closest to the chosen geographical scale/level for this project (DataFirst, 2014b: 
5). 
As suggested above, ‘subplace’ is not necessarily synonymous with ‘suburb’. In fact, 
according to Statistics South Africa (2010) these terms are defined as follows: 
Place name: “the civic entities below the level of municipality in the 
census geography hierarchy” (Statistics South Africa, 2010: 113) 
Main Place: “first (lowest) level of place names” (Statistics South Africa, 
2010: 111) 
Subplace: “second (lowest) level of place names” (Statistics South 
Africa, 2010: 116) 
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Suburb: “areas within a town or city proclaimed or set aside mainly for 
residing purposes […] See informal settlement and subplace.” (Statistics 
South Africa, 2010: 116) 
In order to understand the differences between these geographical levels, we can 
consider Mitchell’s Plain on the Cape Flats, which according to Turok (2001) was established 
and developed for Coloured residents in the 1970s and 1980s. In terms of the geographical 
levels in the census data, Mitchell’s Plain is an example of a “main place”. On the other hand, 
in the 2011 census there were 19 subplaces that comprised that main place. Some of the 
names of these subplaces include Tafelsig, Strandfontein, Rocklands and Westridge. 
An additional challenge with the 1980 data was that prior to the 1996 data there were no 
ready-made GIS shapefiles available for spatial analysis of the data, but the spatial 
implications of the city’s inequalities were central to the way this project was conceptualised 
and it was essential to be able to demonstrate the spatial distribution of the data for 1980. 
Since it can be (and has been) argued that all non-geographic data can be associated 
with geographical data (Kavouras and Kokla, 2011), it became clear that this was going to be 
have to done manually. This was done by using Google Maps (maps.google.co.za) to locate 
the suburbs referred to in the 1980 census data and then match them with the names of 
subplaces in the 1996 GIS shapefiles, which were the earliest available GIS data available 
from Statistics South Africa. 
3.3.2.3 1985: 
While an additional pre-1991 dataset could have been useful, there were too many 
problems with this dataset to be useful for this project. Since the occupational data need to be 
disaggregated by employment status, there was some concern that this would be the case 
with the 1985 data too. However, this was not possible because the datasets did not include a 
‘work status’ or ‘employment status’ variable, so there was no way of accounting for the 
possible that some unemployed individuals were included in the occupational data. This was 
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also a reason that Borel-Saladin (2012a) chose not to use the 1985 data. Furthermore, there 
was no income category variable, which was essential for the planned analyses. 
Borel-Saladin (2012a: 40) also pointed out the following problem with the occupational 
data for 1985: 
“There are several problems with these data. There appears to be a 
different number of occupational categories in the data set than in the 
codebook. There are only 28 or 29 occupational codes. In addition, the 
way the occupations have been grouped is quite dissimilar to how I have 
recoded the other sets according to the SASCO system.” 
3.3.2.4 1991: 
As already stated, certain changes to the composition of some suburbs and occupational 
classes had already undergone some change by 1991, even though the apartheid government 
was still in power. 
Nevertheless, the 1991 census “was an enumeration of the population and housing in 
South Africa… [that] collected data on dwellings and individuals' demographic, family and 
employment details” (DataFirst, 2014c: 2). 
As with the 1980 data, the metadata available from DataFirst (2014c) does not explicitly 
confirm that the datasets including a full count, but this fact was confirmed by the 
aforementioned correspondence between Statistics South Africa and DataFirst (Alberts, 
2008). 
While the 1991 datasets were purported to include a full count of the population there 
were some problems with implementing the sample design. According to the metadata report 
from DataFirst (2014c: 4): 
“As a result of the unplanned and unstructured nature of certain 
residential areas, as well as the inaccessibility of certain areas during the 
preparations for the enumeration of census, comprehensive door-to-door 
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surveys were not possible. The Human Sciences Research Council had to 
enumerate these areas by means of sample surveys. 88 areas country-
wide were enumerated on this basis.” 
Based on the analysis of the 1991, as well as literature on the state of the city at the time, 
suggest that this sample design deviations like had a considerable impact on the count of the 
Cape Town population, more specifically the city’s Black African population. 
According to Cook (2001), contrary to the limitations on the number of Black Africans 
permitted to be in the Western Cape since 1955, the 1983 announcement of a new settlement 
(that would become Khayelitsha) was a surprise. Furthermore, a 1988 survey indicated that 
there were 110,000-189,000 residents in Khayelitsha at the time, yet the 1991 census datasets 
suggest that there were only around 36,000 Black Africans living in the greater Cape Town 
area at the time. 
This is arguably a consequence of the aforementioned sample design problems, which 
would have a significant impact on the accuracy of the 1991 data – not only in terms of race, 
but also in terms of other factors like employment and occupational distributions. It was at this 
point that the decision was taken to exclude the 1991 census data from this project. 
3.3.2.5 1996: 
South Africa’s 1996 census aimed to enumerate all persons, households and institutions 
present in the country on the census night, 9-10 October 1996. According to DataFirst (2014d) 
the enumeration took place between 10 and 30 October, although in some places it was 
necessary to continue as late as December of that year. 
Whereas the SPSS data files for previous included the data for the full count, the 1996 
SPSS files only included 10% samples, using a stratified sampling method according to 
provinces and districts. The files also included a weight variable that adjust for undercount as 
well as to inflate the 10% sample to match the population size (DataFirst, 2014d). In addition 
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to the SPSS outputs, 1996 was the first census where the full count was made available for 
analysis using the SuperCROSS or SuperTABLE software (Space-Time Research, 2016b, 
Space-Time Research, 2016a). 
According to Statistics South Africa (2001: iii): 
“The SuperCROSS software package is an Australian product that was 
first used by Stats SA for the dissemination of Census 1996 data. Access 
to the software was limited to those individuals and organisations that 
could afford to pay the licence fees.” 
It provided a user-friendly “desktop cross tabulation analytics tool” that not only made it 
easier to handle large datasets, it also simplified processes of the “data aggregation, 
manipulation and dissemination” (Space-Time Research, 2016b). 
The boundaries for lowest level of geographic aggregation was determined by the local 
authority in each area (DataFirst, 2014d). In addition to the benefits of using the Space-Time 
Research software, census 1996 was the first one for which ArcGIS shapefiles were produced 
and provided by Statistics South Africa that corresponded with the geographical levels 
available in the Community Profile Databases. 
3.3.2.6 2001: 
According to DataFirst (2014e: 4), the 2001 census “covered every person present in 
South Africa on Census Night, 9-10 October 2001 including all de jure household members 
and residents of institutions”. 
As with 1996, the SPSS datasets were 10% samples that included weight variables that 
accounted for the undercount, as well as to inflate the 10% sample. The extent of the 
undercount was determined by means of a post-enumeration that took place approximately 
one month after the census count (DataFirst, 2014e). 
Although enumerator area numbers and subplace names were excluded from the 10% 
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files, they were available in the Community Profile Databases available using the 
SuperCROSS software. Whereas it was necessary to pay a licence fees to access the 1996 
data, when the 2001 data became available it was made available free of charge (Statistics 
South Africa, 2001). 
As with the 1996 census data, ArcGIS shapefiles that corresponded with the geographic 
levels in the Community Profiles had been created and were made available by Statistics SA. 
3.3.2.7 2011: 
Census 2011 was intended to cover all persons present in South Africa on the census 
night in October of that year, as well as “all de jure household members and residents of 
institutions” (DataFirst, 2016). 
As with the censuses in 1996 and 2001, the data was provided in two formats, which 
(DataFirst, 2015: 2) described as follows: 
“A 10% sample dataset at the level of Province, District and 
Municipality plus spatial data at Small Area level.” 
“A database of "Community Profiles" at the level of Province, District, 
Municipality, Main Place, Subplace and Ward. This database is in the 
proprietary software, SuperCROSS, which allows cross-tabulation and 
mapping of the data.” 
Furthermore, as with the two preceding censuses, ArcGIS shapefiles were made 
available that corresponded with the geographic levels in the Community Profiles. Additionally, 
the 10% samples included a weight variables that made the necessary adjustments for 
undercount, as determined by the post-enumeration survey, and inflated the 10% (DataFirst, 
2016). 
3.3.3 Data Analysis: 
3.3.3.1 Subplace level change: 
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The starting point for the analysis was to correctly disaggregate all data by subplace. 
This included the data for employment status, occupations, race, age and more. The reason 
for using the subplace as the starting point is that this allowed for various calculations by 
subplace, including the following: 
▪ Unemployment rates 
▪ Proportions of residents comprised by different groups 
▪ Proportion of employed population in specific occupations 
Where necessary is was also possible to calculate the absolute number of people in 
different categories in each subplace. This was necessary for at least two reasons. Firstly, the 
absolute number of people in different categories or social groups was necessary for the 
segregation calculations used in this project. Secondly, since the files associated with the 
shapefiles including the surface area per subplace it allowed for density calculations including: 
▪ Density of working-age people 
▪ Density of people employed in specific occupations 
This level of detail, while painstaking and complex at times, was necessary to 
accommodate the numerous of spatial and other approaches used in this project. 
3.3.3.2 City-level changes: 
Once total for the various categories and/or social groups were calculated for each 
subplace for each of the years in question, it was possible to calculate totals for the city as a 
whole. Among other things, it allowed for the possibility of calculating city-level unemployment 
rates, proportions of the city’s populations comprised of different race groups, as well as 
proportions of the employed populations in different occupations, among other calculations. 
3.4 Conclusion: 
The purpose of this chapter was to delineate the various decisions made regarding 
datasets to be used, as well as the numerous methods used in the analysis. Due to the nature 
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of the topic of this study (i.e. the relationship between race, space and class/employment), no 
single method was sufficient to address this complex issue.  
The primary debate at the heart of this study focuses on city-level occupational and/or 
employment change over time, but the spatial analyses (both in terms of the ArcGIS work, as 
well as the segregation measures) required low-level geographical detail (i.e. subplace level 
data). 
Additionally, rather than being predominantly guided by the ideal types of city quarters 
discussed in the previous chapter (Marcuse, 1997a, Marcuse and Van Kempen, 1997, 
Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000b, Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000a) or historical categories 
that were borne out of the Group Areas Act (1966), such as formerly Coloureds-only 
neighbourhoods, the analyses and interpretations were primarily driven by the data. 
The chapter that follows will address city-level changes in demographics, employment 
and occupational distributions, with the aim of determining the whether the social polarisation 
or professionalisation theories were most applicable in Cape Town. The next chapter goes 
further to interrogate the changing racial characteristics of the city’s occupational distribution, 
as well as the differences in unemployment rates (if any) between different race groups.  
The subsequent chapter address the question of the spatial (i.e. residential) implications 
of the changes in the labour market. The first focuses on middle-class suburbia, whereas the 
last chapter addresses the concept of ghettos and its applicability in the Cape Town context. 
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4 RACIALLY UNEQUAL EFFECTS OF LABOUR MARKET 
CHANGES: 
4.1 Growing Population and Labour Market: 
Since the focus of this project is centred, to a large extent, on the labour market, it is 
worth starting with a look at the growth in more detail. The reason for the focus on the working-
age population (here and throughout the rest of this thesis), is that the labour market data 
under discussion is limited to that portion of the population, so it makes sense to focus on that 
category at all times. 
Nevertheless, the table below shows how the labour market, has changed between 1980 
and 2011, as well as disaggregating those who are employed, unemployed and not 
economically active. According the four census counts used here, the labour market, which 
according to Statistics South Africa (2010) includes all three of the aforementioned categories, 
grew from 1,016,163 in 1980 to 2,604,192 in 2011.  
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1980 614,452 27,587 374,124 1,016,163 4%
1996 888,412 216,979 578,093 1,683,484 20%
2001 939,508 382,818 648,577 1,970,903 29%
2011 1,294,236 405,981 903,975 2,604,192 24%
1980-2001 325,056 355,231 274,453 954,740 
2001-2011 354,728 23,163 255,398 633,289 
TOTAL 679,784 378,394 529,851 1,588,029 
Changes
 
Table 4.1: Absolute numbers of Employed, Unemployed and Non-economically active people in 
Cape Town, 1980-2011 
Source: South African population censuses (see: Note 1) 
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The majority of that growth comprised increases in the unemployed population 
(+378,394) and those who were not economically active (+529,851). Despite this, the 
employed more than doubled in the same period. More specially, it grew by 679,784 between 
1980 and 2011, from 614,452 to 1,294,236. Due to the focus on the polarisation-
professionalisation debate, much of the discussion going forward will focus on the 
economically active population (i.e. the employed and unemployed), with specific attention 
paid to its occupational and racial composition. 
4.2 Polarisation or Professionalisation: 
The starting point for this study was to engage with the debate between those who argue 
that urban job markets are becoming increasingly polarised (i.e. the school of thought built on 
the work of Saskia Sassen) and those who argue that they are undergoing a process of 
professionalisation (i.e. the theory posited in the work of Chris Hamnett, among others). Initially 
the aim was not to determine whether the previously-determined process of professionalisation 
(Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw, 2009) had continued, but as the analysis progressed it became 
evident that any assumptions that that process had continued would need to be interrogated. 
After all, the question of whether the city has been professionalising or becoming polarised 
had already been the subject of previous studies, with the apparent conclusion that the Cape 
Town’s labour market had been undergoing professionalisation (Borel-Saladin and 
Crankshaw, 2009, Crankshaw, 2012). 
4.2.1 Occupational Distribution of the Employed Working-age Population: 
Determining whether the professionalising pattern previously identified by Borel-Saladin 
and Crankshaw (2009) had continued in the decade following the 2001 census was central to 
this project and a starting point was to reproduce some of the results discussed in that 2009 
study. The reason for this was not only to confirm those findings, but also to ensure that the 
corresponding categories were used through for ease of comparison. The analysis conducted 
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for this project was in agreement with their findings when focusing on the entire 1980-2001 
period, but some differences became evident when looking at the 2001-11 period. 
1980 1996 2001 2011
1 Legislators, senior official and managers 33,169 57,041 65,402 145,654
2 Professionals 53,651 94,884 84,621 104,291
3 Technical and associate professionals 41,377 79,966 99,068 133,351
4 Clerks 80,937 102,992 132,284 186,950
5 Service workers, shop and market sales workers 68,443 85,411 108,437 218,390
6 Skilled agricultural and fishery workers 8,808 12,262 7,590 10,002
7 Craft and related trades workers 42,718 113,536 110,781 151,627
8 Plant and machine operators and assemblers 151,136 74,653 74,057 64,170
9 Elementary Occupation 116,297 185,233 188,975 277,782
10 Occupation unspecified 17,916 82,438 68,290
 
Table 4.2: Absolute number of people employed in Major Occupation Groups in Cape Town, 
1980-2011 
Source: South African population censuses (see: Note 1) 
 
Based on the 2011 census data, all major occupational groups continued to grow during 
the period 2001-11, with the only exception being among “Plant and machine operators and 
assemblers”, which continued to drop during this period. The major occupational categories 
that saw the most significant growth, in terms of the absolute number of jobs added in the 
during the 2001-11 period were “Service workers, shop and market sales workers” (+109,953), 
“Legislators, senior official and managers” (+80,252) and “Elementary Occupations” (+88,807). 
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1980 - 1996 1996 - 2001 2001 - 2011
1 Legislators, senior official and managers 23,872 8,361 80,252
2 Professionals 41,233 -10,263 19,670
3 Technical and associate professionals 38,589 19,102 34,283
4 Clerks 22,055 29,292 54,666
5 Service workers, shop and market sales workers 16,968 23,026 109,953
6 Skilled agricultural and fishery workers 3,454 -4,672 2,412
7 Craft and related trades workers 70,818 -2,755 40,846
8 Plant and machine operators and assemblers -76,483 -596 -9,887 
9 Elementary Occupation 68,936 3,742 88,807
 
Table 4.3: Changes in the absolute number of people employed in Major Occupation Groups in 
Cape Town, 1980-2011 
Source: South African population censuses (see: Note 1) 
Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw (2009) argued that Cape Town saw a net increase of 
employment in middle-income occupations because the growing service-sector occupations 
such as “Clerks” and “Service workers, shop and market sales workers” were, on average, on 
par with and even slightly better paid than the declining manufacturing jobs. Therefore, is made 
sense to regard them as middle-income, not low-income, occupations. 
While the Census 2011 dataset used for this study did not have detailed income data, 
but only income categories, the comparison between in the incomes of different major 
occupational groups once again was limited to determining the modal income category. 
The data depicted in Table 4.4 below, is reminiscent of the data discussed by Borel-
Saladin and Crankshaw (2009) in that “Sales and Service”, “Craft and related trades”, as well 
as “Plant and machine operator” occupations all share the same modal income category of 
“R19,201-R38,400” per annum. On the other hand, the modal income category of those 
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employed as “Clerks” is “R 76,801 - R 153,600”, which is also the modal income category of 
those employed as “Technicians” (i.e. a major occupational group more closely associated 
with managerial and professional occupations, according to ISCO). Nevertheless, this would 
suggest that both of the aforementioned non-manual occupations can be regarded as middle-
income occupations, at the very least.  
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R1 to R4,800 1% 1% 1% 1% 2% 2% 2% 4%
R4,801 to R9,600 2% 1% 2% 2% 3% 5% 4% 7%
R9,601 to R19,200 5% 3% 6% 7% 12% 14% 13% 20%
R19,201 to R38,400 11% 7% 14% 16% 24% 25% 28% 29%
R38,401 to R76,800 15% 11% 17% 19% 18% 18% 20% 14%
R76,801 to R153,600 19% 20% 21% 19% 14% 11% 11% 6%
R153,601 to R307,200 19% 26% 17% 13% 9% 7% 5% 3%
R307,201 to R614,400 11% 16% 6% 5% 3% 3% 2% 1%
R614,401 to R1,228,800 4% 5% 1% 1% 1% 1% 0% 0%
R1,228,801 to R2,457,600 1% 2% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
R2,457,601 or more 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Median (annual)
R76,801 to 
R153,600
R153,601 to 
R307,200
R76,801 to 
R153,600
R76,801 to 
R153,600
R38,401 to 
R76,800
R38,401 to 
R76,800
R38,401 to 
R76,800
R19,201 to 
R38,400
Median (monthly)
R6,400 to 
R12,800
R12,800 to 
R25,600
R6,400 to 
R12,800
R6,400 to 
R12,800
R3,200 to 
R6,400
R3,200 to 
R6,400
R3,200 to 
R6,400
R1,600 to  
R3,200
 
Table 4.4: Income distributions (percentages) of selected Major Occupation Groups in Cape 
Town, 2011 
Source: South African population censuses (see: Note 1) 
By following the logic used by Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw (2009), these major 
occupation groups can be collated into high-income, middle-income and low-income 
occupations. However, for the sake of engaging with the polarisation and professionalisation 
arguments, middle-income non-manual occupations, will be kept separate from middle-income 
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manual occupations. When reorganising the data according to this arrangement, the data for 
the changes in the absolute number of people employed in different occupations according to 
income and skill levels can be presented as follows: 
1980 1996 2001 2011
Change: 
1980-2001
Change: 
2001-2011
Change: 
1980-2011
Highly-skilled high-income 128,197 231,891 249,091 383,296 120,894 134,205 255,099
Semi-skilled middle-income 
non-manual
149,380 188,403 240,721 405,340 91,341 164,619 255,960
Semi-skilled middle-income 
manual
193,854 188,189 184,838 215,797 -9,016 30,959 21,943
Low-skilled low-income 116,297 185,233 188,975 277,782 72,678 88,807 161,485
Highly-skilled high-income 21% 26% 27% 30% 5.6% 3.1% 8.8%
Semi-skilled middle-income 
non-manual
24% 21% 26% 31% 1.3% 5.7% 7.1%
Semi-skilled middle-income 
manual
32% 21% 20% 17% -11.9% -3.0% -14.8%
Low-skilled low-income 19% 21% 20% 21% 1.2% 1.4% 2.6%
 
Table 4.5: Changes in the occupational distribution of the working population, in Cape Town, 
grouped according to skill and income levels, 1980-2011 
Source: South African population censuses (see: Note 1) 
Based on the findings in table 4.5 it is clear that, whereas between 1980 and 2001 the 
most significant growth was in the high-income Managerial and Professional occupations 
(+120,894), followed by the combined middle-income occupations (+82,325; i.e. the 91,341-
9,016), there has been shift in the kinds of changes taking place since 2001. However, before 
focusing on the changes in the period 2001-11, it is worth reiterating that, whereas Sassen 
(2000, 2002) regarded non-professional non-manual occupations as both unskilled and low-
income earning, Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw (2009) showed that ‘Clerical Support Workers’, 
as well as ‘Services and Sales Workers’ were in fact middle-income earners. Additionally, 
according to International Labour Organization (2007) many of these occupations require 
some degree of literacy, numeracy and communication skills that would benefit from having 
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completed high school. 
In the decade following the 2001 census, employment in highly-skilled high-income 
occupations continued to grow considerably. However, there was marginally higher growth 
among semi-skilled middle-income occupations, particularly non-manual occupations. 
During this period, an additional 195,578 middle-income jobs were added to the labour 
market. More specifically the 2011 census shows that there was an additional 164,619 people 
employed in Clerical, Sales and Service occupations, as well as an additional 30,959 people 
employed in Craft, Plant and Machinery occupations. This middle-income job growth was 
therefore greater than the growth among Managerial and Professional occupations (+134,205) 
and Elementary occupations (+88,807). 
These findings concur with those of Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw (2009) who argued 
that the changes in the labour market were dominated by a professionalisation trend between 
1980 and 2001. On the other hand, if one looks at the subsequent decade in isolation, it 
appears as though the trend has shifted, and the job market growth has become dominated 
growth in semi-skilled middle-income occupations, more specifically non-manual occupations. 
However, it would be a mistake to focus on the 2001-11 period in isolation, because when one 
focuses on the entire period in question (i.e. 1980-2011) the growth in the number of semi-
skilled middle-income occupations (including both the manual and non-manual occupations) 
exceeds the growth of highly-skilled high-income occupations by just 22,804 (or 9%). 
How then do these findings contribute to the polarisation-professionalisation debate? 
Firstly, as polarisation theory proponents would expect, the evidence does not point to the 
increased employment being found predominantly at the poles of the occupational distribution 
(Baum, 1997, Chiu and Lui, 2004, Sassen, 2000, Sassen, 2002), because middle-income 
occupations saw add more jobs to the during the period in question than either low- or high-
income occupations. Secondly, while some might argue that the aforementioned expansion of 
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middle-income occupations also contradicts what professionalisation proponents might expect 
(Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw, 2009, Crankshaw, 2008, Crankshaw, 2012, Hamnett, 1994, 
Hamnett, 1996) and are more reminiscent of the middle-income occupational growth found in 
the eThekwini metropolitan municipality between 1980 and 2014 (Lombard and Crankshaw, 
2017), there are a number of caveats to consider. 
Firstly, the growth of middle-income manual occupations exceeded the growth of middle-
income non-manual occupations in eThekwini during certain intervals during the 1980-2014 
period in question, with the latter eventually taking the lead in the final decade of the period. 
Cape town did not see comparable middle-income manual occupation growth. In fact, 
employment in those occupations decreased during the 1980-2001 period and when focusing 
on the entire period in question, manual labour growth was miniscule compared to that of 
middle-income non-manual occupations. In fact, the findings in table 4.5 show that in terms of 
job market share, those manual occupations lost 15% (from 32% to 17% during this period), 
whereas semi-skilled non-manual occupations gained 7% (from 24% to 31%). 
Secondly, unemployment in eThekwini appears, at least on the surface, seems to have 
changed very little. According to Lombard and Crankshaw (2017), the unemployment rate was 
15% in 1980 and had risen to 16% by 2014. On the other hand, the increase in unemployment 
in Cape Town is more reminiscent of what Hamnett (1994, 1996) argued would occur in a 
professionalising labour market. As shown in table 4.1, the unemployment rate in Cape Town 
increased from just 4% in 1980 to 24% in 2011, although it was as high as 29% in 2001. 
Lastly, whereas the polarisation included the argument that occupational changes have 
included significantly increased demand for low-skilled workers, the professionalisation theory 
argues that changes in occupational distributions dominated by increased employment in 
highly-skilled high-income occupations have contributed to improving the skill profile of the 
employed workforce as a whole (Hamnett, 1994, Hamnett, 1996, Sassen, 2000, Sassen, 
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2002). 
4.2.2 Changing Education Profile of the Labour Market: 
At this point it is worth revisiting the part of the polarisation-professionalisation debate 
that addresses the lesser-skilled and/or unskilled part of the labour market. As part of her 
polarisation thesis, Sassen (2000, 2002) argued that one of the consequences of the changes 
that occurred at the poles of the occupational distribution (i.e. in terms of both skill and income) 
attracted large numbers of lesser-skilled or unskilled migrants who saw those changes as the 
opportunity to find employment. On the other hand, Hamnett (1994) argued that employment 
growth in low-skilled low-income occupations were only present in those cities with large 
unskilled migrant populations and therefore concluded that those populations were the cause, 
not the consequence, of the growth of low-income employment, as well as that it was not 
evident in cities with smaller migrant populations. 
He went on to argue that in contexts that did not have large unskilled migrant populations, 
it was more likely that the urban job markets would undergo professionalisation (i.e. the 
occupational changes would be dominated by significant growth in highly-skilled high-income 
occupations). What then would happen to those without the necessary education or skills to 
enter those skills-intensive occupations? Hamnett (1994) argued that they are likely to be 
unemployed or relying on the welfare system, where applicable (Hamnett, 1996).  
In his work on the Dutch labour force, Hamnett (1994: 415) argued that Randstad 
“underwent an upward shift in the 1980s which is consistent with growing professionalisation”. 
The question of skill and/or educational attainment in the labour market was previously 
addressed by Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw (2009). Using the same bands of educational 
attainment used in that study (including reproducing their results for 1980 and 2001), it is 
evident that education has become increasingly important in Cape Town’s labour market 
during the period under discussion here. 
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Figure 4.6 shows that the educational profile of Cape Town’s employed population has 
undergone significant changes during the period in question. Perhaps most noteworthy is that, 
while 76% of Cape Town’s employed population in 1980 had never completed what is now 
referred to as ‘basic education’ (i.e. primary and high school), this figure dropped to just 44% 
by 2011. This means that more than half of all jobs in Cape Town in 2011 required that the 
employee had completed high school. It is although worth keeping in mind that at least some 
of the employees in this category might have been employed for decades, so it is logical to 
assume that an increasing proportion of first-time employees are expected to have completed 
high school or more. 
The increasing skills intensity of the city’s job market is also evident in the fact that in 
2011, 57% of all employed had, at the very least completed high school. Included in that figure 
is the 35% of the employed population who had completed high school and the 16% who had 
at least one university degree. The remaining 6% comprised those who had completed various 
post-secondary certificates and diplomas; a figure that decreased from 10% in 1980. Perhaps 
the most revealing comparison, regarding the extent to which the job market has become skills 
intensive, is that in 2011 there was a greater percentage of employed persons with at least 
one university degree (i.e. 16%) that there were people who had just completed high school in 
1980 (i.e. 14%). 
Considering the professionalisation trend discussed by Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw 
(2009), which would require specialised and/or technical skills, and the growth of Clerical, 
Sales and Service occupations in the subsequent decade, which would require numeracy and 
literacy skills required for information processing, this trend is not all that surprising 
(International Labour Office, 2012). From these results, it is evident that educational attainment 
has become increasingly important for labour market success during the study period. Stated 
differently, in order to find employment, it was becoming increasing important to have, at the 
very least, completed high school.  
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Figure 4.6 Educational distribution of the employed population in Cape Town, 1980-201114 
Source: South African population censuses (see: Note 1) 
                                                 
14 Totals might not add up to 100% because of rounding. 
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Thus, while the 2011 census data show that the changes in the labour market were 
dominated by growth in semi-skilled middle-income non-manual occupations, employment in 
the aforementioned highly-skilled occupations also continued to grow. Furthermore, the 
demand for skills continued to grow significant during the 2001-11 period. In fact, previous 
work addressing this question, such as the research by Branson et al. (2009) that used national 
data for the period 2000-07, has confirmed a correlation between increased educational 
attainment with both labour market success and better earnings. 
In other words, the changes evident in the 2011 data do not necessarily contradict the 
Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw (2009) findings. Because, while the employment growth among 
highly-skilled high-income occupations was exceeded by the growth of middle-income non-
manual employment, the growth of high-income employment actually accelerated during the 
2001-11 period. More specifically, according to the findings in table 4.5, employment in high-
income occupations grew by 120,894 during the 1980-2001 period and then increased by an 
additional 134,205 in just ten years after that. 
Secondly, the continually increasing demand for literacy, numeracy and other more 
advanced skills in the labour market cannot be disconnected from the strong 
professionalisation trend of the preceding 21 years. Thirdly, and connected to the previous 
points, the characteristics of many of the fast growing occupations in the 2001-11 period, 
especially the clerical occupations, indicate that they would provide essential support for those 
in highly-skilled high-income occupations and that this growth can therefore be seen as a by-
product of the aforementioned professionalisation trend (International Labour Organization, 
2007, International Labour Office, 2012). 
While this skills intensiveness is evident in the employed portion of the labour market, 
what about those who were unemployed (but in search of employment)? 
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Figure 4.7 Educational distribution of the unemployed population in Cape Town, 1980-2011 
Source: South African population censuses (see: Note 1) 
While focusing on the portion of the labour market that is not economically active is 
unlikely to be all that revealing, because it includes full-time students, the disabled and others 
who are not searching for employment, the educational profile of the unemployed workforce is 
useful. The utility is that it provides an educational profile of the proportion of the economically 
active population who are not able to find employment.  
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The first noteworthy point when discussing the data depicted in figure 4.7 is that even 
among unemployed workers a trend is evident that points to increasing skills or educational 
attainment. However, the difference here is that the majority of the unemployment (albeit a 
decreasing one) have never completed high school. More specifically, while 95% of Cape 
Town’s unemployed population in 1980 had never finished high school, this figure had dropped 
to 70% in 2011.  
Considering the findings regarding the ongoing professionalisation in Cape Town’s 
labour market, focusing on university graduates in the labour market is essential. As a starting 
point, it is worth noting that whereas in 1980 approximately 1 in 25 employed persons in Cape 
Town were university graduates, in 2011 the ratio was approximately 1 in 6. Additionally, while 
some might argue it is more likely for holders of certain degrees to find employment, Branson 
et al. (2009) did not draw this distinction when they found that those with degrees were more 
likely to find employment and were more likely to earn more than those without degrees.  
4.2.3 Impact of Education Level of Unemployment: 
The findings presented by Hamnett (1994) and Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw (2009) 
show that the education levels of the labour force increases in the context of a professionalising 
labour market.  Additionally, arguments have been presented here that suggest that when 
changes in the labour market are dominated by considerable growth in highly-skilled high-
income occupations, those who do not have the requisite skills or educational qualifications 
are going to struggle to find employment (Hamnett, 1994, Kasarda, 1989). 
That said, it is worth asking about the extent of the unemployment problem among those 
with different levels of education. The findings in figure 4.8 once duplicate the bands of 
education levels used in the Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw (2009), however all those who have 
never completed high school (i.e. including those who have incomplete primary school) have 
been combined into one band. 
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The findings presented in figure 4.8 show that those with some kind of post-secondary 
educational qualification have fared noticeably better than those with less education. While 
unemployment increased in all educational bands, the unemployment rate among those with 
a ‘Post-school certificate/diploma’ was 9% and it was just 4% among those with a ‘University 
degree or NQF-level equivalent’.  
 
Figure 4.8: Unemployment rate by level of education in Cape Town, 1980-2011 
Source: South African population censuses (see: Note 1) 
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On the other hand, the unemployment rate among those who had never completed their 
basic education (i.e. at most they had some secondary or high school education) was 
consistently higher than the rate for all education levels combined. This is not too surprising, 
especially when one considers the professionalisation trend that was evident over the period 
in question.  
For example, the highest unemployment rate, across all educational levels and races, 
found in the data analysed here was 29% in 2001 and this dropped to 24% in 2011. However, 
when focusing on those with incomplete basic education, the unemployment rates in at those 
points in time were 38% and 33%, respectively. Whereas figure 4.6 showed the increased 
prevalence of higher educational or skill levels among the employed population over the period 
in question, the findings in figure 4.8 concur with that point by showing that over the period in 
question those groups in the population with higher educational attainment consistently 
experienced lower unemployment rates over the same period.  
4.3 Occupational Distributions, Unemployment and Racial Composition: 
4.3.1 Changing Racial composition of Cape Town’s Working-Age Population: 
The literature discussed here has shown that, regardless of the context, people of 
different races and/or ethnicities have had different experiences and/or levels of success in 
urban labour markets. It has been evident in the discussions on Rio De Janeiro (Ribeiro and 
Telles, 2000), Brussels (Kesteloot, 2000) and numerous cities in the USA (Kasarda, 1989, 
Wilson, 2011, Wilson, 2012). This is certainly true in South Africa too, but here we also have 
to deal with the legacy of legislated inequalities in the quality of education available to different 
races, as well as job reservations that contributed to preserving the racial hierarchy of the 
apartheid era (McGrath, 2004, Seekings, 2011, Webster, 1986). 
While Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw (2009) did not address the issue of how the 
professionalising labour market was being experienced by different races, Crankshaw (2012) 
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did and made an important contribution to this ongoing debate. After all, while some were 
arguing that changes to the labour market and the city’s geography were perpetuating 
apartheid-era inequalities (Lemanski, 2007, Turok, 2001), Crankshaw (2012) actually 
presented evidence to show the extent to which Black Africans and Coloureds have made 
gains in certain occupational categories. 
However, before taking that debate further, it is necessary to better understand how the 
changing racial composition of Cape Town’s working-age population. Furthermore, as will 
become more evident as the analysis progresses, it is necessary to focus on both the absolute 
numbers of working-age population individuals, as well as their proportional compositions. 
Table 4.9 summarises the changes that have taken place and shows that, over the period 
in question, Cape Town’s working-age population grew from 1.0 million in 1980 to 2.6 million 
in 2011. The most significant contributions to this growth were the growth of the Coloured 
(+554 867) and Black African (+885 645) populations. 
Race vs WAP
BLACK 
AFRICAN
COLOURED INDIAN WHITE TOTAL
1980 139,218 523,585 11,054 342,306 1,016,163
1996 441,001 789,317 24,638 428,528 1,683,484
2001 641,143 922,724 29,436 377,600 1,970,903
2011 1,024,863 1,078,452 38,436 462,441 2,604,192
1980-2001 501,925 399,139 18,382 35,294 954,740
1980-2011 885,645 554,867 27,382 120,135 1,588,029  
Table 4.9: Absolute change in the racial composition of the Working-age Population in Cape 
Town, 1980-2011 
Source: South African population censuses (see: Note 1) 
A major contributor to the growth of the Black African population was the removal of 
apartheid-era influx controls that restricted their urbanisation prior to and in the 1980s. 
Additionally, since the poorest communities in South Africa were in more rural communities, 
 120 
 
the growth of the city’s labour market who have been seen as an attractive prospect 
(Christopher, 2005b, Seekings, 2011). In contrast to the growth of these groups, the White 
population decreased from 428,528 in 1996 to 377,600 (i.e. -50,928) before peaking again in 
2011 at 462,441.  
When one considers the change in the racial profile of Cape Town’s working-age 
population, there have been considerable changes. For example, because the White working-
age population saw very little growth during this period (i.e. +120,135), they decreased from 
34% of the working-age population in 1980 to 18% in 2011 (see: figure 4.14). of the city’s 
working-age population because the other racial groups were growing that much faster. 
 
Figure 4.10: Working-age population by race, 1980-2011 (percentage) 
Source: South African population censuses (see: Note 1) 
At the other end of the scale, the growth of the Black African working-age population 
(+885,645) meant that, while they accounted for just 14% in 1980, they accounted for 39% of 
the working-age population in 2011. One question that might be raised at this point is how, if 
at all, this relates to the polarisation-professionalisation debate? Well, an issue raised by 
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Hamnett (1994) and which also formed part of his critique of the polarisation argument is that 
a large influx of lesser skilled migrants (whether from other countries or those moving from 
rural to urban) contributes to social polarisation. On the other hand, he also suggests that 
where this does not happen and where unemployment increases, those communities or groups 
bear brunt of increased unemployment. Either scenario, if found to be true in Cape Town, 
would seem to support the claims made by Lemanski (2007). 
Nevertheless, some of the findings presented by Crankshaw (2012) already alluded to 
some paradoxical changes in the Cape Town labour market and this study aims to find out 
whether those patterns have continued, as well as what the spatial dynamics of those changes 
are? 
While the reason for focusing changes to the racial composition of the working-age 
population in terms of absolute numbers and percentages might not be obvious at this stage, 
the latter will be useful when considering the racial composition of various occupational groups 
in order to determine whether certain groups are over- or under-represented. 
 So far, the analyses and related discussions have shown that whereas there is evidence 
of Cape Town’s labour market undergoing a process of professionalisation during the 1980-
2001 period (Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw, 2009), the changes in the occupational distribution 
between 2001 and 2011 appear to be dominated by expanding employment in middle-income 
non-manual occupations. However, growth in high-income occupations are continued and the 
upskilling of the employed population, a characteristic of professionalisation according to 
Hamnett (1994), also continued. 
As previously stated, the aforementioned studies focused on Cape Town did not include 
data from the 2011 census. So, one of the issues being addressed here is how the racial 
differences in each of the major occupational categories (as depictured in the figure below) 
have come about. More specifically, the aim is to make sense of the intra-racial occupational 
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changes, or lack thereof, that have resulted in Black Africans being significantly over-
represented in Elementary occupations, whereas Whites are over-represented among 
Managerial, Professional, Technical and Associate Professional occupations.  
As a starting point, it is worth looking at the data on the racial composition of the major 
occupational categories, as well as the occupational distribution of the racial groups. In the 
figures below, it is evident that the racial compositions of the occupational categories in 2011, 
depicted below, the Black African working-age population is over-represented among 
Elementary and Unspecified occupations, but significantly under-represented among the 
Managerial and Professional occupations. Conversely, Whites are over-represented among 
Managerial and Professional occupations, as well as the Clerical, Sales and Services 
occupations. 
Due to the previously discussed changes in the labour market, the focus on the coming 
sections will focus on the changes in the largest and fastest growing occupational categories. 
4.3.2 Racial Composition of Highly-skilled High-income occupations: 
Although the decision to engage with the polarisation-professionalisation debate has 
been quite clear throughout this project, a central aspect of this project has been to understand 
the racial and spatial characteristics of these labour market changes. While there was limited 
attention given to how different racial or ethnic groups were impacted in either Sassen’s (2000, 
2002) or Hamnett’s (1994, 1996) work, some have made attempts to engage with the role of 
marginalised groups in Sydney (Baum, 1997) and Hong Kong (Chiu and Lui, 2004).  
As stated earlier, Crankshaw (2012) raised this issue by addressing the question of who 
was benefiting from the professionalising trend in Cape Town’s labour market. While the 
evidence presented clearly indicated that Black Africans and Coloureds had made gains in 
both the high-income occupations, as well as the middle-income non-manual occupations, a 
few unanswered questions remained that will be addressed here. 
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For example, in a figure with the title ‘Percentage racial composition of employment in 
professional, managerial, and technical occupations in Cape Town, 1980 to 2007’, the 
evidence shows that during this period, the percentage of people employed in those 
occupations who identified as Coloured or Black African has increased considerably. And yet, 
Whites were still the single largest group. However, an issue that remained unclear was how 
the racial composition of those occupations compared to that of the working-age population. 
Figure 4.15 aims to address this issue by presenting the racial composition of those 
employed in high-income occupations in Cape Town for 1980-2011 and compare that to the 
composition of the working-age population as a whole. As seen in the Crankshaw (2012) 
article, it is evident that both Black Africans and Coloureds made considerable gains in these 
occupations during period in question. For example, where Black Africans comprised 2% of 
those employed in high-income occupations in 1980 and Coloureds comprised 21%, that 
increased to 17% and 36%, respectively in 2011. It is also worth reiterating that this took place 
over a period where employment in these occupations grew from just 128,197 in 1980 to 
383,296. 
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Figure 4.11: Percentage racial composition of those employed in highly-skilled high-income 
occupations15 compared with the working-age population, 1980-2011 
Source: South African population censuses (see: Note 1) 
While those are arguably significant gains for both groups, findings that demonstrate that 
at least some Black Africans and Coloureds were able to benefit from the professionalisation 
trend in this labour market, it is worth keeping in mind that in 2011 Black Africans and 
                                                 
15 Managerial, Professional, Associate Professional and Technical occupations. 
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Coloureds comprised 39% and 41% of the working-age population, respectively. This would 
suggest that although gains were made by these groups in these occupations, both were 
comparatively-speaking underrepresented. 
On the other hand, focusing solely on what percentage of persons employed in these 
occupations were White, it would appear as though they have incurred losses because they 
comprised 75% in 1980, but 45% in 2011. And yet, when on compares this to the fact that 
Whites, in 2011, comprised just 18% of the city’s working-age population, then it would appear 
that they were substantially over-represented in those occupations. 
Nevertheless, it is apparent over the period of this study a growing number of Black 
Africans and Coloureds in Cape Town have benefited from the expansion of high-income 
employment. 
4.3.3 Racial Composition of Middle-income Non-Manual Occupations: 
A fundamental contribution to the polarisation-professionalisation debate made by Borel-
Saladin and Crankshaw (2009) was that workers in the types of non-manual occupations that 
Sassen (2000, 2002) described as low-income occupations were earning incomes on par with, 
if not higher than, those in the middle-income manual occupations that were declining. They 
also argued that proponents of the polarisation thesis focused on Sydney (Baum, 1997) and 
Hong Kong (Chiu and Lui, 2004) misinterpreted data on income by categorising certain 
occupations as low-income, even where the incomes for those workers were only marginally 
lower than those in supposedly middle-income occupations. 
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Figure 4.12: Racial composition of those employed in semi-skilled middle-income non-manual 
occupations16 compared with the working-age population, 1980-2011 
Source: South African population censuses (see: Note 1) 
As with the high-income occupations, it was helpful to compare the racial composition of 
these occupations with that of the working-age population as a whole. The finding presenting 
in figure 4.16 indicate that a pattern similar to the one presented by Crankshaw (2012) is 
                                                 
16 Clerical, Sales and Service occupations. 
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evident here too. For example, in 1980 Blacks Africans comprised just 7% of the workers in 
these occupations and by 2007 this had increased to 33%. For Whites, those figures were 
50% and 25%, respectively. Despite of these changes, and in a similar way to the findings on 
high-income occupations, Whites continued to be over-represented in these occupations too 
(they comprised just 18% of the working-age population in 2011), whereas Black Africans, who 
accounted for 39% percent of the working-age population, were under-represented. 
While neither of these occupations require the extensive knowledge and skills required 
for managerial and professional occupations, some of the occupations in these categories 
require a certain level of numeracy (e.g. ‘Tellers, Money Collectors, and Related Clerks’), 
literacy (e.g. ‘Secretaries (general)’), and interpersonal and/or communication skills (e.g. 
‘Waiters and Bartenders’). Therefore, it could be argued that differences in educational 
attainment between the different races could account for some of these differences. However, 
as will be demonstrated in the section that follows, the data suggest that even when focusing 
on those within specific bands of educational attainment (such as those used thus far), certain 
racial groups are still less likely to find employment in these occupations. 
4.3.4  Unemployment by Race and level of education: 
The discussion so far has shown that Cape Town’s labour market has seen an overall 
upgrading of the employed population due to the increased importance of education, as well 
as an increase in unemployment, particularly among those who do not have the requisite skills 
for those the dominant occupational groups. Between 1980 and 2001, the employment growth 
was unambiguously dominated by the growth in highly-skilled high-income occupations and 
while those occupations did not dominate the growth in the subsequent decade that growth 
continued. Additionally, the overall upgrading of the skill levels, a cornerstone of the 
professionalisation theory (Hamnett, 1994) also continued.  
The findings shown in figure 4.8, that skill or educational level impacted unemployment 
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rates is not only consistent with the professionalisation theory (Hamnett, 1994, Hamnett, 1996), 
but is also consistent with the work of Kasarda (1989) that focused on urban USA. He also 
found that the most marginalised groups in those cities (e.g. recent migrants and/or ethnic 
minorities) that bore the brunt of the labour market changes brought about due to de-
industrialisation and the related increasing skills demands. 
Consequently, one of the aims of this study is to go beyond determining whether the 
professionalising trend has continued, but also to understand how those changes have been 
experienced by Coloureds, Black Africans and Whites. The previous section demonstrated 
that, although there has been some movement to more equitable racial compositions among 
middle-income non-manual and high-income occupations. The next issue to be addressed is 
to revisit the unemployment data presented in figures 4.8 (i.e. unemployment rates by level of 
education), but to differentiate between the rates for each of these racial groups.  
As a starting point, it is looking at the unemployment rate and how it has changed over 
the study period for each of the population group. What is noteworthy from figure 4.17 is that 
in 1980 the unemployment rates for all 4 groups were below 10%. However, by 1996 there 
were substantial differences between the unemployment rates of each of these groups. While 
the unemployment rate across all groups was 20%, the rates for Black Africans, Coloureds 
and Whites were 38%, 18% and 5%, respectively. It is likely that the removal of influx control 
measures preventing Black African urbanisation, as well as the apparent attractiveness of a 
growing labour market, proved to be an attractive prospect for those living in difficult 
circumstances in outside the city (Christopher, 2005b, Seekings, 2011, Seekings and Nattrass, 
2005).  
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 Figure 4.13: Unemployment rate for the working-age population by race, 1980-2011 
Source: South African population censuses (see: Note 1) 
Considering that census was just a few years after South Africa's first democratic 
elections and the passing of various laws aimed at repealing apartheid-era legislation, it is 
perhaps not surprising that the inequalities were evident. This is especially true when one 
considers that, as Crankshaw (2012) explains, educational institutions and the labour market 
had been deracialised. However, it would take a few more years for the Employment Equity 
Act (1998), aimed at promoting the employment of previously disadvantaged groups, to be 
implemented.   
In the ensuing years, until 2011, there would be some fluctuation in the unemployment, 
but the census data suggests that the unemployment rate for Black African in Cape Town was 
consistently the highest, with the rate for Whites being the lowest. One of the questions that 
was raised during the course of this study, when encountering these apparent racial 
inequalities in terms of labour market success and (as will be addressed in the section that 
follows), type of occupation, was whether it was perhaps a product of unequal access to 
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education. After all, after the legislated inequalities in educational provision of the apartheid 
era (Hyslop, 1999), it could be argued that the legacy thereof might have persisted. 
Nevertheless, the data were disaggregated by race and level of education, with the 
unemployment rates for those with incomplete basic education displayed in figure 4.18 and 
those who have completed high school in figure 4.19. 
 
 Figure 4.14: Unemployment rate for the those with incomplete basic education, by race, 1980-
2011 
Source: South African population censuses (see: Note 1) 
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 Figure 4.15: Unemployment rate for the those with matric, by race, 1980-2011 
Source: South African population censuses (see: Note 1) 
What is clear from these findings is that, even within these bands of educational 
attainment, Whites experienced the lowest unemployment rates and Black Africans the 
highest.  
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 Figure 4.16: Unemployment rate for the those with a university degree or NQF-level equivalent, 
by race, 1980-2011 
Source: South African population censuses (see: Note 1) 
However, it is apparent that the differences between the unemployment rates 
experienced by each race decreases as the level of education increase. Nevertheless, despite 
educational attainment, in the context of a professionalising labour, some are still less likely, 
even unable to find suitable employment opportunities. 
4.3.5 Occupations, race and skills levels: 
4.3.5.1 Occupations and Associated Skill Levels: 
Over the course of the analyses and discussions here, occupations have not only been 
categorised according to income level, but also according to the skills or education required 
for someone to be employed in those occupations. The International Standard Classification 
of Occupations (ISCO) used here not only provides a framework for different types of 
occupations, but also incorporates a framework for the skill levels that are associated with the 
various occupations. According to this ISCO framework, Professional occupations are 
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generally associated with skill level 4, whereas Technicians and Associate Professional are 
associated with skill level 3 and Managerial occupations tend to cross both skill levels. 
According to the International Labour Office (2012): 
“Occupations at Skill Level 4 typically involve the performance of tasks 
that require complex problem-solving, decision-making and creativity 
based on an extensive body of theoretical and factual knowledge in a 
specialised field… The knowledge and skills required for competent 
performance in occupations at Skill Level 4 are usually obtained as the 
result of study at a higher educational institution for a period of 3-6 years 
leading to the award of a first degree or higher qualification…” 
(International Labour Office, 2012: 13) 
“Occupations at Skill Level 3 typically involve the performance of 
complex technical and practical skills that require an extensive body of 
factual, technical and procedural knowledge in a specialised field… The 
knowledge and skills required for competent performance in occupations 
at Skill Level 3 are usually obtained as the result of study at a higher 
educational institution for a period of 1-3 years following completion of 
secondary education…” (International Labour Office, 2012: 13) 
On the other hand, the middle-income non-manual occupations that have also seen 
substantial growth, particular in the years leading up to 2011, are typically associated with skill 
level 2, which can be understood as follows: 
These occupations are described as follows, according to the International Labour 
Office’s International Standard Classification of Occupations: 
“Occupations at Skill Level 2 typically involve the performance of tasks 
such as operating machinery and electronic equipment; driving vehicles; 
maintenance and repair of electrical and mechanical equipment; and 
manipulation, ordering and storage of information… Many occupations at 
this skill level require relatively advanced literacy and numeracy skills and 
good interpersonal communication skills.” (International Labour Office, 
2012: 12) 
When focus on the differences between the major occupational groups included, the 
ISCO framework indicates that people employed as ‘Clerical Support Workers’ require the 
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aforementioned literacy and numeracy skills process, manage and otherwise organise 
information in the course of their duties. On the other hand, while there is less emphasis on 
those skills for ‘Services and sales workers’ they certainly are required, in addition to the 
communication and other interpersonal skills that enable them to effectively communicate with 
employees, customers and/or members of the public. 
Against the backdrop of the skill levels associated with these various occupations, it 
makes sense that the dominance of the growth in these middle-income non-manual and high-
income occupations Cape Town’s labour market is associated with the type of upskilling 
evident in the employed population (as depicted in figure 4.6). Nonetheless, it is worth inquiring 
as to whether the occupational distribution within educational bands are comparable for the 
different racial groups under discussion here. After all, if they are not it would indicate that 
there are other factors, apart from level of skill or education, that are shaping labour market 
success and/or the type of occupation someone enters. 
4.4 Conclusion: 
While there is an array of findings in this chapter that reveal the nuanced changes in the 
city’s labour market over the period in question, there are a number of points that are worth 
reiterating. 
Firstly, the findings discussed here concurred with Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw (2009), 
who argued that Cape Town underwent professionalisation between 1980 and 2001. However, 
the data from the 2011 points to a slightly different trend. On the one hand, employment growth 
in high-income occupations accelerated during the 2001-11, and yet the increase in middle-
income non-manual employment was even greater. Consequently, when looking at the entire 
1980-2011 period, there was very little difference between the number of jobs added to high-
income occupations (i.e. +255,099) and middle-income non-manual occupations (i.e. 
+255,960). However, since the educational profile of the labour force, especially employed 
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workers, has continued to improve, the pattern of change still has more in common with the 
professionalisation, than the polarisation theory. 
Secondly, Black Africans and Coloureds have continued to gain a greater foothold in 
both middle-income non-manual occupations, as well as highly-skilled high-income 
occupations. Nevertheless, when comparing the composition of those categories with the 
labour market as a whole, Whites continue to be over-represented in both. In contrast to these 
gains, Blacks Africans continued to experience the highest unemployment rates, followed by 
Coloureds. And that leads to the final point. 
While unemployment decreased between 2001 and 2011, from 29% to 24%, it was still 
high, particularly for the aforementioned groups. Nonetheless, this high unemployment rate 
raises questions about Hamnett’s (1994, 1996) claims regarding the reasons for high 
unemployment rates and the role of large numbers of unskilled workers in the labour market. 
He argued that the large unskilled migrant populations in the cities that Sassen (2000, 2002) 
discussed were the cause of the polarised job market and that in contexts where the supply of 
unskilled labour is not as large, the result would be a professionalising labour market. He also 
argued that even when there might be large unskilled populations, strong welfare systems 
might give workers the ability to opt out of taking low-income jobs. 
However, Cape Town’s labour market has a large and growing supply of unskilled 
workers in the labour market. Additionally, the limited welfare provision in South Africa, is 
insufficient to allow workers to opt out of low-income employment (Seekings, 2002). At the very 
least, this requires further investigation in order to determine the reasons for the lack of low-
income employment growth in cities like Cape Town.  
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5 HOW HAS MIDDLE-CLASS SUBURBIA CHANGED IN CAPE 
TOWN?  
As discussed in the previous chapter, urban South Africa, including what is now known 
as the City of Cape Town, was shaped by policies that not only determined where people of 
different racial could live, but also which occupations they could enter. As Seekings (2011: 
533) explained it, the aim was to construct and maintain a social and racial hierarchy that “took 
on a caste-like form”, which was also inscribed on spaces.   
5.1 Interrogating the applicability of the concepts “ghetto” and “suburb” in 
Cape Town: 
5.1.1 Apartheid-era Group Areas: 
As a starting point to interrogating the of these terms, it is worth looking at the locations 
of formerly Black Africans-only, Coloureds-only and Whites-only areas of the city. Map 5.1 
shows Cape Town’s former Group Areas, as identified by Graham (2007) and also used by 
Crankshaw (2012), and was produced using the 2001 census shapefiles and subplace names. 
Nevertheless, it is worth remembering that the implementation of segregation measures was 
not necessarily final or completed. As the text Abolition of Racially Based Land Measures Act 
(1991), there were amendments made to the Group Areas Act (1966) as recent as 1984.17 
There are also a few additional observations that are worth highlighting here. Firstly, the 
formerly Whites-only areas were concentrated along the west coast, most of the peninsula 
(including both coasts), and close to the Table Mountain range, as well as east of the CBD 
toward the northern suburbs. They also avoid the so-called Cape Flats (south-east of the CBD), 
but there were a few located in the Helderberg region (i.e. Somerset West and surrounds). The 
proximity to the city centre and surrounding suburbs contradicts the type of suburbanisation 
                                                 
17 Furthermore, some apparent inconsistencies between the distribution of various racial groups, as well as the 
composition of subplaces, and the aforementioned groups areas could also be the result of shifting subplace 
boundaries. After all, the work conducted by Graham (2007) made use of the 2001 subplace boundaries, which 
would likely have shifted somewhat since the 1980s. 
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already discussed in some of the urban studies literature already discussed here (Kasarda, 
1989, Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000b, Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000a, Wilson, 2011, 
Wilson, 2012) and is an issue that will be raised again at a later stage.  
Secondly, apart from a few formerly Coloureds-only neighbourhoods near the city centre, 
such as Bo Kaap on the western edge of the city bowl and the Woodstock and Salt River 
neighbourhoods just east of the city centre, most of the formerly Black Africans-only and 
Coloureds-only areas were located on the Cape Flats. As explained by Graham (2007), there 
are numerous locations around the city where physical barriers such as train tracks, freeways 
or industrial areas (such as Epping Industrial area, which can be found at the cluster of railway 
tracks just west of the centre of the map) were used to separate Whites-only areas from areas 
set aside for other racial categories. This is especially true of both the southbound and 
eastbound train lines (i.e. the grey lines in the map below).  
Since the aforementioned Coloureds-only and Blacks-only neighbourhoods were 
created for those population groups who were regarded as socially and politically subordinate 
during the apartheid-era, these neighbourhoods are often associated with the ghettos concept 
already discussed (Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000b, Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000a, 
Wilson, 2012). However, one of the issues that will be addressed in this chapter and the one 
that follows, is the applicability of that concept to the townships on the Cape Flats, as well as 
whether the changes that have taken place over the period in question means that they have 
become so-called excluded or outcast ghettos (Marcuse and Van Kempen, 1997, Marcuse and 
Van Kempen, 2000b, Marcuse, 1997b). 
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A. Robben Island 
B. Table Bay 
C. CBD 
D. Table Mountain and Devil’s Peak 
E. Epping Industrial Area 
F. Philippi Farms 
G. Cape Town International Airport 
H. N7 highway 
I. N1 highway 
J. N2 highway 
K. False Bay 
Map 5.1: Apartheid-era Group Areas 
Source: Graham (2007) 
Based on the geography of these former Group Areas it would seem as though the 
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priority was a physical boundary between Coloured and White neighbourhoods, as well as 
using Coloured neighbourhoods as a barrier between White and Black18 neighbourhoods. 
Some exceptions to this patter (or examples of incomplete segregation) can be seen in 
Southfield on the predominantly-Coloured side of the railway line, as well as the Whites-only 
Zeekoevlei neighbourhood that was sandwiched between the marshlands and the Coloureds-
only Grassy Park area. 
Another exception is Langa, which is the oldest Black Africans-only township in Cape 
Town, and was surrounded by a Coloureds-only neighbourhood, the N2, the N7 and the Epping 
Industrial area. Thus, despite its apparent proximity to some Whites-only neighbourhoods and 
the CBD, there were significant barriers in place between it and the White neighbourhoods. 
At this time, due to the apartheid-era legislation, the boundaries of race, space and class 
were being socially and politically engineered to coincide. However, this was achieved with 
varying degrees of success. As already discussed, efforts to float the colour bar in the labour 
market were being permitted to a greater extent, although in ways to ensure that the racial 
hierarchy was maintained (Crankshaw, 1997, Webster, 1986).  
The previously discussed research by Graham (2007) demonstrated which parts of Cape 
Town had been set aside for specific racial groups. However, according to the text of the 
Abolition of Racially Based Land Measures Act (1991) amendments to the Group Areas Act 
(1966) was still being made during the 1980s. Nonetheless, certain patterns in the city’s 
divisions were clearly evident, as show in the map above. 
5.1.2 Suburbs, Ghettos, Neighbourhoods and more: 
Over the course of this study, it became apparent that the ideal types conceptualised 
Marcuse, including his work with Van Kempen, (Marcuse, 1997a, Marcuse and Van Kempen, 
                                                 
18 Comprising Black African, Coloureds and Indians/Asians. 
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1997, Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000b, Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000a) were potentially 
quite useful in trying to understand the ways in which the geography of post-Fordist cities have 
changed. Their concepts have been applied to a variety of contexts, including Calcutta 
(Chakravorty, 2000), Brussels (Kesteloot, 2000), Rio de Janeiro (Ribeiro and Telles, 2000), 
Johannesburg (Beall et al., 2002, Crankshaw, 2008) and Cape Town (Crankshaw, 2012, 
Lemanski, 2007). 
It was also apparent that since these concepts were developed by scholars who studied 
the USA, the ideas are primarily shaped by the history of urban USA, therefore it was 
necessary to keep in mind that, since different contexts have specific social and political 
histories, questions need to be raised about the applicability of these concepts to Cape Town, 
as Chakravorty (2000) did in his work on Calcutta. 
5.1.2.1 Suburbs: 
According to Marcuse and Van Kempen (2000b) the suburbs they referred to primarily 
residential areas where single families own homes and where there are safe, quiet spaces 
suitable for children. Additionally, it is also worth reiterating that the suburbs in the USA are 
municipalities that are independent and geographically separate of the central city 
(Crankshaw, 2008). Based on this definition, the tendency to discuss formerly Whites-only 
neighbourhoods in Cape Town, as comparable or synonymous with the concept of the suburb 
in the dominant urban studies literature, is at least somewhat problematic. Therefore, rather 
than attempting to fit the data into this taxonomy of city quarters, the term ‘neighbourhood’ will 
be used quite broadly to refer to primarily residential areas and any further categorisation will 
be shaped by the characteristics of the subplaces. 
Prior to the formation of the Cape Town Unicity and the subsequent metropolitan 
municipality referred to as the City of Cape Town, the area comprised six independent Metro 
Local Councils. And, a number of the formerly Whites-only areas depicted in map 5.1 include 
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significant area around the city centre. Additionally, maps 5.2 and 5.3 depict the percentage of 
dwellings in each subplace in 1996 and 2011 that were formal dwellings, but exclude dwellings 
in blocks of apartments or flats, because of the above-mentioned definition of the suburb 
(Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000b). 
Based on the inner-city and other locations of formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods, as 
well as the types of dwellings, then uncritically equating these neighbourhoods with the 
concept of suburbs discussed here is profoundly problematic. After all, that concept of the 
suburb is characterised by the dwelling types, as well as the location in relation to the central 
city and not solely the racial composition. 
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Map 5.2: Selected formal dwellings19 as proportion of all household dwellings, 1996 
Source: Community Profiles Databases (see: Note 3) 
                                                 
19 These include: Houses or brick/concrete block structure on a separate stand or yard or on a farm, Cluster 
houses in complexes, Townhouse (semi-detached house in a complex) or Semi-detached houses. It therefore 
explicitly excludes dwellings in blocks of apartments/flats. 
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Map 5.3: Selected formal dwellings20 as a proportion of all household dwellings, 2011 
Source: Community Profiles Databases (see: Note 3) 
5.1.2.2 Ghettos: 
The ghettos concept has also been discussed extensively here and, while it is 
unavoidable when engaging in urban research, caution needs to be applied here too when 
uncritically using this concept. In the taxonomy of ideal types in the post-Fordist city collated 
by Marcuse and van Kempen (Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000b, Marcuse and Van Kempen, 
                                                 
20 These include: Houses or brick/concrete block structure on a separate stand or yard or on a farm, Cluster 
houses in complexes, Townhouse (semi-detached house in a complex) or Semi-detached houses. It therefore 
explicitly excludes dwellings in blocks of apartments/flats. 
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2000a, Marcuse, 1997a), they defined a ghetto as an involuntary spatial concentration of a 
group of people deemed to be socially, politically and/or economically subordinate. Some of 
the ways that these groups have been defined over the course of human history include 
ethnicity, race and/or religion.   
Based on this definition, it makes sense that some might associate the formerly 
Coloureds-only and formerly Black Africans-only neighbourhoods and township with the ghetto 
concept.  
5.2 What are the spatial consequences of Cape Town’s Deracialising and 
Professionalising labour market? 
As discussed in the previous chapter, and depicted in figure 4.15, the racial composition 
of Cape Town’s middle class shifted considerably during the period in question, even though 
Whites were still over-represented among those employed in these occupations in 2011. 
These changes took place during a period when the number of people in these occupations 
grew from 128,197 in 1980 to 383,296 in 2011, when those employed in these occupations 
accounted for 30% of all employed persons in the city (see table 4.5). 
Considering the discussion in the previous section, as well as the intention not to be 
constrained by the previously-discussed ‘ideal types’ in the urban studies literature (Marcuse 
and Van Kempen, 2000b, Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000a), it is necessary to define and 
locate predominantly middle-class neighbourhoods in order to begin to understand how the 
professionalisation of Cape Town’s labour market has impacted the geography of the city. As 
the findings and discussions in the remainder will demonstrate, by not being limiting the 
analyses and interpretations to the suburb-vs-ghetto framework, certain nuances in the spatial 
distribution of the races and classes under discussion become apparent. 
5.2.1 1996: 
5.2.1.1 Distribution of middle-class residents: 
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When discussing the residential location and/or movement of middle-class residents in 
in contemporary urban literature, some of the dominant arguments have emphasised the 
movement of middle-class residents from older inner-city neighbourhoods to the suburbs 
(Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000b, Marcuse, 2001, Wilson, 2009, Wilson, 2012). One 
definition that has been useful in this study comes from (Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000b), 
who describe suburbs as those part of the city where individual values own homes, which also 
include quiet and green spaces suitable for children.  
Below, map 5.2 is a depiction of the distribution of the absolute number of those 
employed in highly-skilled high-income occupations. Considering the fact that the legislated 
residential segregation and labour market discrimination had been rescinded a few years prior 
to the census under discussion here, some might have expected significant numbers of these 
individuals to have left the ghettos and moved to the formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods. 
However, map 5.2 shows that, while the tallest columns (indicating the largest number of 
middle-class residents) appear to be in the southern and northern suburbs, the so-called Cape 
Flats also have a number of reasonably tall towers. While this map is, analytically speaking, 
not necessarily all that helpful, it provides a useful impression to start this discussion. 
On the other hand, map 5.3 shows these high-income earning individuals as a 
percentage of all employed persons. Considering the fact that Whites still comprised 58% of 
these individuals (see: figure 4.20), it is not surprising that the subplaces with the highest 
percentage of high-income earning individuals can be found in those parts of the city that where 
we find the formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods. 
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Map 5.4: Column chart of the absolute 
number of people in highly-skilled high-
income occupations, 1996 
Source: Community Profiles Databases (see: 
Note 3) 
 
Map 5.5: People employed in highly-skilled 
high-income occupations as a proportion 
of employed people by subplace, 1996 
Source: Community Profiles Databases (see: 
Note 3) 
However, which of these might be regarded as middle-class suburbs? For the purposes 
of these discussions, those subplaces where the majority of the employed were highly-skilled 
high-income earners are to be regarded as middle-class suburbs. 
5.2.1.2 Majority middle-class suburbs: 
Map 5.4 depicts the distribution of these middle-class suburbs and, for the most part, 
they were located in those parts of the city that Graham (2007) identified as formerly Whites-
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only neighbourhoods21.  
 
Map 5.6: Majority middle-class subplaces in 1996 and outlines of apartheid-era Group Areas 
Sources: Community Profiles Databases (see: Note 3), Graham (2007) 
These middle-class suburbs comprised 104 of the 405 subplaces in the 1996 census, 
                                                 
21 The racial group areas depicted in this map are those identified by Graham (2007) and used by Crankshaw 
(2012). Those parts of this maps and others that follow are used for presentation purposes and are used with 
Graham’s permission. Also, other calculations and mapping, such as those identifying middle-class suburbs and 
all presentations of unemployment rates and occupational data was calculated by the author. 
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but just 16% of the working-age population (i.e. 265,707 of 1,684,889). On the other hand, all 
these middle-class suburbs comprised just 41% of those employed in highly-skilled high-
income occupations at the time (i.e. 96,248 of 232,413). This reveals that the majority of the 
city’s high-income earning individuals were resident in subplaces where this category did not 
comprise the majority. These subplaces will be discussed as a later point. 
5.2.1.3 Diverse composition of middle-class neighbourhoods: 
As previously mentioned, the dominant arguments in the literature, which are often 
focused on North American and/or European contexts, discuss these middle-class suburbs as 
predominantly-White spaces (Kasarda, 1989, Kesteloot, 2000, Marcuse and Van Kempen, 
2000b, Wilson, 2012). However, in those contexts, the population categories and/or ethnic 
groups with low proportions of high-income earning individuals are usually a numerical minority 
– for example, the international migrants in Brussels (Kesteloot, 2000) or various ethnic 
minorities in the USA (Wilson, 2012, Kasarda, 1989).  
On the other hand, in the South African context, Black Africans (26%) and Coloureds 
(47%) collectively comprised 73% of the working-age population in Cape Town in 1996. 
Nevertheless, since they only comprised 40% (Black Africans: 8%; Coloureds: 32%) of high-
income earners at the time, it is not surprising that most of these middle-class suburbs were 
predominantly White. 
Map 5.5 shows the locations of the 95 majority-White middle-class subplaces, whereas 
map 5.6 shows the nine that were majority Black. In previously-discussed paper by Crankshaw 
(2012), the focus was on the desegregation that had taken place in the formerly Whites-only 
neighbourhoods in Cape Town up to that point. However, when we focus on these middle-
class suburbs, particularly the size and composition we start to see the rather limited extent of 
the apparent desegregation that had taken place in those neighbourhoods.  
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Map 5.7: Majority-White middle-class subplaces in 1996 and outlines of apartheid-era Group 
Areas 
Sources: Community Profiles Databases (see: Note 3), Graham (2007) 
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Map 5.8: Majority-Black middle-class subplaces in 1996 and outlines of apartheid-era Group 
Areas 
Sources: Community Profiles Databases (see: Note 3), Graham (2007) 
In the 95 majority-White middle-class subplaces, the working-age population can be 
broken down as follows: 
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Figure 5.9: Racial composition of majority-
White middle-class subplaces (working-
age population), 1996 
Source: Community Profiles Databases (see: 
Note 2) 
 
Figure 5.10: Racial composition of majority-
White middle-class subplaces (middle 
class only), 1996 
Source: Community Profiles Databases (see: 
Note 2) 
Figure 5.7 the finding that, although Black Africans and Coloureds had moved into these 
majority-White middle-class subplaces, they comprised very small amounts (in both absolute 
and percentage terms). More specifically, the columns show that in 1996 these subplaces were 
home to 12,621 Black African working-age people (or 3% of all Black Africans in the city), as 
well as 16,791 Coloureds (or just 2% of the total across the city). 
As previously mentioned, as well as depicted in map 5.6, there were nine middle-class 
subplaces that were majority Black. While these subplaces were home to a negligible 
percentage of the city’s working-age population of any race (see: figure 5.9), they were home 
to just over 3% of the city’s middle-class Black Africans and Coloureds respectively (see: figure 
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5.10) 
 
Figure 5.11: Racial composition of majority-
Black middle-class subplaces (working-
age population), 1996 
Source: Community Profiles Databases (see: 
Note 2) 
 
Figure 5.12: Racial composition of majority-
Black middle-class subplaces (middle 
class only), 1996 
Source: Community Profiles Databases (see: 
Note 2) 
However, it is the location of some of these subplaces that could be indicative of a familiar 
pattern of change. In his discussion of changes in Johannesburg (Crankshaw, 2008) and Cape 
Town (Crankshaw, 2012), Crankshaw argued that the formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods 
that had undergone the most significant change were those in close proximity to formerly 
Blacks-only  neighbourhoods. 
The three subplaces in question were as follows: 
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▪ Mowbray (59% Black22) in close proximity to Salt River and Woodstock which 
are formerly Coloureds-only subplaces 
▪ Rondebosch East (57% Black23) in close proximity to Athlone which is a 
formerly Coloureds-only subplace 
▪ Acacia Park (54% Black24) in close proximity Kensington and Factreton which 
are formerly Coloureds-only subplaces 
5.2.1.4 What can we learn from mixed-class subplaces? 
As mentioned when reviewing the urban studies literature, it is worth keeping in mind 
that when Marcuse and van Kempen (Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000b, Marcuse, 1997a, 
Marcuse, 2001) discuss the different quarters of the post-Fordist city, they are using ‘ideal 
types’. Furthermore, since so much emphasis is placed on the ghetto vs suburb comparison 
by them and others (Kasarda, 1989, Kasarda, 1993, Wilson, 2009, Wilson, 2011, Wilson, 
2012), caution is essential in order to avoid falling into a binary mode of thinking about cities25. 
While the suburb has often been framed as a predominantly middle-class space 
(Kasarda, 1989, Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000b, Wilson, 2012), the data under discussion 
suggested that a more nuanced understand of suburbs was necessary to understanding the 
changes in Cape Town. Consequently, a decision was made to focus on what will be referred 
to as ‘mixed-class suburbs’, which are those subplaces where the those in high-income 
occupations do not comprise the majority. Furthermore, the selection was limited to those 
subplaces where the unemployment was below that of the city as a whole, which at the time 
was 20%26. 
Of the 405 subplaces under discussion, 171 fit these criteria. Of those, only 15 had a 
majority occupational category, so for the most part there was a real mix of occupational 
                                                 
22 Comprising Black African, Coloureds and Indians/Asians. 
23 Comprising Black African, Coloureds and Indians/Asians. 
24 Comprising Black African, Coloureds and Indians/Asians. 
25 The author wishes to acknowledge the other quarters of the city (e.g. enclaves and citadels) discussed by 
Marcuse, van Kempen and others, but much of the emphasis is on the concepts “ghetto” and “suburb”. 
26 The reason for this additional parameter will become clearer when discussing ghettos in the following chapter.    
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classes in these subplaces, the locations of which can be seen in map 5.11. 
 
Map 5.13: Location of mixed-class suburbs in 1996 and outlines of apartheid-era Group Areas 
Sources: Community Profiles Databases (see: Note 3), Graham (2007) 
While, the locations of most of the middle-class suburbs coincided with formerly Whites-
only neighbourhoods, the distribution of these mixed-class suburbs is much less obvious. 
However, there is at least one point worth raising here. Many of these mixed-class subplaces 
that are located in formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods are in close proximity to formerly 
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Coloureds-only subplaces and those that are located in the latter category are in close 
proximity to the former. This is the same pattern that was found when focusing on the locations 
of the middle-lass suburbs.  
Additionally, when differentiating between those mixed-class subplaces that are majority-
White (map 5.14) and those that are majority-Black (map 5.15) the aforementioned pattern 
appears to be evident once again, albeit with a few exceptions. While all the majority-White 
mixed-class subplaces were located in formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods, the same cannot 
be said of the majority-Black subplaces.  
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Map 5.14: Majority-White mixed-class 
subplaces in 1996 and outlines of 
apartheid-era Group Areas  
Sources: Community Profiles Databases (see: 
Note 3), Graham (2007) 
 
Map 5.15: Majority-Black mixed-class 
subplaces in 1996 and outlines of 
apartheid-era Group Areas  
Sources: Community Profiles Databases (see: 
Note 3), Graham (2007) 
In terms of the composition of these mixed-class subplaces, those that were majority-
White did not reveal much new information. Figures 5.7 and 5.8 already showed that the 
majority of the White working-age population (58%) and middle class (68%) were resident in 
the White middle-class subplaces at the time. Nevertheless, the 61 majority-White mixed-class 
subplaces in 1996 were home to 32% of working-age Whites (see: figure 5.14) and 24% of 
middle-class Whites (see: figure 5.15). 
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Figure 5.16: Racial composition of majority-
White mixed-class subplaces (working-age 
population), 1996 
Source: Community Profiles Databases (see: 
Note 2) 
 
Figure 5.17: Racial composition of majority-
White mixed-class subplaces (working-age 
population), 1996 
Source: Community Profiles Databases (see: 
Note 2) 
This then indicates that, at the time of the 1996 census, 90% of working-age Whites and 
92% of middle-class Whites in Cape Town were resident in subplaces that were predominantly 
White. But what about those subplaces made up of a mix of occupational classes (but with 
below-average unemployment rates), that were majority-Black? 
So far, figures 5.7 and 5.8 showed that very small numbers of working-age or middle-
class Black Africans or Coloureds were resident in majority-White middle-class subplaces in 
1996. Furthermore, there were so few majority-Black middle-class subplaces that the numbers 
in those subplaces (see: figures 5.9 and 5.10) were even lower. 
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However, according to this census, there were 110 subplaces that were not 
predominantly middle class and where the unemployment rate was below the Cape Town 
average at the time. Not surprisingly, these subplaces were home to very small portions of the 
White working-age (7%) or middle-class (5%) populations. However, when focusing solely on 
the Coloured population, the majority of the working-age (55%) and middle-class (67%) 
populations were resident there.  
On the other hand, while there were significantly fewer Black Africans in these subplaces 
compared to Coloureds (both in absolute and relative terms), more were resident here than in 
any of the middle-class subplaces or the majority-White mixed-class subplaces.  
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Figure 5.18: Racial composition of majority-
Black mixed-class subplaces (working-age 
population), 1996 
Source: Community Profiles Databases (see: 
Note 2) 
 
Figure 5.19: Racial composition of majority-
Black mixed-class subplaces (middle class 
only), 1996 
Source: Community Profiles Databases (see: 
Note 2) 
The reason for including this concept of a mixed-class subplace in the discussion here 
is that it speaks to a concept that has not been given sufficient scope in the discussions on 
Cape Town’s geography. Turok (2001: 2371) discussed the “gulf between Cape Town’s poor 
townships and its affluent suburbs which appears to be widening”, Lemanski (2007) discussed 
the poverty traps in the slums on the city’s periphery.  
The aim of including this mixed-class subplace concept is not to detract from the 
undeniable challenges of poverty and spatial dislocation in the city, but to acknowledge that 
there is a sort of transitional type of neighbourhood between the poverty traps in the slums and 
the more affluent suburbs (Lemanski, 2007, Turok, 2001).  
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5.2.2 2001: 
5.2.2.1 Distribution of middle-class residents: 
According to the figures in table 4.5, the number of people employed in highly-skilled 
high-income occupations grew by 17,200 during the 1996-2001 period, after growing by 
103,694 during the 1980-1996 period. Furthermore, the racial composition also continued to 
change, the White portion of this category decreased from 58% in 1996 to 53% in 2001. On 
the other hand, the Black African (8% in 1996; 10% in 2001) and Coloured (32% in 1996; 35% 
in 2001) portions grew by 2%-points and 3%-points, respectively. 
 
Map 5.20: Column chart of the absolute 
number of people in highly-skilled high-
income occupations by subplace, 2001 
Source: Community Profiles Databases (see: 
Note 3) 
 
Map 5.21: People employed in highly-skilled 
high-income occupations as a proportion 
of employed people by subplace, 2001 
Sources: Community Profiles Databases (see: 
Note 3), Graham (2007) 
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Despite these changes, the subplaces with the greatest number and/or percentage of 
persons employed in high-income occupations were still to be found in formerly Whites-only 
neighbourhoods. Nevertheless, there were a number of formerly Coloureds-only and Black 
Africans-only subplaces in the greater Mitchell’s Plain and Khayelitsha areas (south and 
southeast of the airport), as well as on the northern edge of the airport where more than 20% 
or 30% of employed persons were in these high-income occupations. 
However, the emphasis here is to better understand the composition and locations of 
those subplaces where the majority of the employed are in these occupations. 
5.2.2.2 Majority middle-class suburbs: 
As previously mentioned, the number and sizes of subplaces have changed from one 
census to the next. Therefore, simply counting the number of middle-class subplaces could be 
misleading. Consequently, one of the ways to understand the composition and population size 
of these middle-class subplaces, attention will be paid to changes in the percentage of the 
city’s working-age (or middle-class) population that were resident in those subplaces.  
For the most part, map 5.20 that depicts the locations of middle-class suburbs in 2001 
resembles the 1996 version (see: map 5.4). However, there are two changes that are worth 
mentioning. Firstly, there are a number of subplaces in the southern suburbs that were marked 
as middle class in 1996, but not in 2001. For example, in 1996, 53% of employed persons in 
the formerly Coloureds-only subplace of Fairways were in high-income occupations, but this 
figure decreased to 44% in 2001. Also, in the formerly Whites-only neighbourhood of 
Rondebosch East, 62% of the employed in 1996 were in high-income occupations, but in 2001 
this figure was just 46%27. 
                                                 
27 NOTE: Both of these have become categorised as “Mixed Class” subplaces in 2001. 
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Map 5.22: Majority middle-class subplaces in 2001 and outlines of apartheid-era Group Areas 
Sources: Community Profiles Databases (see: Note 3), Graham (2007) 
Secondly, there are a number of formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods in the Kuils River 
area, northeast of the airport, that were not recognised as middle-class subplaces in 1996 but 
were categorised as such in 2001. It’s possible that a reason for this is that what was a single 
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‘Kuilsrivier’ subplace in 1996 was divided into at least 14 subplaces for the 2001 census28. 
5.2.2.3 Not all majority middle-class suburbs are majority White: 
According to the parameters used here, 202 of the 683 subplaces in 2001 were 
categorised as majority middle-class. As with 1996, the majority of those subplaces, 196 to be 
specific, were predominantly White and their locations can be seen in map 5.23, below. Without 
exception, these majority-White middle-class subplaces were located in the formerly Whites-
only areas identified by Graham (2007). 
On the other hand, of the six majority-Black middle-class subplaces, two were in formerly 
Whites-only neighbourhoods not far from the University of Cape Town and, as previously 
mentioned, in close proximity to the formerly Coloureds-only neighbourhoods of Salt River and 
Woodstock.  
                                                 
28 Unfortunately, these types of complications were unavoidable because the data was aggregated according to 
the subplaces used in each census. 
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Map 5.23: Majority-White middle-class subplaces in 2001 and outlines of apartheid-era Group 
Areas 
Sources: Community Profiles Databases (see: Note 3), Graham (2007) 
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Map 5.24: Majority-Black middle-class subplaces in 2001 and outlines of apartheid-era Group 
Areas 
Sources: Community Profiles Databases (see: Note 3), Graham (2007) 
While the locations of the middle-class subplaces, particularly those that were majority-
White, were not all that surprising, the composition of these subplaces are quite revealing. 
Some findings on South Africa's largest cities have indicated that there has been some 
movement from formerly Blacks-only to formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods (Christopher, 
2005b, Christopher, 2005a, Crankshaw, 2008, Crankshaw, 2012, Schensul, 2009), however, 
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the findings here would suggest that it would be a mistake to overestimate the extent of that 
movement. 
The findings presented in figure 5.25 show how many of the city’s working-age 
population, by race, were resident in these neighbourhoods (both in absolute numbers and as 
a percentage of all in the city). What these figures indicate is that, although there was some 
desegregation, particular in subplaces that were close to or on the border between formerly 
Whites-only and formerly Blacks-only neighbourhoods, they accounted for a very small 
percentage of the Black African and Coloured populations (figure 5.25). Even when focusing 
just on the middle-class population, only 13% of middle-class Black Africans and 7% of middle-
class Coloureds (looking at both majority-White and majority-Black middle-class subplaces in 
figures 5.26 and 5.28). 
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Figure 5.25: Racial composition of majority 
White middle-class subplaces (working-
age population), 2001 
Source: Community Profiles Databases (see: 
Note 2) 
 
Figure 5.26: Racial composition of majority 
White middle-class subplaces (middle 
class only), 2001 
Source: Community Profiles Databases (see: 
Note 2) 
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Figure 5.27: Racial composition of majority-
Black middle-class subplaces (working-
age population), 2001 
Source: Community Profiles Databases (see: 
Note 2) 
 
Figure 5.28: Racial composition of majority-
Black middle-class subplaces (working-
age population), 2001 
Source: Community Profiles Databases (see: 
Note 2) 
5.2.2.4 Further lessons to be learnt from mixed-class subplaces: 
As already discussed, the 1996 census data on Cape Town has already pointed out that 
in this context there were large numbers of subplaces that were not predominantly middle-
class, nor were their unemployment rates particularly high (i.e. they were not higher that the 
unemployment rate for the city at the time). Furthermore, some were majority-Black, others 
not. And, some were located in formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods. 
Once again in 2001, these mixed-class subplaces could be found in different parts of the 
city, but there are two characteristics that are worth noting here. A number of these subplaces 
could be found close to or on the border between formerly Whites-only and formerly Blacks-
0,6%
0,5%
0,8%
0,0%
0,5%
1,0%
1,5%
2,0%
2,5%
0
1 000
2 000
3 000
4 000
5 000
Black
African
WAP
Coloured
WAP
White
WAP
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
 o
f 
C
it
y
 T
o
ta
l
A
b
s
o
lu
te
 N
u
m
b
e
r
Absolute (WAP)
Percentage of total (WAP)
2,4%
1,3%
0,8%
0,0%
1,0%
2,0%
3,0%
4,0%
0
300
600
900
1 200
Black
African
Middle
Class
Coloured
Middle
Class
White
Middle
Class
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
 o
f 
C
it
y
 T
o
ta
l
A
b
s
o
lu
te
 N
u
m
b
e
r
Absolute (Middle Class)
Percentage of total (Middle Class)
 169 
 
only neighbourhoods. This pattern can be seen in a number of subplaces immediately north 
and east of the airport, as well as in a number of subplaces west of the airport that are in close 
proximity to the formerly Whites-only just below the lowest eastern slopes of the mountain. 
 
Map 5.29: Location of mixed-class suburbs in 2001 and outlines of apartheid-era Group Areas 
Sources: Community Profiles Databases (see: Note 3), Graham (2007) 
While these mixed-class subplaces will be discussed in greater detail when focusing on 
the 2011 data, it is worth noting that these were some of the more diverse subplaces in 2001, 
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as shown in the figure below. 
 
Figure 5.30: Comparison between the composition of mixed-class and middle-class subplaces, 
2001 
Source: Community Profiles Databases (see: Note 2) 
When focusing on all mixed-class or middle-class subplaces, it is apparent that there is 
one racial group that comprises an outright majority, but there are a greater percentage of 
White in the mixed-class subplaces than there are Coloureds in the middle-class subplaces. 
At the very least this raises the question as to where the residential integration is taking place, 
because some of the dominant voices in this debate have focused on the middle-class suburb 
idea, without considering some space between it and the townships (Crankshaw, 2012, 
Lemanski, 2007, Turok, 2001). However, as already stated, this will be addressed in greater 
detail when focusing on the 2011 data, in order to determine whether these occurrences were 
still evident then.  
For now, it is sufficient to differentiate between those mixed-class subplaces that were 
majority-Black and those that were majority-White, including focusing on their composition. As 
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they relate to city-wide total29. When focusing on the findings in the figures below, what is most 
surprising is that there does not appear to be any significant change during the five-year period 
up to 2001, thereby lending further credence to Christopher (2005b: 2305) referring to the “slow 
pace of desegregation” during this period. 
 More specifically, figure 5.31 shows that 1% of working-age Black Africans, 3% of 
Coloureds and 32% of Whites in Cape Town at the time were resident in majority-White mixed-
class subplaces in 2001. On the other hand, for the same type of subplace in 1996, the figures 
were 2%, 3% and 32%, respectively. Similar, when focusing just on the middle-class 
individuals, the figures for 2001 that are shown in figure 5.32 are nearly identical to those in 
199630.  
                                                 
29 As was done in figures 5.25 to 5.28 
30 The figures for 1996 were 5% of middle-class Black Africans, 6% of Coloureds and 24% of Whites. 
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Figure 5.31: Racial composition of majority-
White mixed-class subplaces (working-age 
population), 2001 
Source: Community Profiles Databases (see: 
Note 2) 
 
Figure 5.32: Racial composition of majority-
White mixed-class subplaces (middle 
class only), 2001 
Source: Community Profiles Databases (see: 
Note 2) 
When focusing on the majority-Black mixed-class subplaces, there appears to be 
marginally more change, and this is among subplaces that are home to considerably more 
people than the middle-class subplaces. For example, while the majority-White mixed-class 
subplaces comprised to 154,527 working-age people (or 8% of the population), majority-Black 
mixed-class subplaces comprised 613,204 people or 31% of the working-age population. 
Nevertheless, there are two points worth raising from the figures below. Firstly, 10% 
working-age Whites and 7% of middle-class Whites were resident in these majority-Black 
mixed-class in 2001, compared to 7% and 5% respectively in 1996. This points to a slight 
increase in the percentage of Whites living in these majority-Black subplaces that might not 
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necessarily be regarded as middle-class neighbourhoods. 
 
 
Figure 5.33: Racial composition of majority-
Black mixed-class subplaces (working-age 
population), 2001 
Source: Community Profiles Databases (see: 
Note 2) 
 
Figure 5.34: Racial composition of majority-
Black mixed-class subplaces (middle class 
only), 2001 
Source: Community Profiles Databases (see: 
Note 2) 
5.2.3 2011: 
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dissimilarity index, was incorporated into this project31. 
Consequently, a question that was raised while focusing on the 2011 data was whether 
there would be any evidence of the pace of desegregation increasing during the subsequent 
decade. There is no simple answer to this question, however based on conversations that have 
occasionally arisen around the topic of this project, there has been less progress than some 
people might expect. 
5.2.3.1 Distribution of middle-class residents: 
While the employed population in Cape Town grew by 354,728 between 2001 and 2011, 
the number of people in high-income occupations32 grew by 134,205 during the same period. 
Map 5.35 shows the absolute number of people in high-income occupations per subplace and 
what is apparent is that, while those subplaces with the tallest columns remained in parts of 
the city that corresponded with the formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods, there are some 
comparable columns on the Cape Flats. Nevertheless, when looking at which of the subplaces 
had the highest percentage of people employed in these occupations, it was the formerly 
Whites-only areas and some of the adjacent formerly Blacks-only subplaces that showed the 
largest percentage of people employed in those occupations.  
Nonetheless, compared to 2001, there appeared to be more subplaces east and south 
of the airport (i.e. the Mitchell’s Plain and Khayelitsha areas) with large numbers of high-income 
earners (map 5.35), even if they did not appear to comprise a significantly high percentage of 
the employed in those subplaces (map 5.36). 
                                                 
31 See: chapter 7 for more. 
32 That is, those regarded as middle class in the context of this study, based on the usage of the term by: 
CRANKSHAW, O. 2008. Race, Space and the Post-Fordist Spatial Order of Johannesburg. Urban Studies 
(Sage Publications, Ltd.), 45, 1692-1711. 
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Map 5.35: Column chart of the absolute 
number of people in highly-skilled high-
income occupations by subplace, 2011 
Source: Community Profiles Databases (see: 
Note 3) 
 
Map 5.36: People employed in highly-skilled 
high-income occupations as a proportion 
of employed people by subplace, 2011 
Source: Community Profiles Databases (see: 
Note 3) 
While these do not aid all that well in terms of analysis, presenting the data in this way 
(regardless of which census was in focus) was a useful catalyst in the process of making 
decision about the data analysis processes. One example is the decision that was made to 
incorporate the issue of population densities into the analyses and this will be addressed in the 
next chapter. 
5.2.3.2 Majority middle-class suburbs: 
As with the previous years, one of the pivotal objectives tackled was to determine the 
middle-class subplaces (i.e. those where the majority of the employed are in highly-skilled 
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high-income occupations). After all, and this is worth reiterating here, one of the questions 
being addressed here is what the spatial implications have been for the professionalisation 
that the Cape Town labour market has undergone?  
Map 5.37 depicts the distribution of the middle-class neighbourhoods in 2011 and from 
the outset there are two points worth raising when discussing this map. Firstly, and perhaps 
not surprisingly, most of these subplaces correspond with the formerly Whites-only areas 
identified by Graham (2007). Although there are a few exceptions to this, these will be 
discussed in greater detail when the focus narrows in on the majority-Black middle-class. The 
second point is that, as with previous years, there are hardly any middle-class subplaces on 
the Cape Flats, particularly not in areas in close proximity to the airport. For example, there 
are no middle-class subplaces in Khayelitsha (i.e. blue polygons southeast of the airport), nor 
in Mitchell’s Plain (i.e. red polygons south of the airport), nor in the Nyanga-Crossroads are 
(i.e. blue polygons southwest of the airport), nor the Elsies River and Matroosfontein areas 
(i.e. red polygons north of the airport). 
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Map 5.37: Majority middle-class subplaces in 2011 and outlines of apartheid-era Group Areas 
Sources: Community Profiles Databases (see: Note 3), Graham (2007) 
5.2.3.3 Not all majority middle-class suburbs are majority White: 
The majority of these middle-class subplaces were predominantly White and were all 
located in formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods (see map 5.37), the anomalies highlight a 
previously-mentioned characteristics of the changes taking place in parts of the city. 
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Map 5.38: Majority-White middle-class subplaces in 2011 and outlines of apartheid-era Group 
Areas 
Sources: Community Profiles Databases (see: Note 3), Graham (2007) 
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Map 5.39: Majority-Black middle-class subplaces in 2011 and outlines of apartheid-era Group 
Areas  
Sources: Community Profiles Databases (see: Note 3), Graham (2007) 
Map 5.38 depicts the majority-Black middle-class subplaces and there are two points 
worth noting. As has already been alluded to, there were not many subplaces in 2011 that 
matched these criteria. On the other hand, there were 17 of these subplaces that corresponded 
with formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods in different parts of the city. And, it is worth taking 
a closer look at a number of them. 
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Firstly, just a few kilometres from the CBD and in close proximity to a number of 
University of Cape Town campuses and residences, three formerly Whites-only 
neighbourhoods had become majority-Black middle-class subplaces by 2011. The three 
subplaces were Rosebank, Mowbray and Observatory each somewhat closer than the 
previous to the formerly Coloureds-only subplaces of Woodstock and Salt River. 
While these changes, both the existence of majority-Black middle-class subplaces and 
formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods becoming majority-Black, could be seen as evidence of 
positive change, the significance of these shifts should not be overstated. For example, figures 
5.40 and 5.41, show the limited proportion of the city’s Black African and coloured labour 
market that lived in majority-White middle-class subplaces. In fact, when focusing on the 
working-age population, just 3% of Blacks Africans and 2% of the Coloureds in the city lived in 
those subplaces (figure 5.40) and when the attention shifts to the majority-Black middle-class 
subplaces (figure 5.42) the proportions are 1% and 2% respectively. 
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Figure 5.40: Racial composition of majority-
White middle-class subplaces (working-
age population), 2011 
Source: Community Profiles Databases (see: 
Note 2) 
 
Figure 5.41: Racial composition of majority-
White middle-class subplaces (middle 
class only), 2011 
Source: Community Profiles Databases (see: 
Note 2) 
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Figure 5.42: Racial composition of majority-
Black middle-class subplaces (working-
age population), 2011 
Source: Community Profiles Databases (see: 
Note 2) 
 
Figure 5.43: Racial composition of majority-
Black middle-class subplaces (middle 
class only), 2011 
Source: Community Profiles Databases (see: 
Note 2) 
Even when focusing solely on the middle-class proportion of the labour market these 
subplaces do not comprise a significant proportion of that population (figures 5.41 and 5.43). 
5.2.3.4 Further lessons to be learnt from mixed-class subplaces: 
In 2011, as with 2001, a significant number of people were living in what has been 
referred to as mixed-class subplaces. More specifically, 899,402 working-age people (or 35%), 
compared to just 338,739 (or 13%) middle-class subplaces. The remainder were in high-
unemployment subplaces, which will be the focus of the next chapter, but for now attention 
turns to these mixed-class subplaces and map 5.44 shows the locations of those subplaces in 
relation to the apartheid-era Group Areas identified by Graham (2007). 
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As with 2001, most of these subplaces are found in formerly Blacks-only subplaces that 
are in close proximity to formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods, and vice versa. That said, there 
appear to be some subplaces in the Mitchell’s Plain area33 that are no longer mixed class (nor 
were they middle-class) and the same can be found in the Belhar and Blackheath areas34. 
However, it is worth noting that the increase from 683 subplaces in 2001 to 921 in 2011, which 
was in part due to subplaces in the aforementioned areas being split. 
                                                 
33 Red polygons, south of the airport. 
34 Red polygons, north and northeast of the airport. 
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Map 5.44: Mixed Class subplaces in 2011 and outlines of apartheid-era Group Areas 
Sources: Community Profiles Databases (see: Note 3), Graham (2007) 
However, certain patterns only become evident when differentiating between majority-
White and majority-Black mixed-class subplaces. Map 5.45 shows the locations of the 106 
subplaces that were majority-White mixed-class subplaces in 2011 and, although they spread 
across a number of divergent parts of the city they all have something else in common. Each 
subplaces was located in parts of the city that coincide with the formerly Whites-only areas 
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identified by Graham (2007). 
 
Map 5.45: Majority-White Mixed-Class subplaces in 2011 and outlines of apartheid-era Group 
Areas 
Sources: Community Profiles Databases (see: Note 3), Graham (2007) 
Furthermore, map 5.44 showed that there were numerous mixed-class subplaces in 
formerly Whites-only areas in close proximity to formerly Blacks-only  subplaces yet many do 
not appear on map 5.45. in fact, it seems as though many of the majority-White mixed-class 
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subplaces are quite far removed from the Cape Flats and/or other formerly Blacks-only  
subplaces. However, there are a few exceptions such as around the Kraaifontein35 area, 
Somerset West36, as well as a number of areas closer to the city centre. 
On the other hand, when looking at map 5.46, it shows the locations of 222 majority-
Black mixed-class, out of a total of 328 mixed-class subplaces. In a pattern reminiscent of the 
patterns of desegregation patterns found in Johannesburg (Crankshaw, 2008) and the 
previous work on Cape Town (Crankshaw, 2012), a significant amount of desegregation 
among these mixed-class subplaces is happening in the formerly Whites-only areas that are 
in close proximity to the formerly Blacks-only  subplaces. Some of the areas where this is 
particularly evident is in the southern suburbs, as well as northeast of the airport where one 
finds the formerly Coloureds-only areas in Blackheath and Kuils River can be found in close 
proximity to the formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods in Kuils River. 
 
                                                 
35 Red polygons, farthest northeast of the airport. 
36 The cluster of red and yellow polygons in the farthest south-eastern area of the city. 
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Map 5.46: Majority-Black mixed-class subplaces in 2011 and outlines of apartheid-era Group 
Areas 
Sources: Community Profiles Databases (see: Note 3), Graham (2007) 
As with previous years, there were a large number of mixed-class subplaces identified 
in Cape Town in the 2011 census. Out of the 921 subplaces in the census, 131 were identified 
as majority-White mixed-class subplaces and home to 167,596 working-age people, whereas 
283 were majority-Black mixed-class subplaces and home to 731,806. 
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Even when focusing on the majority-White mixed-class subplaces, the proportion of 
working-age and middle-class Whites in these subplaces (figures 5.47 and 5.48) is 
considerably lower than in the middle-class subplaces (figures 5.40 and 5.41). For example, 
these majority-White mixed-class were home to just 29% working-age Whites and 25% of 
middle-class Whites. 
 
 
Figure 5.47: Racial composition of majority-
White mixed-class subplaces (working-age 
population), 2011 
Source: Community Profiles Databases (see: 
Note 2) 
 
Figure 5.48: Racial composition of majority-
White mixed-class subplaces (middle 
class only), 2011 
Source: Community Profiles Databases (see: 
Note 2) 
On the other hand, figures 5.49 and 5.50 showed that in 2011 majority-Black mixed-class 
subplaces was a category that continued to be home to a significant proportion of working-age 
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and middle-class Coloureds. However, the same could not be said of the Black African 
population 
 
Figure 5.49: Racial composition of majority-
Black mixed-class subplaces (working-age 
population), 2011 
Source: Community Profiles Databases (see: 
Note 2) 
 
Figure 5.50: Racial composition of majority-
Black mixed-class subplaces (working-age 
population), 2011 
Source: Community Profiles Databases (see: 
Note 2) 
 
5.3 How has the composition of formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods 
changed? 
Despite the decision not to limit the analyses by fitting them into a framework that regards 
formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods in Cape Town as equivalent to the concept of suburbs 
in the dominant literature, the fact is that this equivalence is in the literature on South African 
cities. Therefore, additional analysis was done to determine how these areas have changed.  
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Because Graham (2007) used the 2001 shapefiles and subplace boundaries when 
mapping the formerly Black Africans-only, Coloureds-only, Indians-only and Whites-only 
neighbourhoods, it was necessary to determine which of the 1996 and 2011 subplaces 
corresponded with those in 2001. In order to do this, the option to select polygons by location 
was used. This allows for the selection of polygons or shapes from one layer based on where 
it corresponds with selected polygons in another layer. In this instance the aim was to find the 
1996 or 2011 subplaces with the 2001 subplaces that Graham (2007) identified as formerly 
Whites-only areas. 
5.3.1 Racial composition: 
An interesting point worth making, at the outset, is that in 2011, 84 of those 424 
subplaces identified as corresponding with the formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods were 
majority-Black subplaces. This is not too surprising, since Crankshaw (2012) demonstrated, 
using the 2001 census data, that there was substantial desegregation in some formerly Whites-
only areas of the city. Additionally, in his work that had a national focus, Christopher (2005b, 
2005a) argued that, where there was evidence of some desegregation, particularly the 
dissimilarity measures involving Whites, it was due to other racial groups moving into these 
formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods.  
However, what is more pertinent is the composition of these neighbourhoods and how 
they changed in the post-apartheid period. Figure 5.51 shows the number of working-age Black 
Africans, Coloureds and Whites living in these formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods in 1996, 
2001 and 2011. It also what proportion of each race that represents. While the 2001 data show 
a minor drop, in absolute numbers37, across the board, all races showed an increase to some 
extent between 1996 and 2011. 
                                                 
37 This could be due to some subplaces being excluded because they fell across different Group Areas and were 
therefore excluded from the calculation. 
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Figure 5.51: Racial composition of formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods (working-age 
population), 1996-2011 
Source: Community Profiles Databases (see: Note 2) 
That said, the most noteworthy contribution coming from both figure 5.51 (working-age 
population) and figure 5.52 (middle class only), is in assessing what proportion of city-wide 
totals were resident in these formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods. More specifically, despite 
gradual declines over the period in question, likely due to the development and expansion of 
post-apartheid areas, 84% of working-age Whites and 84% of middle-class Whites were 
resident in these neighbourhoods. The findings in the next chapter will confirm this, but most 
of the remainder were resident in neighbourhoods that were never subject to apartheid-era 
legislation and/or not developed at the time. 
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Figure 5.52: Racial composition of formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods (middle class only), 
1996-2011 
Source: Community Profiles Databases (see: Note 2) 
Since there has been considerable discussion about the desegregation of these formerly 
Whites-only neighbourhoods, these findings are important to demonstrate the limited 
proportion of the Black African and Coloured populations that have played a part in that 
desegregation. It is also with this last point in mind that the chapter focusing on the city-level 
segregation measures has been included to demonstrate the limited impact of localised 
desegregation on the extent of segregation across the city.  
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5.3.2 Class composition: 
Although the formerly Whites-only areas in Cape Town were not segregated by 
occupational class, Whites have dominated employment in the high-income occupations 
through this period in question, as well as remaining over-represented in middle-income non-
manual occupations throughout the period. So, with 84% of Cape Town’s Whites living in these 
neighbourhoods in 2011, it is logical to expect that the class compositions of these 
neighbourhoods would be impacted by the numbers of high-income earning Whites living 
there. 
The class composition of these formerly Whites-only areas does not necessarily reveal 
anything new, but rather provide another perspective on a number of characteristics of Cape 
Town’s changing geography that other evidence discussed here has already revealed.  
More specifically, in 2011, 165 of the 424 the subplaces that comprise these formerly 
Whites-only areas were mixed-class and 10 had unemployment rates higher than the city-wide 
rate, it is not too surprising that there were significant numbers of residents employed in middle-
income or low-income occupations (see figure 5.53). However, these results show that more 
than half of the high income earners in the city were resident in these formerly Whites-only 
neighbourhoods in 1996, 2001 and 2011 (even though that proportion decreased gradually 
over the period in question).  
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Figure 5.53: Class composition of formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods, using absolute 
numbers of people employed in occupational groups and as a proportion of employed in those 
groups in Cape Town, 1996-2011 
Source: Community Profiles Databases (see: Note 2) 
Nevertheless, the fact that nearly half of those employed in high-income occupations 
were living outside these so-called White suburbs in 2011, will only make sense once the 
findings on the so-called ghettos has been address. Fortunately, that is the focus of the next 
chapter.  
5.4 Conclusion: 
This chapter has presented findings from two perspectives - firstly, the data-driven 
categories of middle-class and mixed-class subplaces, followed by the discussion of the 
composition of the formerly Whites-only subplaces.  
59%
57%
51%
40%
34%
32%
18%
11%
20%
15%
12%
19%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
0
48 000
96 000
144 000
192 000
240 000
H
ig
h
-in
c
o
m
e
 (1
9
9
6
)
H
ig
h
-in
c
o
m
e
 (2
0
0
1
)
H
ig
h
-in
c
o
m
e
 (2
0
1
1
)
M
id
d
le
-in
c
o
m
e
 n
o
n
-
m
a
n
u
a
l (1
9
9
6
)
M
id
d
le
-in
c
o
m
e
 n
o
n
-
m
a
n
u
a
l (2
0
0
1
)
M
id
d
le
-in
c
o
m
e
 n
o
n
-
m
a
n
u
a
l (2
0
1
1
)
M
id
d
le
-in
c
o
m
e
 m
a
n
u
a
l
(1
9
9
6
)
M
id
d
le
-in
c
o
m
e
 m
a
n
u
a
l
(2
0
0
1
)
M
id
d
le
-in
c
o
m
e
 m
a
n
u
a
l
(2
0
1
1
)
L
o
w
-in
c
o
m
e
 (1
9
9
6
)
L
o
w
-in
c
o
m
e
 (2
0
0
1
)
L
o
w
-in
c
o
m
e
 (2
0
1
1
)
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
 o
f 
C
it
y
 T
o
ta
l
A
b
s
o
lu
te
 N
u
m
b
e
r
Absolute Percentage of all employed in category
 195 
 
When one focuses on the middle-class and mixed-class subplaces, it is apparent that 
the majority of the White labour market, regardless of occupation, is resident in the middle-
class subplace. On the other hand, while fewer Whites were resident in the mixed-class 
subplaces, they were home to the majority of working-age Coloureds. 
That said, when focusing specifically on the formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods, it was 
apparent that a considerable proportion of working-age and middle-class Whites were resident 
there throughout the period in question. And, while there was clearly evidence of an increased 
presence of Black Africans and Coloureds in those neighbourhoods, they accounted for very 
small proportions of either population. Nevertheless, there are a number of points worth 
reiterating here because of the contributions these results could make to the debate on social 
and spatial changes in post-Fordist cities. 
Firstly, whereas the discussions about Cape Town’s geography has emphasised the 
start contrast between slums, poverty traps and/or ghettos on one side and affluent suburbs 
on the other (Crankshaw, 2012, Lemanski, 2007, Turok, 2001), the presence of what has been 
termed mixed-class subplaces points to a more nuanced spatial profile for the city. 
Secondly, the existence of majority-Black middle-class subplaces is also a positive 
development in terms of the social and spatial transformation of the city. However, there were 
very few of these subplaces and they too accounted for just 1% of working-age Black Africans 
and 2% of Coloureds. Nevertheless, this is something that was previously not identified in 
Cape Town. 
Thirdly, the results here show that the formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods are still 
predominantly White and although there has been some desegregation of those 
neighbourhoods, caution is necessary not to overstate its significance. After all, when one 
considers the Black Africans and Coloureds in those neighbourhoods as a proportion of the 
city-wide totals, the results were just 15% and 11% respectively, in 2011. Additionally, the 
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location of formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods that had undergone the most significant racial 
desegregation were often in close proximity to formerly Coloureds-only neighbourhoods. This 
is similar to a pattern that Crankshaw (2008) found in his work on Johannesburg.  
Lastly, in each census count discussed here, these formerly Whites-only subplaces have 
been home to more than half of all people employed in high-income occupations. Based on 
that result and the emphasis on suburbanisation in the literature, as well as the idea that the 
upwardly mobile would want to move to more affluent neighbourhoods (Kasarda, 1989, 
Lemanski, 2007, Turok, 2001, Crankshaw, 2012, Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000b, Marcuse 
and Van Kempen, 2000a), the assumption might be that many of the rest were resident in 
areas that were never subject to apartheid-era legislation. However, as the next chapter will 
demonstrate, a significant proportion of the middle-class have continued to live in what some 
might refer to as Cape Town’s racial ghetto.  
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6 DOES CAPE TOWN HAVE OUTCAST GHETTOS? 
As already discussed here, the literature on urban change, especially in post-Fordist 
cities, defines ghettos as involuntary spatial concentrations of a group of people (e.g. defined 
by ethnicity, race or religion) in a subordinate position in society (Marcuse and Van Kempen, 
2000b, Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000a, Marcuse, 1997a, Marcuse, 2001). While ghettos 
could be the product of legislation, at other times they are the product of discriminatory banking 
and/or financial practices in a supposedly free market (Marcuse, 1997a, Wilson, 1996, Wilson, 
2009). 
As already discussed, the so-called townships in the South African, which are sometimes 
equated with the ghetto concept, were created in order to accommodate migrant labourers in 
the years prior to the formalisation of the apartheid regime and/or to house those Black 
Africans, Coloureds and Indians who were forcibly removed from neighbourhoods that had 
been set aside for Whites only. This was done due to the implementation of the Group Areas 
Act (Field, 2001, Seekings, 2011, Swanson, 2001, Swanson and Harries, 2001, Thomas, 
2001). 
Seekings (2011) explained that the many of the country’s poor and unemployed were 
prevented from entering the urban centres, which were regarded as being ‘White’. The 
unemployment rates shown in figure 4.26 support the argument that, at least in the Cape Town 
context, this was not as high as South Africa as a whole (Holborn, 2012). 
Nevertheless, despite the occasional association between South African townships and 
the ghetto concept in urban studies literature, the approach used in the previous chapter will 
be used here too. Rather than basing the analysis and discussion on the aforementioned 
association between ghettos and townships, the discussion remains more open-ended and 
aimed at understanding the spatial characteristics of the professionalisation that the Cape 
Town labour market has undergone. 
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Whereas the previous chapter focused on those subplaces that were predominantly 
middle class, followed by those that were referred to as mixed class subplaces, this chapter 
focuses on those parts of the city where unemployment was the highest at any given point in 
time. More specifically, because Cape Town’s unemployment rate fluctuated from one census 
to the next, the decision was taken to focus on those subplaces where the unemployment was 
higher than the rate for the city at the time.  
6.1 Changing composition of the majority-Black subplaces with above 
average unemployment rates, 1996-2001: 
In his work using indices to determine the extent of desegregation in South Africa in the 
early years after the end of apartheid Christopher (2005b, 2005a) argued that although 
legalised segregation had come to an end, there was little change in the extent of racial 
desegregation in those early post-apartheid years. One of his arguments (Christopher, 2005b, 
Christopher, 2005a), which was reiterated by Crankshaw in his work on Johannesburg (2008) 
and Cape Town (2012) , was that much of the desegregation was by the upwardly-mobile 
Black38 population to the formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods. 
As demonstrated in the findings discussed in the previous chapter, this was only part of 
the changes taking place. After all, while some of the formerly Whites-only neighbourhood are 
becoming more racially diverse, with some even becoming majority-Black subplaces by 2011, 
many Black Africans and Coloureds in high-income or middle-income occupations still lived in 
what some have referred to as the ‘racial ghetto’ or formerly Blacks-only   neighbourhoods. 
Nevertheless, in the process of engaging with the idea of the outcast ghetto, attention will once 
again turn to the ways in which Crankshaw (2012), Lemanski (2007), Turok (2001) and others 
they have cited have contrasted the increasingly racially diverse suburbs with the racially 
homogenous townships struggling under the intertwined burdens of poverty and 
                                                 
38 Comprising Black African, Coloureds and Indians/Asians. 
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unemployment. 
Without pre-empting the findings to be discussed in the remainder of this chapter, at this 
stage, it is sufficient to say that even in contexts where unemployment rates are high, there 
are some paradoxical findings regarding the composition of the populations in some of these 
subplaces.   
6.1.1 Determining the locations of majority-Black high-unemployment subplaces in 
1996: 
As discussed in the previous chapter, a number of the majority-Black subplaces that 
were categorised as middle class (see: map 5.8) or mixed class (see: map 5.15) in 1996 were 
located in formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods. However, here the focus is on majority-Black 
subplaces, with high unemployment rates39. And, one of the aims of this discussion is to 
determine whether the involuntary racial ghettos (Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000b, Marcuse, 
1997a) might have become so-called outcast ghettos. The characteristics of this type of ghetto 
are that poverty is concentrated, unemployment rates are high, the residents are largely 
excluded from potential employment networks and the neighbourhoods have seen a significant 
exodus of the upwardly mobile (e.g. middle class) to the predominantly-White suburbs 
(Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000b, Marcuse, 1997a, Wilson, 2012). 
The chosen starting point here was to determine whether, just five years after residential 
racial segregation was officially ended with the Abolition of Racially Based Land Measures Act 
(1991), there was any evidence of significant movement by the Black40 residents in Cape Town. 
After all, during the apartheid era, their movement and residential location choices were limited 
by the legislation in place at the time. Map 6.1 shows the spatial distribution of the 231 majority-
Black subplaces (out of a total of 405 subplaces). As can be seen in this map, very few of 
                                                 
39 Since the unemployment rate fluctuated from one census to the next, the cut-off point for high unemployment 
was the unemployment rate for Cape Town as a whole at the time. In other words, the cut-off point was 20% in 
1996, 29% in 2001 and 24% in 2011. 
40 Comprising Black African, Coloureds and Indians/Asians. 
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those subplaces were found in formerly Whites-only parts of the city. Not surprisingly, based 
on the findings already discussed here, many of those majority-Black, but formerly Whites-only 
neighbourhoods were located in neighbourhoods that bordered the apartheid-era racial 
ghettos. 
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Map 6.1: Majority-Black subplaces in 1996 and outlines of apartheid-era Group 
Areas 
Sources: Community Profiles Databases (see: Note 3), Graham (2007) 
More specifically, of the 231 majority-Black subplaces, nine were categorised as middle 
class and another 110 were mixed class41, and all of them were discussed in the previous 
                                                 
41 As the discussion will unpack, the high-unemployment subplaces also include a variety of occupational class in 
their population, but what makes the mixed-class subplaces different is that the unemployment rates there were 
lower than that for the city at the time. 
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chapter. This means that there were 112 subplaces that were majority Black and where the 
unemployment rates were higher than that for the city at the time. However, before focusing 
on those subplaces, it is worth noting that, in 1996, the subplaces with the highest 
unemployment rates were to be found on the Cape Flats (see map 6.2).  
 
Map 6.2: Unemployment rates by subplace, 1996 
Source: Community Profiles Databases (see: Note 3) 
The unemployment rate in Cape Town in 1996 was 20%, so any subplaces where 
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unemployment exceeded that rate were identified and put into ArcGIS to produce map 6.342. 
For the most part, these subplaces are confined to formerly Blacks-only subplaces on the Cape 
Flats or near the city centre. However, there is one subplace in a formerly Whites-only part of 
the southern suburbs, not far from the False Bay coastline. That is Westlake, where a 
development putting a poor neighbourhood in close proximity to a middle-class or wealthier 
neighbourhood, was established in the post-apartheid years43. 
 
                                                 
42 It is also worth pointing out that, in 1996, there were no subplaces where the unemployment rate exceeded 
20% and where the majority of the population was White. 
43 For more on this neighbourhood: LEMANSKI, C. 2006. Spaces of exclusivity or connection? Linkages between 
a gated community and its poorer neighbour in a Cape Town master plan development. Urban Studies, 43, 397-
420. 
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Map 6.3: Majority-Black subplaces with high unemployment rates in 1996 and outlines of 
apartheid-era Group Areas 
Sources: Community Profiles Databases (see: Note 3), Graham (2007) 
As previously stated, this census was just five years after the abolishment of legislated 
residential segregation and two years after the country’s first democratic elections, so it is 
possible that the expected changes, as laid out in urban studies literature, would emerge in 
the ensuing years. However, since Christopher (2005b, 2005a) argued that desegregation, 
across the country, moved at a slow pace during this period it might not be worth expecting 
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that too much was different in the 2001 data.  
6.1.2 Determining the locations of majority-Black high-unemployment subplaces in 
2001: 
By 2001, Cape Town’s racial composition had shifted significantly with Coloureds 
comprising 47% of the working-age population, the same as it was in 1996. However, the Black 
African portion of the working-age population grew from 26% in 1996 to 33% in 2001, whereas 
Whites declined from 25% to 19%. Thanks to the work of Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw (2009), 
it was clear that the labour market had undergone professionalisation since 1980. Also, the 
Black Africans and Coloureds had a greater share in both highly-skilled high-income 
employment (figure 4.15), as well as semi-skilled middle-income non-manual occupations 
(figure 4.16). However, those groups also suffered the highest rates of unemployment 
compared to Whites, regardless of the level of education (figures 4.17 to 4.20). however, the 
issue to be addressed here is what the spatial implications of those changes were. 
Once again, the starting point is focusing on majority-Black subplaces, which can be 
seen in map 6.4. Even seven years after the first democratic elections and ten years after the 
Abolition of Racially Based Land Measures Act (1991) was passed, most of these subplaces 
were to be found in formerly Blacks-only areas and the few exceptions were in close proximity 
to them.   
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Map 6.4: Majority-Black subplaces in 1996 and outlines of apartheid-era Group 
Areas 
Sources: Community Profiles Databases (see: Note 3), Graham (2007) 
The unemployment rate peaked at 29% in 2001, but for Black Africans in Cape Town it 
was 50%. On the other hand, it was 25% among Coloureds and just 5% among the city’s White 
population. Not surprisingly, and in agreement with some of the literature on Cape Town, many 
of the subplaces with the highest unemployment rates, were on the Cape Flats, particularly in 
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the formerly Black Africans-only areas of Khayelitsha44, as well as in the adjacent areas of 
Gugulethu, Nyanga and Crossroads45. After all, those with the areas with large numbers of 
Black African and Coloured residents and those were the fastest growing populations at the 
time.  
                                                 
44 Southeast of the airport. 
45 All are west to southwest of the airport. 
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Map 6.5: Unemployment rates by subplace, 2001 
Source: Community Profiles Databases (see: Note 3) 
When focusing on those subplaces with unemployment rates that exceeded the city’s 
29% unemployment rate at the time, there are a number of subplaces scattered around 
different parts of the city, yet the largest clusters of these subplaces remained on the Cape 
Flats. More specifically, these subplaces could be found across the Khayelitsha area46, as well 
                                                 
46 Blue polygons, southeast of the airport. 
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as the aforementioned Gugulethu-Nyanga-Crossroads47 cluster. Also, a number of the central 
and southern subplaces in the Mitchell’s Plain48 area have already been categorised as mixed 
class and therefore are not included in this map, yet a number of the subplaces closest to the 
aforementioned formerly Black Africans-only areas had higher unemployment rates. 
Considering the unemployment rates by race discussed at the beginning of this section, 
it is apparent that Black Africans were not only dealing with the worst unemployment rates at 
the time (at any level of education), but there were also large clusters of subplaces in or in 
close proximity to the formerly Black Africans-only areas where the unemployment rates were 
above the city-wide rate at the time. 
 
                                                 
47 Blue polygons, southwest of the airport. 
48 Red polygons, south of the airport. 
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Map 6.6: Majority-Black subplaces with high unemployment rates in 2001 and outlines of 
apartheid-era Group Areas 
Sources: Community Profiles Databases (see: Note 3), Graham (2007) 
Based on these patterns it would appear as though some of these cluster might resemble 
the ideal type of the outcast ghetto previously discussed (Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000b, 
Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000a, Marcuse, 1997a), as well as the impoverished racial 
ghettos described in some of the literature specifically focused on Cape Town (Crankshaw, 
2012, Lemanski, 2007, Turok, 2001). However, when focusing on the composition of these 
 211 
 
subplaces, there are, once again a number of counterintuitive findings that helped highlighting 
the problem of discussing Cape Town using a binary framework of suburb vs racial ghetto. 
6.1.3 Changing composition of majority-Black high-unemployment subplaces, 1996-
2001: 
In order to facilitate comparisons between the composition of these subplaces in 1996 
and 2001, the figures below present results for the same calculations for the two census counts 
side by side. 
When focusing on the working-age population by race the results for 1996 (figure 6.7) 
and 2001 (figure 6.8), it is apparent that there has been an increase in the number of people 
living in this category of subplaces. For Black Africans, the figure increased from 389,775 to 
583,575 and for Coloureds, 306,834 to 355,398. That said, since the Black African population 
in Cape Town increased by 200,142 during the period in question, the increase in the number 
of people in this racial group living in majority-Black high-unemployment subplaces accounts 
for nearly that entire increase. And, since this is only focusing on working-age population, it is 
evident that in-migration to the city has been a major contributor to this increase, but that nearly 
all Black Africans who came to Cape Town between 1996 and 2001 found themselves living 
in contexts with high levels of unemployment. 
When one considers the potential impact of living in that type of environment, especially 
as it pertains to whether someone is going to be able to find employment through their 
networks, then this posits a potential hypothesis for the above-mentioned increase in the 
unemployment rates across all population groups in 200149, but especially among the Black 
African population, where the unemployment rate was 50% in 2001. 
                                                 
49 The unemployment rate increased from 20%, in 1996, to 29% in 2001. 
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Figure 6.7: Racial composition majority-
Black high-unemployment subplaces 
(working-age population), 1996 
Source: Community Profiles Databases (see: 
Note 2) 
 
Figure 6.8: Racial composition majority-
Black high-unemployment subplaces 
(middle class only), 2001 
Source: Community Profiles Databases (see: 
Note 2) 
Despite these increases in the number of Black Africans and Coloureds living in these 
majority-Black high-unemployment subplaces, as a percentage of the citywide populations the 
results had hardly changed between 1996 and 2001. 
The findings presented earlier in table 4.5 showed that the number of people in high-
income occupations increased from 231,891 to 249,091 during the 1996-2001 period. For 
Black Africans it increased from 17,692 to 24,671, whereas for Coloureds it increased from 
75,406 to 88,305. While the growth of the Black50 middle class has been reported on 
                                                 
50 Comprising Black African, Coloureds and Indians/Asians. 
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previously, such as by Crankshaw (2012), the contexts where some are resident continued to 
defy expectations in 2001. 
The findings and discussion presented previously showed that the majority of the high-
income earning Coloureds were resident in majority-Black mixed-class subplaces in both 1996 
(67%) and 2001 (69%), but the same is not true of high-income earning Black Africans. Figure 
6.9 shows that 65% of that group were living in majority-Black high-unemployment subplaces 
in 1996, compared to 60% in 2001 as shown in figure 6.10.  
 
Figure 6.9: Racial composition majority-
Black high-unemployment subplaces 
(working-age population), 1996 
Source: Community Profiles Databases (see: 
Note 2) 
 
Figure 6.10: Racial composition majority-
Black high-unemployment subplaces 
(middle class only), 2001 
Source: Community Profiles Databases (see: 
Note 2) 
Nevertheless, the data indicate that a shrinking percentage of high-income earners in 
both the Black African and Coloured populations are living in these subplaces with high levels 
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of unemployment. Logically, this does not necessarily mean that they are moving out of these 
subplaces, but possibly that they never lived there at all. Logic requires that, at the very least, 
we allow for the possibility that they grew up in other parts of the city or moved to the city when 
taking up their high-income earning jobs. Regardless of what the circumstances are that 
brought about their residence in other parts of the city, the data indicate that, between 1996 
and 2001, a greater proportion of both high-income Coloureds and Black Africans were living 
in mixed-class or middle-class neighbourhoods. While this concurs with much of the literature 
discussed here, it does suggest that the change is a gradual process. 
6.2 Composition of the majority-Black subplaces with above average 
unemployment rates in 2011: 
6.2.1 Distribution and composition of Majority-Black subplaces with high 
unemployment in 2011: 
Of the 921 subplaces in Cape Town in the 2011 census, 479 were majority-Black 
subplaces. Of those, the 283 mixed-class subplaces and the 34 middle-class subplaces have 
already been discussed, leaving 162 that were home to people in a variety of occupations and 
where the unemployment rates were higher that the citywide rate of 24%. 
In the process of identifying the subplaces that fit that profile, map 6.11 was produced to 
show the unemployment rates by subplace. What is apparent in this map, even from just a 
cursory look, is that many of the subplaces with the highest rates of unemployment are on the 
Cape Flats, particularly those in close proximity to and beyond the airport. Some of these 
include subplaces that have already been the focus of discussion here, including: Gugulethu, 
Nyanga and Crossroads, which are immediately southwest and south of the airport; Mitchell’s 
Plain, which is farther south; as well as the Khayelitsha area, which is southeast of the airport. 
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Map 6.11: Unemployment rates by subplace, 2011 
Source: Community Profiles Databases (see: Note 3) 
This pattern becomes more apparent when focusing solely on those where the 
unemployment rate was higher than Cape Town’s 24% at the time. Map 6.12 highlights the 
locations of the 162 subplaces that were majority-Black and where the unemployment rates 
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exceeded the citywide rate51. A number of the subplaces included here were in parts of the city 
with relatively small populations (compared to the numbers on the Cape Flats) and/or in areas 
that were established in the post-apartheid period. Some of these include the following: Joe 
Slovo and Du Noon in the Milnerton and Blouberg areas northwest of the city centre; Atlantis 
and Mamre in the far north; as well as a number of subplaces in the Strand, Somerset West 
and Gordons Bay areas in the far southeast. 
On the other hand, the Cape Flats is home to a number of areas established during and 
even prior to the apartheid period and purposely set aside for Coloured or Black African 
residents. When looking at those areas and focusing specifically on those that were majority-
Black with high unemployment rates, we find that in excess of 1.1 million working-age people 
were living in those subplaces, which is significant considering the entire city was home to 
2,604,192 working-age people at the time. These numbers indicate that more than 2 in 5 
working-age people in Cape Town in 2011 were living in subplaces on the Cape Flats where 
the employment rate was in excess of 24% 
 
                                                 
51 There were two majority-White subplaces with unemployment rates higher than the citywide rate, but together 
they were home to just 17 working-age people according to the 2011 census data. 
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Map 6.12: Majority-Black with high unemployment rates in 2011 and outlines of apartheid-era 
Group Areas  
Sources: Community Profiles Databases (see: Note 3), Graham (2007) 
Nevertheless, when focusing on all majority-Black high-unemployment subplaces across 
the, the data indicate that the majority of working-age Black Africans (82%) and middle-class 
Black Africans were resident in these subplaces. These figures are marginally less than those 
from the 2001, which were 90% and 60%, respectively. Not surprisingly, considering the results 
and discussion about mixed-class subplaces in the previous chapter, the results for Coloureds, 
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45% of the working-age and 25% of the high-income earners, are considerably lower. 
Nevertheless, those results are marginally higher than those from 2001, which were 39% and 
17%, respectively. 
 
Figure 6.13: Racial composition majority-
Black high-unemployment subplaces 
(working-age population), 2011 
Source: Community Profiles Databases (see: 
Note 2) 
 
Figure 6.14: Racial composition majority-
Black high-unemployment subplaces 
(middle class only), 2011 
Source: Community Profiles Databases (see: 
Note 2) 
6.2.2 Understanding the paradoxical composition of the changing racial ghettos: 
During the earlier exploratory phase of becoming more familiar with the data, it became 
apparent that some subplaces not only had significantly larger populations than others, but 
also that some of those heavily populated subplaces were, at times, among the cities smaller 
subplaces (in terms of surface area). 
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Initially, the significance of this fact was not apparent, but as the work progressed it would 
become increasingly apparent that ignoring these differences, especially of those more 
densely populated subplaces, could result in very different conclusions being reached about 
the class dynamics in a particular area. For example, map 5.36 presented the findings for 
persons in high-income occupations as a percentage of all employed persons in the subplace 
and the pattern that was evident was that the highest results were found in and around formerly 
Whites-only neighbourhoods around Cape Town. This is a familiar way of presenting this type 
of data and was used by Crankshaw (2012) to present data on persons employed in those 
same occupations. 
However, a query that surfaced during the data analysis focused on whether there was 
some way to account for the differences in subplace population and surface area sizes. What 
might then be found when focusing on persons employed in these high-income occupations?  
As a starting point, map 6.15 shows the population density (using working-age population 
only) of Cape Town’s subplaces in 2011 and it demonstrates that in some subplaces, albeit 
very small ones, the density is equal to as much as 62,695 working-age persons per square 
kilometre (or around 627 people per hectare52). 
The map also includes the outlines of the majority-Black high-unemployment subplaces 
and it shows that many of the subplaces with the highest population densities are in or in close 
proximity to those high-unemployment subplaces. This is particularly true of the subplaces 
surrounding the airport, as well as the Khayelitsha area southeast of the airport. 
With the question of the outcast ghetto (Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000b, Marcuse and 
Van Kempen, 2000a, Marcuse, 1997a), as well as the idea of a lack of access to so-called 
mainstream institutions (Wilson, 2011, Wilson, 2012) in the background, the focus turned to 
                                                 
52 That is, a square of 100m by 100m, or 1/100 of a square kilometre. 
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the employed population and those results are presented in map 6.16. 
 
 
Map 6.15: Population density by subplace, as number of working-age persons per km2, 2011 
Source: Community Profiles Databases (see: Note 3) 
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Map 6.16: Population density by subplace, as number of employed persons per km2, 2011 
Source: Community Profiles Databases (see: Note 3) 
Once again, the use of this approach reveals something that solely focusing on 
calculations such as the unemployment rate (e.g. map 6.13) could obfuscate. After all, there 
are subplaces identified in map 6.16 where the unemployment rate is higher that the citywide 
rate, yet one can still find a high density of employed persons, even if some might not be in 
very lucrative occupations. Furthermore, since the city’s economic geography has stayed 
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relatively unchanged (Geocentric Information Systems, 2009, Didier et al., 2012, Didier et al., 
2013, Sinclair-Smith and Turok, 2012, Turok, 2001) the unemployment in these areas are likely 
to see many leaving their neighbourhoods in the morning and/or returning in the evenings as 
they commute to and from work. So, at the very least they are aware of the numerous people 
in their neighbourhoods who are employed and who might be able to connect with potential 
employment networks. 
Additionally, numerous majority-Black high-unemployment subplaces were also found to 
have concentrations of people employed in high-income occupations, comparable to formerly 
Whites-only and/or predominantly middle-class subplaces. Map 6.17 shows the concentration 
of persons in high-income occupations per square kilometre, by subplace.  
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Map 6.17: Population density by subplace, as number of persons employed in high-income 
occupations per km2, 2011 
Source: Community Profiles Databases (see: Note 3) 
6.3 How has the composition of the racial ghetto changed? 
While some might choose to critique the discussion in this chapter thus far because it 
does not focus on a single part of the city, that is easy to define and locate, the findings here 
suggest that care should be taken to avoid fitting data and an interpretation into a 
predetermined and/or rigid theoretical framework. It also shows that some of the changes 
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taking place in those parts of Cape Town that might be referred to as townships or racial 
ghettos defy some of the expectations of the dominant literature in urban studies and are 
therefore worthy of further attention. 
Nevertheless, the aforementioned literature cannot be ignored because those 
researchers have provided concepts and frameworks that have been useful to interrogate what 
is happening in urban setting around the world. Consequently, this chapter would not be 
complete without focusing on Cape Town’s racial ghettos. 
6.3.1 Racial composition: 
Based on the 2011 subplaces that overlapped with the apartheid-era Group Areas 
identified by Graham (2007), all the formerly Blacks-only areas were majority-Black subplaces 
in 2011. Considering the patterns discussed by Crankshaw (2012) regarding the movement 
from these areas to the formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods, something that was also argued 
by Christopher (2005a, 2005b) regarding other cities in South Africa, this was to be expected.  
However, when focusing on the racial composition of these areas, there is at least one 
finding that, at least at first, might appear to be counterintuitive. According to the findings 
presented in figure 6.18, 78% of working-age Coloureds in Cape Town in 2011 were living in 
these formerly Blacks-only areas, but just 45% of working-age Black Africans. The reason for 
this is that there are parts of the city that, in the post-apartheid era, have been developed 
and/or expanded, but were never officially declared as set aside for any particular group. After 
all, it was not developed at the time. 
Some of the areas that fall into this category including Masiphumelele, Imizamo Yethu, 
parts of the greater Khayelitsha area, Delft, as well as Du Noon and Joe Slovo Park northeast 
of the city centre. Also, it is worth noting that all the areas mentioned here were majority-Black 
high-unemployment subplaces in 2011, which suggests that at least some of the more recent 
arrivals to Cape Town (i.e. since the removal of influx control legislation) and some of those in 
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search of employment have taken up residence in these post-apartheid developments or 
expansions. 
 
 
Figure 6.18: Racial composition of formerly Blacks-only subplaces (working-age population), 
1996-2011 
Source: Community Profiles Databases (see: Note 2) 
Nevertheless, when focusing on these formerly Blacks-only neighbourhoods, it is 
apparent that a growing number of working-age and middle-class Black Africans (and 
Coloureds to a lesser degree) have been residing there. However, this accounts for a shrinking 
proportion of those populations.  
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Figure 6.19: Racial composition of formerly Blacks-only subplaces (middle class only), 1996-
2011 
Source: Community Profiles Databases (see: Note 2) 
Despite these changes, as recently as 2011, these formerly Blacks-only neighbourhoods 
were still home 41% of middle-class Black Africans and 71% of their Coloured counterparts 
(figure 6.19). 
6.3.2 Class composition: 
One of the characteristics of the professionalisation-driven changes in Cape Town that 
has been discussed here is that while there has been a degree of deracialisation in high-
income occupations (figure 4.11), as well as middle-income non-manual occupations (figure 
4.12), Black Africans in Cape Town have continually experienced the highest levels of 
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unemployment, followed by Coloureds (see figures 4.13 to 4.16). It is because of this, as well 
as the limited movement of Black Africans and Coloureds out of the so-called racial ghetto, 
that 93 of the 265 subplaces identified as formerly Blacks-only areas in 2011, had 
unemployment rates above the city’s 24% rate at the time. Of the remained, eight were 
predominantly middle-class (i.e. the majority of the employed people in those subplaces were 
in high-income occupations). 
 
Figure 6.20: Class composition of formerly Blacks-only areas, using absolute numbers of people 
employed in occupational groups and as a proportion of all employed in those groups in Cape 
Town, 2011 
Source: Community Profiles Databases (see: Note 2) 
One of the comments toward the end of the previous chapter was that just 51% of all 
those employed in high-income occupations were resident in formerly Whites-only 
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neighbourhoods in 2011 and that this would make sense once the attention shifts to the so-
called racial ghetto. The findings presented in figure 6.20 provide some clarity, because this 
figure shows that 35% of all high income earners in Cape Town it 2011, were living in formerly 
Blacks-only areas of the city. While pursuing a causal explanation for this phenomenon is 
beyond the scope of this particular project, this alone is an important finding, because it 
contradicts theory-driven expectations about the changes in post-Fordist cities (Kasarda, 1989, 
Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000b, Marcuse, 1997a, Wilson, 2012), as well as providing a 
broader understanding of the limited extent of the exodus of high income earning Black 
Africans and Coloureds from these racial ghettos. Furthermore, by revisiting the findings 
presented in figure 6.19 we see that the high income earners still resident in the racial ghetto 
accounted for 41% of Black Africans and 71% of Coloureds who were employed in high-income 
occupations at the time. 
Additionally, when one considers the ideal type of the outcast ghetto posited by Marcuse 
and van Kempen (Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000b, Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000a, 
Marcuse, 1997a), then the racial ghettos in Cape Town clearly do not resemble that concept. 
Yes, the evidence indicates that there are pockets with extremely high rates of unemployment 
(e.g. Delft where the working-age population was 48,816 and the unemployment rate was 
49%), but this is not the whole picture. After all, when the so-called racial ghetto is home 
approximately 1 in 3 high income earners in the city, as well as 1 in 2 of those employed in 
middle-income non-manual occupations (see figure 6.20) then it does not fit the definition of 
an outcast ghetto. 
6.4 Conclusion: 
As previously discussed, the Abolition of Racially Based Land Measures Act (1991) did 
not necessarily bring about residential racial desegregation. Furthermore, the pace of 
desegregation in the ensuing years was slow, at least in part due to the limited government 
intervention to undo the spatial inequalities of the past (Christopher, 2005b, Seekings, 2011). 
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And, since they had little to no access to mortgage finance, many Black Africans and Coloureds 
were relegated to staying in Cape Town’s formerly Blacks-only neighbourhoods. consequently, 
the concentration of Black Africans and Coloureds in these neighbourhoods, as well as the 
aforementioned high unemployment rates are not surprising. That said, there are a number of 
counterintuitive findings coming out of this chapter that are worth repeating.  
Firstly, while seeing large numbers of Black Africans and Coloureds living in majority-
Black neighbourhoods was in line with expectation, based on previous work on the city, the 
socio-economic diversity of those subplaces was considerably greater than someone familiar 
with the literature on ghettos and/or the changing geography of Cape Town might have 
expected (Crankshaw, 2012, Kasarda, 1989, Lemanski, 2007, Marcuse and Van Kempen, 
2000b, Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000a, Turok, 2001, Wilson, 2012). 
However, as the discussion below will attest, these findings also contributed to 
differentiating between the contexts in which Black Africans and Coloureds in Cape Town were 
resident. 
Firstly, the findings in the previous chapter already indicated the majority of the city’s 
working-age and middle-class Coloureds were resident in mixed-class subplaces, the findings 
in this chapter have confirmed that the majority of working-age and middle-class Black Africans 
in Cape Town were resident in majority-Black high-unemployment subplaces throughout the 
period in question. The extent of the presence of middle-class Black Africans, in particular, 
was counterintuitive because of the expectations that they might have been more significantly 
distributed across middle-class and/or mixed-class subplaces. 
However, the most significant contribution from this chapter is not just that large numbers 
of people employed in high-income occupations can be found in these high-unemployment 
subplaces, but also that many have continued to stay in formerly Blacks-only neighbourhoods. 
And, they have done so in large numbers. While high income earners as a proportion of 
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employed people in many of these neighbourhoods might obfuscate this point, when focusing 
on the density of high income earners and/or the absolute number of these individuals living in 
these neighbourhoods, it becomes much more revealing.  
Therefore, these findings indicate that rather than simply being contexts of high 
unemployment, the formerly Blacks-only neighbourhoods have a paradoxical composition that 
includes many people employed in middle-income and high-income occupations. 
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7 HAS THE “SLOW PACE” OF DESEGREGATION PERSISTED IN 
CAPE TOWN? 
7.1 Racial segregation or desegregation (evenness dimension): 
7.1.1 Segregation among the working-age population: 
As already stated, Cape Town’s demographics are quite unlike any of the country’s other 
major metropolitan areas, because the proportions of Coloureds and Blacks Africans in the 
city have consistently differed significantly from the national averages. The proportion of the 
population consisting of Black Africans has consistently been below the national average, 
whereas the Coloured proportion is consistently above the national average. Nevertheless, 
these differences do not inherently have an impact on the results from the dissimilarity index. 
Once again, it is worth remembering that the range of the dissimilarity index is 0-100 and the 
higher the score the less a particular group is evenly distributed across the city compared to 
the rest of the population or another group (Castree et al., 2013, Christopher, 2005a, Massey 
and Denton, 1988, Massey et al., 1996). 
In 1980, the segregation (in terms of evenness) between Cape Town’s three largest 
population groups was near perfect, with dissimilarity index results of between 88 and 91. 
Possible reasons that this was not 100 across the board is that the subplaces used in the 
census did not necessarily coincide perfectly with the borders between different Group Areas. 
Additionally, it is worth restating that the Abolition of Racially Based Land Measures Act (1991) 
indicated that there were amendments being made to the Group Areas Act (1966) has late as 
1984. 
As previously stated, one way to interpret these results are that the result of the 
dissimilarity index points to the proportion of the population in question that would need to be 
moved in order for the distribution across the city to be even. It is due to the technical limitations 
of the dissimilarity index involving extremely small population proportions that the results for 
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the Indian population are somewhat meaningless (Massey and Denton, 1988, Taeuber and 
Taeuber, 1976), in addition to the fact that when focusing on the occupational and demographic 
changes, the Indian/Asian population had very little impact on the overall changes in Cape 
Town. 
Based on the table 7.1 below, it is clear that there was minimal difference between the 
inter-group dissimilarity results in 1980, which is not surprising since, by that stage, virtually 
the entire area that makes up the present day City of Cape Town had been segregated by 
race.  
By 1996, even though Cape Town’s demographics had changed significantly, in both 
absolute and relative terms, it had a negligible impact on the inter-group dissimilarity results 
between Black Africans and other populations groups. This is not surprising, since the largest 
Black African and Coloured populations in the city at the time were found in the southeast and 
just the handful of neighbourhoods discussed earlier, were home to the majority of the city’s 
Black53 population. 
This limited change regarding residential segregation was not unique to the Cape Town 
context. As already discussed, between 1996 and 2001 Anthony Christopher discussed what 
he referred to as the “slow pace of desegregation” in the country’s cities (2005b: 2305). 
As previously discussed, much of the dominant literature on the changing geographies 
of cities at the very least mentions that those who are employed and perhaps upwardly mobile 
will leave the so-called ghettos, that were predominantly home to ethnic minorities, for the 
predominantly-White suburbs; I am using the North American terminology (Marcuse and Van 
Kempen, 2000b, Marcuse, 1997a, Wilson, 2012). Since these dissimilarity results include the 
large numbers of unemployed, as well as the low-income earning portion of the working 
                                                 
53 Comprising Black African, Coloureds and Indians/Asians. 
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population, focusing on the dissimilarity measures of those in middle-income and high-income 
occupations might indicate a move toward evenness, if this had occurred by 1996. The reason 
for this focus is two-fold. Firstly, one of the central foci of this project is to understand the spatial 
changes that took place as the city’s labour market was changing. Those high-income 
occupations are central to the professionalisation theory, in general, and in the Cape Town 
context the middle-income employment growth caught up with the high-income employment 
growth by 2011. And, secondly, the Cape Town literature discussed in this project has 
suggested that the professionalisation trend would lead to the Black54 middle class moving out 
of the townships and contribute, at the very least, to desegregation among those earning higher 
incomes. However, that will be done at a later stage.  
Working-age 
population
Black vs 
Coloured
Black vs 
White
White vs 
Coloured
1980 91 88 90
1996 89 89 79
2001 86 93 88
2011 80 81 80
 
Table 7.1: Dissimilarity Index between the three largest race groups (Black Africans, 
Coloureds and Whites), 1980-2011 
Source: Community Profiles Databases (see: Note 2) 
As already mentioned, this index has been subject to considerable critique, but one way 
that it has been understood is as a measure of just one dimension of segregation (Massey and 
Denton, 1988, Massey et al., 1996) and has been used extensively, including in south Africa 
(Christopher, 2005b, Christopher, 2005a, Parry and van Eeden, 2015). 
Reference has already been made to the work by Christopher (2005b, 2005a) that 
focused on towns and cities across South Africa between 1996 and 2001 and which refers to 
                                                 
54 Comprising Black African, Coloureds and Indians/Asians. 
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the slow pace of desegregation across the country. So, what about Cape Town in 2011? Was 
there evidence of an increased pace of desegregation? Table 7.1 indicates that, while there 
was some evidence of desegregation during the 1996-2011 period, the indices for the 
segregation between each of the three largest population groups remained extremely high. 
For example, between Coloureds and Whites, as well as between Coloureds and Black 
Africans, the result was 8055. On the other hand, between Black Africans and Whites the result 
was 81. 
This would suggest that, despite the considerable demographic changes, changes in the 
racial composition in the high-income and middle-income occupation, as well as movement of 
Black Africans and Coloureds into formerly Whites-only areas, very little change to city-level 
segregation measures can be found. 
Considering those demographic and labour market changes, this index was applied to 
those employed in certain occupational group, with particular attention paid to the those most 
affected by the professionalisation trend (i.e. high-income and middle-income non-manual 
occupations). 
7.1.2 Racial segregation among middle-income and high-income earners: 
From the findings discussed in chapter 4, it is evident that in the addition to employment 
growing in both high-income and middle-income non-manual occupations, Black Africans and 
Coloureds gradually started comprising a larger percentage of persons employed in those 
occupations. It was this, combined with evidence of some desegregation in some formerly 
Whites-only areas that contributed to the arguments that Cape Town would become divided 
between racial diverse middle-class neighbourhoods and more homogenous townships with 
high levels of unemployment (Crankshaw, 2012, Lemanski, 2007, Turok, 2001). 
                                                 
55 Out of a maximum of 100. 
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However, the findings and discussions in chapters 5 and 6 have shown that, while there 
has been some movement of the Black56 population away from formerly Blacks-only 
neighbourhoods there were still significant numbers of Blacks57 living in the formerly legislated 
Group Areas. Those findings also indicated that the spatial changes are more complex than a 
suburb-or-ghetto binary. Additionally, the dissimilarity results discussed in the previous section 
showed that the movements that have been seen have not had much impact on those results.  
However, a query that surfaced during these analyses was whether the apparent minimal 
impact on the dissimilarity measure could be due to large numbers of unemployed and/or low-
income earners in the Black African and Coloured populations. Consequently, the decision 
was made to focus the dissimilarity index on those in high-income and middle-income earners 
to determine the extent of the interracial desegregation (at least in terms of the evenness 
dimension) evident within those occupational groups. 
Due to the professionalisation trend previously identified (Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw, 
2009), as well as the extent of the deracialisation of those occupations (Crankshaw, 2012) and 
the evidence of Blacks58 moving into formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods, both of which are 
supported by the findings here it would be logical to expect lower dissimilarity results when 
focusing solely on those  employed in high-income occupations. Table 7.2 contains the 
interracial dissimilarity findings for the working-age population shown in table 7.1, as well as 
interracial dissimilarity results focused solely on those employed in high-income occupations. 
Before discussing these results, it is worth repeating that the evenness dimension of 
segregation can be understood as focusing on “differential distribution of two social groups 
among areal units in a city” (Massey and Denton, 1988: 283). On the other hand, Duncan and 
                                                 
56 Comprising Black African, Coloureds and Indians/Asians. 
57 Comprising Black African, Coloureds and Indians/Asians. 
58 Comprising Black African, Coloureds and Indians/Asians. 
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Duncan (1955) explained it as the average deviation of subplaces composition from the overall 
composition of the city as a whole. In other words, for the dissimilarity index between Black 
Africans and Coloureds in 2011 to be zero, then those groups would have had to be 39% and 
41%, respectively, of every single subplace across the city. This is because that was their 
relative contribution to the working-age population in Cape Town at the time. 
There are a number of points worth raising from the table below. Firstly, someone might 
wonder why the dissimilarity results for those in high-income occupations in 1980 would be 
higher than that for the total working-age population. Since there were considerably fewer 
Black Africans and Coloureds in high-income occupations back then, as well as the fact that 
they would likely have clustered in certain neighbourhoods, they would have been even less 
evenly distributed across the city’s subplaces that the working-age people in those groups. 
Nevertheless, when comparing the results for the working-age population and high-
income earners, it is apparent that there has been marginally more desegregation taking place 
among those with higher earnings. This would suggest that, at least to some extent, the idea 
that the upwardly mobile among so-called previously disadvantaged groups59 would move out 
of racially homogenous ghettos or townships to the formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods, 
whether the latter were the product of racist legislation or discrimination in the housing market 
(Crankshaw, 2012, Lemanski, 2007, Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000b, Turok, 2001, Wilson, 
2012). 
                                                 
59 This could refer to ethnic minorities and/or migrants in the USA and/or Europe, as well as Black Africans, 
Coloureds and Indians/Asians in the South African context. 
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Working-age 
population
Black vs 
Coloured
Black vs 
White
White vs 
Coloured
1980 91 88 90
1996 89 89 79
2001 86 93 88
2011 80 81 80
Highly-skilled high-
income occupations
Black vs 
Coloured
Black vs 
White
White vs 
Coloured
1980 95 92 93
1996 78 77 80
2001 74 77 82
2011 69 69 77  
Table 7.2: Dissimilarity Index between each of the three largest race groups among the 
working-age population and those employed in highly-skilled high-income occupations, 
1980-2011 
Source: Community Profiles Databases (see: Note 2) 
Nevertheless, since the dissimilarity index results have a range or 0-100, these results 
indicate that even when focusing solely on high-income earners, racial segregation remained 
high in 2011. That said, much of the literature discussed thus far have stated or implied that 
upward mobility would lead to desegregation and have suggested that the trajectory of change 
was that class differences, rather than race could become the main determinant of divisions 
within the city. After all, those who have worked on Cape Town pointed to a movement toward 
racial diverse middle-class suburbs and racially homogenous poor townships/ghettos 
(Crankshaw, 2012, Lemanski, 2007, Turok, 2001). On the other hand, while neither Wilson 
(1996, 2012), nor Marcuse and van Kempen (Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000b, Marcuse and 
Van Kempen, 2000a, Marcuse, 1997a), have claimed that race is no longer a factor, they have 
argued that change is being driven by class differences. Even when looking at the ideal types 
discussed in the literature here, many are primarily shaped or defined by class position. 
In addition to the persistent growth of employment in high-income occupations, the 
growth in middle-income non-manual accelerated in the 2001-11 period (see: table 4.5). 
 238 
 
Additionally, the findings in chapter 5 showed that there throughout the period of this study 
there was a growing number of mixed-class subplaces, many of which were home to a 
significant number of people from different races, as well as large numbers of middle-income 
earners. 
Since the findings in table 7.2 indicated that there was some desegregation among those 
in high-income occupations, the same question was applied to those in middle-income 
occupations. After all, while their choices regarding residential location choices would have 
been more limited than those in high-income occupations, allowance was made for the 
possibility that they could have been able to move out of the neighbourhoods with the highest 
levels of unemployment and/or poverty. 
Table 7.3 shows that interracial dissimilarity among those in middle-income occupations 
was only marginally lower than that for the entire working-age population. More specifically, 
the difference between the results for the working-age population and those in middle-income 
non-manual occupations was just two points, regardless of the groups included in the 
calculation.  
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Working-age 
population
Black vs 
Coloured
Black vs 
White
White vs 
Coloured
1980 91 88 90
1996 89 89 79
2001 86 93 88
2011 80 81 80
Semi-skilled middle-
income non-manual 
occupations
Black vs 
Coloured
Black vs 
White
White vs 
Coloured
1980 94 85 93
1996 88 87 79
2001 83 90 85
2011 78 79 78  
Table 7.3: Dissimilarity Index between each of the three largest race groups among the 
working-age population and those employed in semi-skilled middle-income non-manual 
occupations, 1980-2011 
Source: Community Profiles Databases (see: Note 2) 
7.2 Class segregation (evenness dimension): 
The discussion thus far in this chapter has focused primarily on racial segregation and 
desegregation, particularly in terms of the evenness dimension of segregation. That said, it 
has also focused on interracial segregation within occupational classes in order to determine 
whether there is evidence that people of the same occupational classes are less segregated. 
The evidence here would suggest that racial desegregation among those in middle-income 
non-manual occupations is marginal, at best60, but that there was evidence of slightly more 
desegregation among those in high-income occupations. 
However, another question was raised during the course of the analysis for two reasons, 
one empirical and the other theoretical. The question was: How does inter-class segregation 
                                                 
60 There was only a 2 point difference between the dissimilarity results for the entire working-age population and 
those in these middle-income occupations, with the latter being marginally less segregated. 
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compare to the results for interracial segregation? 
The first reason for this, which was empirically driven, was that the subplaces with the 
largest percentage of employed persons in high-income occupations had a very different 
geographical to those subplaces where unemployment rates were the highest. Secondly, while 
the mechanisms might differ between theorists, the idea that class is becoming the organising 
principle for cities has been raised numerous times here. One of the ways this is believed to 
come about is that even where certain racial or ethnic groups have been concentrated in 
certain parts of the city, those that are upwardly mobile are likely to leave the ghetto or township 
(Crankshaw, 2012, Lemanski, 2007, Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000b, Turok, 2001, Wilson, 
2012).  
Table 7.4 shows the dissimilarity between a number of grouped occupations, including 
the unemployed over the period 1980-2011. The reason for these groupings is that the 
professionalisation trend identified in Cape Town has been driven by employment growth in 
high-income occupations but has also seen considerable growth in middle-income non-manual 
occupations. Furthermore, the significance of the unemployed is based on Hamnett’s (1994, 
1996) theory that increased unemployment is one characteristics of a professionalising labour 
market. 
There are a number of points worth highlighting from this table regarding how workers in 
these various occupational groups, as well as the unemployed, have been distributed across 
the city. Firstly, the highest dissimilarity results are between the unemployed and those in high-
income occupations, although it is worth noting that there has been a marginal decreased over 
the period in question. From 68 in 1980, it fluctuated somewhat, before peaking at 69 in 2001 
and later dropping to 60 in 2011. While this still points to a considerable degree of segregation, 
the drop can be explained by the deracialisation of high-income occupations, combined with 
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the numbers of Blacks61 in high-income occupations who were still resident in the formerly 
Black Africans-only or formerly Coloureds-only areas. 
Secondly, the findings suggest that those employed in middle-income non-manual 
occupations are likely the most evenly distributed across the city, because the dissimilarity 
results between those occupations and a number of other have consistently been among the 
lowest, with the unemployed being an exception. For example, between these workers and 
those in high-income occupations, the results went from a high of 30 in 1980 to 26 in 2011, 
whereas with those in middle-income manual occupations it moved from 35 to 20. 
Thirdly, across all, but one, of these relationships the results point to inter-class 
desegregation. As already mentioned, much of the literature discussed here suggests that 
greater spatial differentiation across class lines is what is expected in post-Fordist cities. The 
simple example is the move of upwardly mobile people from the ghettos to the suburbs (in the 
USA vernacular), with those with higher incomes and/or greater wealth isolated themselves in 
citadels or fortified enclaves (Kasarda, 1989, Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000b, Marcuse, 
1997a, Wilson, 2012). 
                                                 
61 Comprising Black African, Coloureds and Indians/Asians. 
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Group 1 Group 2
Unemployed
Highly-Skilled High-Income 
occupations 
68 64 69 60
Unemployed
Semi-Skilled Middle-Income Non-
Manual occupations
48 48 49 38
Unemployed
Semi-Skilled Middle-Income 
Manual occupations
24 31 35 25
Highly-Skilled High-Income 
occupations 
Semi-Skilled Middle-Income Non-
Manual occupations
30 26 29 26
Highly-Skilled High-Income 
occupations 
Semi-Skilled Middle-Income 
Manual occupations
58 49 53 43
Semi-Skilled Middle-Income Non-
Manual occupations
Semi-Skilled Middle-Income 
Manual occupations
35 29 29 20
Results of Dissimilarity Index between Grouped 
Occupations
20111980 1996 2001
 
Table 7.4: Dissimilarity between major occupation groups, including the Unemployed, 2011 
Source: Community Profiles Databases (see: Note 2) 
While there might be small-scale examples of this kind of class-based separation into 
different quarters, these city-level figures suggest that the dominant trend, however marginal 
the changes might be, is toward greater desegregation in class terms. Logically, these results 
should not be surprising considering the discussions on mixed-class and high-unemployment 
subplaces, including the diversity of occupations in the former and the large numbers of middle-
income and high-income earners still found in the latter. 
The most noteworthy finding is only observable when comparing these results with those 
in table 7.2. That table presented the interracial dissimilarity results for the period 1980-2011, 
by first presenting the results for the working-age population and then the results for just those 
in high-income occupations. The reason for pointing to revisiting the interracial dissimilarity 
results in table 7.2 when discussing the inter-class dissimilarity results in table 7.4 is that the 
interracial results, even when focusing solely on high-income earners were higher than the 
 243 
 
results for dissimilarity between the unemployed and high-income earners. This would indicate 
that racial segregation, even just among high income earners, was greater than that between 
high income earners and the unemployed. 
7.3 Potential Residential Isolation or Exposure to other Races and/or 
Occupations: 
7.3.1 Interracial Isolation-Exposure: 
At this stage the only segregation measure that has been discussed is the much 
critiqued, yet ubiquitous, dissimilarity index. However, that has only focused on one of “The 
Dimensions of Residential Segregation” (i.e. evenness) discussed in that article by Massey 
and Denton (1988). Another dimension they identified was referred to as exposure, which 
could be contrasted with isolation. According to Massey and Denton (1988: 287), the exposure 
dimension “refers to the degree of potential contact, or the possibility of interaction” between 
people of different groups within certain geographic areas of a city. 
The decision to focus solely on these two dimensions of segregation is supported by the 
work of Reardon and O’Sullivan (2004). In an article focused on residential segregation in 
Cape Town and Johannesburg, Parry and van Eeden (2015) cite the aforementioned article 
when they explain that Reardon and O’Sullivan (2004) explained that whereas Massey and 
Denton (1988) identified five dimensions of segregation, they can arguably be collapsed into 
just these two dimensions. 
Rather than focusing on the question of the evenness of the distribution of different 
groups, this index, which also has a range of 0-100%, can be understood as the measure of 
the probability that someone in group α might interact with someone in group β in their 
residential geographical area, which is the exposure measure, compared to the probability that 
someone in group α might interact with someone in the same group, which is the isolation 
measure (Massey and Denton, 1988, Reardon and O’Sullivan, 2004, Stearns and Logan, 
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1986). 
Table 7.5 shows the results of the isolation-exposure measure for interracial contact in 
2011. Keeping in mind that, as shown in table 7.1, that the interracial dissimilarity between 
Black Africans, Coloureds and Whites fell in a very narrow range of 80-81. However, the range 
of isolation results was slightly greater. More specifically, when focusing on the entire working-
age population, the probability that a Black African, Coloured or White person would encounter 
someone of the same race in their residential subplace was 80%, 79% and 67%, respectively. 
 
Isolation-Exposure 
measure for inter-
racial contact, 2011
Black 
African
Coloured
Indian/ 
Asian
White Other Total
Black African 80% 12% 1% 5% 2% 100%
Coloured 12% 79% 1% 6% 2% 100%
White 13% 15% 2% 67% 2% 100%
 
Table 7.5: Isolation-Exposure Index between Cape Town’s various largest racial groups 
(Working-Age Population only), 2011 
Source: Community Profiles Databases (see: Note 2) 
One way to understand this is that, as Crankshaw (2012) explained, there has been a 
gradual move of Black Africans and Coloureds into formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods, as 
well as Black Africans into formerly Coloureds-only neighbourhoods, but no evidence of the 
opposite happening. Furthermore, this point is also one that Christopher (2005b, 2005a) 
discussed in his work on towns and cities across South Africa.  
So, whereas there might have been an extremely uneven distribution of each of these 
groups across the City of Cape Town, as demonstrated by the dissimilarity indices, this limited 
desegregation of predominantly-White neighbourhoods means that they are, on average, more 
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likely than the average Black African or Coloured person to encounter someone of a difference 
race in their neighbourhoods. After all, these findings further seem to concur with the finding 
that 95% of Black Africans and 95% of Coloureds lived in majority-Black subplaces, whereas 
81% of Whites lives in majority-White subplaces. 
7.3.2 Class segregation or desegregation: 
7.3.2.1 Interclass Isolation-Exposure using Unemployment and Occupational class: 
In his discussion of the changes to central-city ghettos in the USA, Wilson (2009, 2012) 
explains that one of the consequences of the exodus of upwardly-mobile minorities from the 
ghettos is that those who remain there are increasingly subject to what he refers to as social 
isolation, which he describes as limited exposure to continuously employed individuals and/or 
social networks that could aid in finding employment a similar dynamic, using different 
terminology is discussed by the work of Kasinitz and Rosenberg (1996), where they discuss 
the lack of what Bourdieu referred to as “social capital”, as well as the so-called excluded or 
outcast ghettos discussed by Marcuse and Van Kempen (Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000b, 
Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000a, Marcuse, 1997a). 
Regarding the relevance and contributions of these calculations, the mechanics of this 
index, the fact that the sum of the probability of isolation and the probability of exposure is 
100%, it allows for the possibility that the exposure can be broken down into its constituent 
components by race and/or class (Massey and Denton, 1988, Reardon and O’Sullivan, 2004, 
Stearns and Logan, 1986). 
As with previous findings presented here, the findings presented in table 7.6 are shaped 
by the categories that are central to the professionalisation theory, namely highly-skilled high-
income occupations and the unemployed (Hamnett, 1994, Hamnett, 1996). However, since 
the findings on cape town showed that there was significant growth in middle-income non-
manual occupations, particularly in the 2001-11 period, that group of occupations was included 
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in the analyses to follow.  
Not surprisingly, based on the maps presented in chapter 5, when someone in a high-
income occupation encounters another working-age person in their residential subplace, they 
have a 25% chance of encountering someone in a similar occupation and a 17% chance of 
encountering someone in a middle-income non-manual occupation. In contrast to this, they 
have just a 1 in 11 chance (9%) of encountering an unemployed person.62  
However, when focusing on the unemployed population a very different pattern emerges. 
Unemployed persons in Cape Town, in 2011, had a 21% chance of encountering another 
unemployed person in their neighbourhood. To put this in perspective, this means that, on 
average, when an unemployed person in interacted with people in their residential subplace, 
approximately every fifth person they encountered was also jobless and searching for 
employment. On the hand, the probability of exposure to someone in a middle-income or high-
income occupation was just 14% and 8% respectively.  
Exposure-Isolation measures between 
occupations, 2011
Highly-skilled 
high-income
Semi-skilled 
middle-income 
non-manual
Unemployed
Highly-skilled high-income 25% 17% 8%
Semi-skilled middle-income non-manual 18% 17% 14%
Semi-skilled middle-income manual 9% 9% 9%
Unskilled low-income manual 8% 10% 13%
Unemployed 9% 13% 21%
Not Economically Active 31% 33% 35%
100% 100% 100%  
Table 7.6: Inter-class Isolation-Exposure measures, 2011 
Source: Community Profiles Databases (see: Note 2) 
                                                 
62 At this point, it is worth reiterating that because of the diverse composition of the ‘not economically active’ 
(NEA) category, it will not be discussed in detail. However, it is worth noting that there is just a 4% range in the 
differences in potential exposure to the NEA. 
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Throughout this project the findings presented have indicated that, even when people 
were in similar occupations or had the same level of education, people of different races faced 
different unemployment rates and/or access to residential locations. Consequently, the 
question of whether these class isolation-exposure measures were consistent between 
different races, was one that could not be avoided.  
7.3.2.2 Interracial Isolation-Exposure by Occupational Class: 
The GIS maps presented so far, as well as the dissimilarity and isolation-exposure 
calculations have shown that Cape Town remained significantly divided along racial lines in 
2011. Therefore, it was posited that disaggregating the occupational data by race in order to 
explore the possibility of differences in interracial isolation/exposure results for difference 
occupational classes might add to the picture that was developing of the City of Cape Town in 
2011. 
In this section, the emphasis will be on certain portions of the economically active 
population, with particular attention to the same categories discussed in the previous section, 
because of the focus on the professionalisation trend that was identified.  
As previously discussed, despite the deracialisation of the job market, Black Africans 
and Coloureds were to different degrees underrepresented among high-income occupations, 
yet somewhat overrepresented among the less skilled occupations and the unemployed. 
Furthermore, maps showing the spatial distribution of racial groups and occupational 
categories indicated that there had been limited movement by Black Africans into the city’s 
formerly Coloureds-only and Whites-only neighbourhoods. This trend confirms what 
Crankshaw (2012) and Graham (2007) discussed with regards to the City of Cape Town and 
what Christopher (2005b, 2005a) found at a national level. 
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Table 7.7 presents the results of interracial isolation-exposure calculations, but unlike 
table 7.5, it differentiates between the potential interracial exposure for people in high-income 
and middle-income occupations, as well as the unemployed. The first point worth noting is that, 
among both occupational groups and the unemployed, racial isolation is more likely that 
exposure to other races. While the probability of racial isolation might differ depending on the 
race and occupational class, from 60% to 88%, these results indicate that racial isolation, not 
interracial exposure, was more likely at various levels of Cape Town’s class structure in 2011. 
Black 
African
Coloured White
Black 
African
Coloured White
Black 
African
Coloured White
Black African 60% 11% 12% 76% 11% 12% 88% 13% 14%
Coloured 19% 73% 13% 14% 78% 15% 9% 81% 18%
Indian/ Asian 1% 2% 2% 1% 2% 2% 0% 1% 2%
White 17% 12% 70% 7% 8% 69% 2% 3% 65%
Other 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2%
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Exposure-
Isolation 
measures
Highly-skilled high-
income occupations
Semi-skilled middle-
income non-manual 
occupations
Unemployed
 
Table 7.7: Interracial isolation-exposure by occupational class, 2011 
Source: Community Profiles Databases (see: Note 2) 
The fact that the difference between the racial isolation of the unemployed compared to 
those in Managerial and Professional occupations is greater among the Black African than the 
Coloured population could be explained by the fact that previous research on Cape Town 
(Crankshaw, 2012, Graham, 2007) and South Africa (Christopher, 2005b, Christopher, 2005a), 
as well as the maps in Chapter 5, show that, while the movement of the upwardly mobile 
population has been in one direction, from formerly Black Africans-only to formerly Coloureds-
only and then to formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods, it makes sense that the racial exposure 
is marginally better among the Black Africans in these occupational classes.   
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Firstly, whereas the unemployed portions of the Black Africans and Coloured populations 
were more racially isolated than those employed in high-income and middle-income 
occupations, among the White population the unemployed are marginally less isolated than 
the aforementioned occupational categories. Considering the aforementioned movement from 
formerly Black Africans-only to formerly Coloureds-only neighbourhoods, and then to formerly 
Whites-only neighbourhoods, it makes sense that more upwardly mobile Black Africans and 
Coloureds will be able to move to more affluent neighbourhoods. While no property valuation 
data is available here, this resonates with a similar finding discussed by Crankshaw (2008) on 
Johannesburg, where upwardly mobile Black Africans and Coloureds were moving in greater 
numbers to formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods that were previously predominantly working-
class neighbourhoods.  
Secondly, based on these findings, it would appear that Coloureds experience greater 
racial isolation than Whites, regardless of the occupational class discussed here. On the other 
hand, only those Black Africans in high-income occupations are less racially isolated than any 
of the portions of the White population discussed here. That said, according to the data 
depicted in Figure 4.11, Black Africans accounted for just 17% of those employed in high-
income occupations. 
7.3.2.3 Interclass Isolation-Exposure, by Race: 
The notions of social isolation (Kasinitz and Rosenberg, 1996, Wilson, 2012, Wilson, 
2009) and the context in which it is likely to be experience, that is the excluded or outcast 
ghetto (Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000b, Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000a, Marcuse, 
1997a) are both associated with being cut off from so-called mainstream networks, which can 
be understood as the types of networks that can lead to employment or perhaps more positive 
aspirations. Additionally, since there is significant evidence that the City of Cape Town was 
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still significantly segregated along racial lines with unemployment concentrated in formerly 
Coloureds-only and formerly Black Africans-only neighbourhoods, the questions of exposure 
to people of different occupational classes could shape people’s aspirations and/or access to 
information about employment opportunities for those groups (Kasarda, 1989, Kasinitz and 
Rosenberg, 1996, Solomon, 2013, Wilson, 2012).  
While the figures in the previous section focused on racial isolation, that in and of itself 
does not necessarily indicate that someone is cut off from networks that could connect people 
to mainstream institutions and job opportunities. Therefore, the findings presented in this 
section go beyond that racial focus, to focus on potential isolation or exposure to people of 
different occupational classes, but also incorporating race as a factor.  Previously discussed 
findings have already shown that the Black African and Coloured populations have the highest 
rates of unemployment, so understanding the potential exposure for those groups to people of 
various occupational classes was of particular interest here.  
Table 7.8 builds on the results in table 7.6, with the aim of interrogating whether there 
are differences between the potential inter-class exposure of people in the same occupations, 
but of different races.  
Firstly, it is worth focusing on the findings regarding exposure to unemployed persons of 
any race. On average, unemployed Black Africans in 2011 had a 1 in 4 (25%) chance of 
encountering an unemployed person in their neighbourhood, whereas for unemployed 
Coloureds and Whites the chances were approximately 1 in 6 (17%) and 1 in 20 (5%), 
respectively63. Before looking any further, this already presents the stark contrasts between 
the kinds of social environments in which unemployed persons of different races live, as well 
as the potential limits that could place on their access to employment networks.  
                                                 
63 It is also worth keeping in mind that this takes all working-age persons into account and not just those who are 
economically active. 
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Furthermore, when one considers the considerable growth in high-income and middle-
income occupations in Cape Town, including the effect that has had on the occupational 
distribution of the job market, it could be of potential benefit to have access to networks that 
include people in those occupations. After all, Wilson (2012) argued that in ghetto contexts 
that have seen a mass exodus of employed and/or upwardly mobile people the lack of 
sustained interaction with regular employed people has the potential to contribute to generating 
behaviour that is contrary to workplace expectations, in addition to the poor access to 
employment networks and limited career or educational aspirations. He includes the important 
of routine and being on time, as opposed to tardiness and/or absenteeism.  
That said, exposure to people in those occupations for unemployed people in Cape Town 
also differed greatly by race. The results presented in table 7.6 showed that, on average, 
employed people had an 8% chance of encountering someone in a high-income occupation 
and a 14% chance of encountering a middle-income earner in their residential subplace. This 
amounts to a 22% (around 1 in 5) chance of encountering someone in one of those 
occupations. However, when differentiating between the three races in question, there is a 
34% difference in the results for Black Africans and Whites, with Coloureds slightly above the 
results for the former. More specifically, unemployed Whites, on average, had a 31% chance 
of encountering someone in a high-income occupation in their residential subplaces and a 21% 
chance of encountering someone in a middle-income occupation. Just those results are worth 
noting, because it suggests that unemployed Whites were more likely to encounter someone 
in a high-skilled high-income occupation, than someone in a middle-income non-manual 
occupation. While he was writing about a very different context, these findings concur with the 
work of Wilson (2012: loc 1083), particular when he says:  
“… simple comparisons between poor whites and poor blacks would be 
confounded with the fact that poor whites reside in areas which are 
ecologically and economically very different from poor blacks.” 
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Black 
African
Coloured White
Black 
African
Coloured White
Black 
African
Coloured White
Highly-skilled high-
income
15% 18% 35% 9% 15% 33% 5% 10% 31%
Semi-skilled middle-
income non-manual
16% 18% 20% 14% 17% 21% 13% 14% 21%
Semi-skilled middle-
income manual
8% 10% 9% 9% 10% 9% 9% 10% 9%
Unskilled low-income 12% 8% 6% 14% 9% 6% 16% 10% 6%
Other 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 0% 0% 1%
Unemployed 16% 11% 4% 21% 12% 4% 25% 17% 5%
Not Economically Active 32% 35% 27% 32% 37% 26% 32% 39% 27%
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Exposure-Isolation 
measures between 
selected occupation 
groups
Highly-skilled high-
income occupations
Semi-skilled middle-
income non-manual 
occupations
Unemployed
 
Table 7.8: Inter-class Isolation-Exposure measures by race, 2011 
Source: Community Profiles Databases (see: Note 2) 
And when shifting the focus to unemployed Black Africans and Coloureds, the results 
are considerably different. For example, at the other end of the scale, when one considers the 
chances that an unemployed Black African person in Cape Town would encounter someone 
in either of these occupational groups, it amounts to just 18% (i.e. 5% for high-income exposure 
plus 13% for middle-income non-manual exposure).in fact, the potential for inter-class 
exposure for unemployed Black Africans in Cape Town in 2011 was so poor that they only had 
a 43% chance (i.e. less than 1 in 2) of encountering any employed person in any occupation 
in their residential subplace.  
While the literature discussed here, on the changing ghettos and other impoverished 
contexts (Kasarda, 1989, Kasarda, 1993, Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000b, Marcuse and 
Van Kempen, 2000a, Marcuse, 1997a, Wilson, 2012), has focused more on the potential 
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negative impact of poor employment network access for the unemployed, discussing those in 
other occupations does reveal something about the types of contexts people of different races 
are living in.  
For example, although there has been considerable evidence presented here that, even 
in high-unemployment subplaces in formerly Black Africans-only or formerly Coloureds-only 
areas, there were an unexpected number of people resident there who were employed in high-
income occupations. Nevertheless, two other points worth raising here is that, firstly, both 
Black Africans (at 15%) and Coloureds (at 18%) in high-income occupations were less likely 
to encounter another high-income earner than unemployed Whites (31%) were. Similarly, both 
of those sub-groups were also more likely to encounter an unemployed person (i.e. 16% and 
11% respectively), than unemployed Whites were (5%). 
Whereas the earlier quote from Wilson (2012: loc 1083) was focused on “poor blacks 
[sic]” and “poor whites [sic]” in the urban USA, these results would suggest that even 
unemployed Whites lived in neighbourhoods that were “ecologically and economically very 
different” from those where many high-income earning Black Africans and Coloureds were 
living in 2011. These findings certain are counterintuitive, especially considering some of the 
dominant theories and arguments in urban studies, but this would suggest that we still have 
lots more to learn about the seemingly paradoxical characteristics of the geographical 
distribution of Cape Town’s population.  
7.4 Conclusion: 
As previously mentioned, high unemployment and racial isolation might lead some to 
conclude that some areas are starting to resemble so-called excluded ghettos, but other 
analyses that are still to be discussed point to a more paradoxical conclusion about formerly 
Blacks-only neighbourhoods. That said, there are two points worth emphasising from this 
chapter.  
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Firstly, based on these findings, Cape Town has continued to be starkly segregated 
along racial lines, both in terms of the evenness and exposure dimensions of segregation. 
Previous work on Cape Town (Crankshaw, 2012) and the findings in this project have indicated 
that there has been some racial desegregation, especially in the former Whites-only 
neighbourhoods. However, the growth of the Black African and Coloured populations, as well 
as their concentration on the Cape Flats, meant that the aforementioned localised 
desegregation had very little impact on the city-level segregation results. 
Secondly, the previous chapters showed that those employed in high-income 
occupations could be found across different parts of the city in different types of subplaces, 
including both formerly Whites-only and formerly Blacks-only neighbourhoods. Considering the 
literature on how the upwardly mobile in cities in the USA tend to leave the ghettos for the 
suburbs, finding high income earners across all parts of the city is an unexpected finding. The 
lack of geographical mobility in conjunction with the upwardly mobility meant that, although 
there was some segregation between people of different occupational classes and the 
unemployment, it was not as high as the results for interracial segregation.  
Lastly, Wilson (2012) argued that the context in which poor Whites and poor Blacks find 
themselves are considerably different in cities in the USA. He goes on to say that the latter are 
more likely to experience isolation from that exposure to what he refers to as mainstream 
institutions and related networks (e.g. potential employment networks). That idea certainly 
resonates with the findings regarding inter-class exposure, because regardless of the 
occupational class or employment status, Black Africans and Coloureds have consistently 
been less likely to encounter someone in a high-income occupation. Furthermore, for 
unemployed Black Africans and Coloureds, their chances of being able to access employment 
networks and/or opportunities in their neighbourhoods are significantly lower than that for 
unemployed Whites. 
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8 DISCUSSION: 
A combination of different methods has been used together in this project, with the aim 
of developing a better understanding of the changing relationship between race, space and 
class in Cape Town between 1980 and 2011. 
8.1 Polarised Labour market, professionalised job market: 
The starting point for this project was to engage with the debate between the proponents 
of the social polarisation and professionalisation theories, with a focus on building on the work 
of Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw (2009), as well as (Crankshaw, 2012), who determined that 
Cape Town’s labour market had undergone professionalisation. Since the latter project did not 
incorporate data from the 2011 census, that was central to chapter 4. 
That said, the findings from the 2011 census indicated that the growth of employment in 
high-income occupations has continued and actually accelerated in the decade leading up to 
2011. Whereas 120,894 jobs in these occupations were added between 1980 and 2001, an 
additional 134,205 were added in just the following ten years. Nevertheless, employment 
growth in middle-income non-manual occupations exceeded that in the 2001-11 period to the 
extent that in terms of numbers of jobs added during the 31-year period in question, marginally 
more jobs were added to these middle-income occupations. Nevertheless, the pattern seen 
here was still more reminiscent professionalisation, albeit somewhat tiered, for the following 
reasons. 
Firstly, as already stated, employment growth in high-income occupations accelerated 
during the 2001-11 period. Secondly, while the combination of middle-income manual and non-
manual employment points to an expanding middle-income, the educational requirements of 
the non-manual occupations particularly in terms of literacy and numeracy skills, appear to 
contribute to the on-going improvements in the educational profile of the labour force. Thirdly, 
rather than polarisation within the job market, the persistently high unemployment rates point 
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to a polarising effect in the labour market – more specially, between those who are employed 
and the rest of the labour market, consisting of the unemployed and those who are not 
economically active. 
Nevertheless, the considerable growth of middle-income non-manual employment is 
something that will be worth watching in years to come, especially if it continues to expand as 
it has.  
8.2 Persistent racial inequality in the labour market: 
In addition to getting a better understanding of the structure and occupational distribution 
of the labour market, it was essential to understand who was benefiting from these changes. 
After all, Lemanski (2007) argued that it was primarily the White population who was benefiting 
from the labour market changes in Cape Town, yet Crankshaw (2012) demonstrated that Black 
Africans and Coloureds had made considerable gains in both middle-income non-manual and 
high-income occupations. He also briefly mentioned that these latter groups experienced high 
levels of unemployment. 
Over the course of this project, there were numerous paradoxical and/or counterintuitive 
findings and the answer to this issue was one of those. On the one hand, Black African and 
Coloured employment in both middle-income non-manual and high-income occupations grew 
throughout the period in question. And yet, those groups not only remained under-represented 
in both of those categories (when compared to the racial composition of the labour market as 
a whole), but they also continued to experience higher unemployment rates than their White 
counterparts. 
Furthermore, these differences in unemployment rates were not merely the product of 
differences in educational attainment, because differences of varying degrees were evident at 
all levels of education. This would indicate that there is a factor, beyond educational attainment, 
that is shaping the labour market successes of people from different races. Hypothesising 
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about possible causes is beyond the scope of this particular project, or the kind of data 
available through the census, but it is a worthy focus for future research. 
8.3 Continuing racial segregation: 
The issues of segregation and spatial analysis took this project beyond what is typically 
considered sociological research, into the realm of geographical work. Nevertheless, question 
of spatial inequality have been the focus of numerous sociologists (for example: Crankshaw, 
2008, Crankshaw, 2012) and other social scientists (for example: Sinclair-Smith and Turok, 
2012, Turok, 2001), apart from geographers. That said, the most salient finding regarding the 
spatial work was that Cape Town has remained a starkly racially segregated city.  
Many Whites have continued to live in formerly Whites-only, with minimal desegregation 
of those areas, and Black Africans and Coloureds have continued to predominate the city’s 
formerly Blacks-only neighbourhoods. 
With regard to the two dimensions of segregation discussed in this project, the 
distribution of different racial groups (even within occupational classes) across the city was 
considerably more uneven than the distribution of various occupational classes and/or the 
unemployment. For example, when using the dissimilarity index to measure the evenness 
dimension of segregation, the evidence pointed to greater interracial segregation among those 
employed in high-income occupations, than the segregation between the unemployed and 
those in high-income occupations.  
Finally, the exposure dimension of segregation was useful to determine the chances that 
someone might encounter someone of the same/different race and/or occupational class in 
their residential subplaces. It was particularly useful because the mechanics of the formula 
measures phenomena that are distinct from, albeit related to that of the dissimilarity index. 
While all three racial groups discussed were, on average, more likely to experience racial 
isolation that exposure (regardless of occupational class), the findings on class exposure was 
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particularly enlightening. Wilson (2012) argued that, in the USA, poor Whites live in 
considerably different contexts, socially and ecologically, than poor Blacks. And, the findings 
on Cape Town concur with that sentiment. In fact, the differences in contexts between the 
races, for people of all occupational classes, was so different that the evidence would suggest 
that unemployed Whites in 2011 were, on average, more likely than high income earning Black 
Africans or Coloureds, to encounter someone employed in a high-income occupation in their 
neighbourhood.  
8.4 Conclusion: 
As previously stated, the findings contained in this project were a collection of both 
predictable and counterintuitive results. For example, it was not surprising that Black Africans 
and Coloureds experienced higher levels of unemployment, yet it was a particularly thought-
provoking finding that this was evident at various levels of education. 
As has been the case throughout this project, the concluding statement of this thesis 
also has a paradoxical element. The evidence presented here indicates that, over the course 
of the 1980-2011 period, Black Africans and Coloureds have made considerable gains in 
middle-income and high-income occupations and this has allowed some to move into formerly 
Whites-only neighbourhoods. However, the evidence indicates that 17 years into the post-
apartheid era, Cape Town was still a starkly segregated city, with further evidence point to 
persistent racial inequalities in the labour market.  
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NOTES:  
1. Population censuses: This project made use of population census data in the form 
of SPSS datasets for some analysis. The 1980 data included a full-count, but later 
datasets only included a 10% sample. Consequently, for the subplace-level analysis it 
was necessary to make use of the ‘Community Profile Databases’. 
2. Community Profile Databases: These databases were accessible using the 
SuperCROSS and SuperTABLE software. It allowed for subplace-level analysis, as 
well as the possibility of disaggregating the data by different variables, such as race, 
employment status or age.  
3. GIS Shapefiles: The GIS shapefile that corresponded with the Community Profile 
Databases were available for the 1996, 2001 and 2011 censuses. While shapefiles for 
the 1980 were not available, Google Maps was used to determine the location and 
shape of various neighbourhoods named in that dataset, in order to ensure that the 
correct 1980 subplaces corresponded with the 1996 shapefiles. Where necessary, the 
data for multiple 1980 subplaces were combined when necessary to fit a subplace in 
the 1996 shapefiles.   
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